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Abstract
DEATH PRIMING IN INVESTIGATIONS: THE EFFECTS ON WORLDVIEW THREAT,
OUT-GROUP DEROGATION, AND STEREOTYPING
by
Laure Brimbal

Advisor: Professor Maria Hartwig, Ph.D.
Terror Management Theory (TMT) hypothesizes that thinking about one’s own death
creates a need to boost our worldview and our self-esteem in order to cope with this existential
threat. Decades of research support the theory’s premises with findings in many different settings
(Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010). The purpose of this dissertation is to extend the findings of
TMT to research on decision making in investigations. In two studies, I evaluated how thinking
about one’s death (Mortality Salience, MS) affected mock investigators’ reactions to the
outcome of a case they investigated and their perceptions of a suspect, depending on their group
memberships. In Study 1, participants (n = 299) were either death primed or not and asked to
provide their assessment of a case as a police investigator. They were then told of the outcome of
the case in court (either fair or unfair), asked how they felt about it. They were also asked how
they would investigate a similar case in the future to assess for the impact of outcome on
motivational bias. Results showed only an effect for outcome, where participants reacted more
positively (and less negatively) to the fair outcome then the unfair outcome. Participants also
showed a tendency to generally seek out more information in the unfair outcome condition;
however, there was no sign of increased confirmation bias. In Study 2 (n = 403), I either primed
participants with MS or not and manipulated what role they took on to investigate the case
iv

(police investigator or journalist), and the race of the suspect (either in-group or out-group
member of different races (Black, Hispanic, or White) depending on their own). I then asked
participants to provide their assessment of the suspect’s culpability and their overall impressions
of him. Results showed that, contrary to predictions, MS decreased mock police investigators’
probability of guilt judgments as compared to those taking on the role of a journalist and those
not death primed. There was also no clear evidence of increased stereotype use under MS.
Results were discussed; limitations and avenues for future research were proposed.
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Chapter 1: Purpose
Television crime dramas have popularized the cliché of law enforcement officers being
motivated to bring a criminal to justice after the death of one of their own. Although fictional,
this example raises the question of how experiencing death can affect our thoughts in ways that
are more subtle than this obvious reaction of outrage. Specifically, how does contemplating our
own death impact our decision making processes? The purpose of this dissertation is to answer
this question in the context of police investigations with mock police investigators assessing
evidence from a case while under the influence of Mortality Salience (i.e., having thoughts of
death accessible in their mind). I focused on how death priming (i.e., Mortality Salience; MS)
affects specific factors that could have biasing effects in an investigation. In Study 1, I examined
how MS affected investigators’ reactions to a fair or unfair outcome in a case they investigated
and how this affected their decision making in future investigations. In this study, I measured
affective responses to verdict and perceived utility of pursuing different types of incriminating,
exonerating and neutral lines of investigation in future cases. In Study 2, I evaluated how MS
affected impressions and judgments of out-group members (racial and professional) and the use
of stereotypes. Of interest for this study was how participants might view a suspect of their racial
out-group, especially if they were told that their personality matched that of a police investigator
vs. that of a journalist. Also of interest for this study was how MS might increase the use of the
“Black criminal” stereotype. The overarching goal of this body of research was to apply decades
of research on Terror Management Theory (TMT; Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Greenberg,
Solomon, & Arndt, 2008) to law enforcement investigations, a field where thoughts of death are
prevalent and could have very real and serious consequences.
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Chapter 2: Terror Management Theory – An Overview
Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1986;
Greenberg et al., 1990; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997; Rosenblatt, Greenberg,
Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989) proposes an answer to the general question of how death
unconsciously affects thought processes. TMT is based on the idea that, as humans, we are
mortal. Further, but more uniquely, as humans, we are aware of this inevitability. Being
programmed with a survival instinct as most other animals are (Becker, 1973), this awareness of
an inescapable fate brings us anxiety that we are eager to suppress however we can (Greenberg,
Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Greenberg et al., 2008).
Knowing that death is certain but wanting to survive necessitates that we have cognitive
mechanisms to protect ourselves from this realization. TMT posits that when thoughts of death
are present, we react in certain ways to bolster our cultural worldview and self-esteem
(Greenberg et al., 1993; Landau, Greenberg, Sullivan, Routledge, & Arndt, 2009; Pyszczynski,
Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). Our cultural worldview –the values that our ingroups hold dear, justifies our existence by providing a purpose and explanation for this
existence (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2008; Hohman & Hogg, 2015a). Complimentarily, our selfesteem gives us reason to believe we are fulfilling our role within this cultural worldview
(Greenberg, 2008). These two factors protect us from thoughts of death by providing us with the
symbolic immortality of being a useful member to a group that will survive our own death
(Dechesne et al., 2003). These two factors are important postulates of TMT because they explain
why thinking of death can result in particular responses. Relevant to this dissertation are findings
that thinking about one’s death increases negative reactions in response to worldview violations
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and derogation of out-group members (Pyszczynski et al., 2004) – the complete rationale for
these effects will be discussed in more detail below.
Terror Management Theory – The Underlying Mechanisms
Although an increase in negative reactions to worldview violations and derogation of outgroup members might seem illogical on the surface, decades of research support these findings.
Nonetheless, over the years, researchers have also observed that thinking about one’s death does
not always provoke these reactions. Researchers exploring the underlying mechanisms of TMT
developed a dual-defense model (for review, see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999)
wherein under certain circumstances we cope with explicit thoughts of death with proximal
defense mechanisms (i.e., defense mechanisms that seek to minimize threat) that result in more
“rational” ways of coping. These processes include suppressing thoughts of death and denying
our own vulnerabilities (Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000) and are used
when thoughts of death are consciously accessed and being paid attention to. When asked to
think about our death, we normally engage in proximal defenses until thoughts of death become
suppressed. And, once thoughts of death are not the focal point of our attention anymore (but still
easily accessible in our minds), we engage in distal defense mechanism (i.e., symbolic cultural
worldview defense; Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997). These distal defense
mechanisms are the main focus of TMT and this dissertation.
The dual process model has found support in research showing that the distal effects of
death priming are stronger when there is a delay after explicit death priming (e.g., having people
write about their own death). Indeed, people do not show the distal effects when measurement
immediately follows death priming (e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus,
1994). Furthermore, when cognitive load is imposed, people show the distal effects of death
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priming (e.g., increased worldview defense, increased pro-American bias in American students)
even without the delay that is typically observed in TMT research (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon,
Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997). Cognitive load increases distal defenses because thought
suppression is a cognitively costly activity that cannot be constantly maintained. Under normal
circumstances, a person can distract themselves from thoughts of death for a certain period of
time, but eventually thoughts will become accessible again. If, for example, one rehearses a
certain number over and over again after thinking about death, this should impair thought
suppression activities and thoughts of death should be accessible without delay (Wegner, 1994).
Further supporting this dual process model is the finding that subliminal death primes (e.g.,
flashing the word death in front of people, priming death without their awareness) increases
worldview defense and Death Thought Accessibility (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, et al.,
1997).
The Role of Death Thought Accessibility (DTA)
Originally, TMT posited that the terror that MS creates in us should manifest as death
anxiety and thus could be measured by people’s affective responses after being death primed.
However, research on MS has almost always failed to produce differences in affect in response
to thinking about one’s own death (for one exception, see Arndt, Allen, & Greenberg, 2001).
After being asked to contemplate their own death, people do not report feeling emotionally
worse than those who are asked to think about control topics (e.g., going to the dentist, watching
TV, etc). TMT theorists posited that this is because people suppress the thoughts of death as a
way to cope with them. As an ironic result of this suppression, however, participants should have
more unconscious access to thoughts of death. In order to explore this idea, Greenberg and his
colleagues (1994), inspired by the methods of Bassili and Smith (1986), developed a word

5
fragment completion task to measure unconscious access to thoughts of death (coined Death
Thought Accessibility; DTA). This task involves participants completing ambiguous word
fragments with the first word that comes to mind. The word fragments were purposely developed
so they could be completed either by a death related word (e.g., corpse) or one unrelated to death
(e.g., course).
The concept of DTA has helped develop TMT theory and further the understanding of
MS. For instance, research involving DTA has shown that more than just death (e.g., terrorism;
see Landau, Solomon, et al., 2004), topics related to death can also increase DTA. People also
differ in dispositional DTA and certain factors (e.g., low self-esteem) can increase spontaneous
DTA. Furthermore, DTA has been hypothesized to be a mediator in the MS process (Vail, Arndt,
Pyszczynski, & Motyl, 2010; for a more comprehensive review of the DTA concept and the
research surrounding it, see Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, & Faucher, 2010).
Critique of TMT and Alternative Explanations
Some critics of the theory claim that because decades of research have been unable to
measure changes in negative affect in response to MS (for one exception to this, see Arndt et al.,
2001; see also Juhl & Routledge, 2015), that the anxiety (i.e., terror) stipulated by TMT does not
exist. However, clarifying the theory, Greenberg, Solomon, and Arndt (2008) explain that
reactions to MS are coping mechanisms to avoid this anxiety on a daily basis. Thus, the absence
of anxiety when presented with MS is simply an indication of an individual’s functional
cognitive management capabilities. This is why alleviating people’s concern about potential
anxiety by giving participants a placebo said to reduce anxiety nullified the effect of MS on
reactions to worldview threat (Greenberg et al., 2003).
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Another frequent critique of TMT is that the effects of MS are not specific to thoughts of
death and that they can be explained by other threats that can produce similar defensive
reactions. Arguments have been put forth presenting alternative explanations wherein it is what
death represents and not death itself that causes the effects. One commonly presented alternative
is uncertainty, the rationale being that death symbolizes ultimate uncertainty. Research on
Uncertainty Salience (US) supports the idea that US can produce similar effects as MS. For
example, van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maasa, Miedema, & van den Hama (2005) found similar
effects of MS and US on reactions to unfairness (i.e., a worldview violation). However these
results have not been replicated with different operationalizations of uncertainty or other
dependent measures (Landau, Johns, et al., 2004; Routledge, Arndt, & Goldenberg, 2004; for a
more thorough review, see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, & Maxfield, 2006), therefore it is
possible that something unique about unfairness is affected by uncertainty. Other researchers
have presented other comparable concepts that death evokes and that could explain the effects of
MS, such as meaninglessness (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Martens, Burke, Schimel, &
Faucher, 2011) or threat to adaptive coalitions (Navarrete & Fessler, 2005), concern for the
future (Greenberg et al., 1995), social exclusion, and extreme physical pain (see Vess, Arndt,
Cox, Routledge, & Goldenberg, 2009). However, many studies show the unique effect of MS,
replicated using many different constructs of death, such as asking people to reflect upon and
write about their own death, a picture of a skull (Chopik & Edelstein, 2014), vivid images of
death (e.g., footage of an autopsy, Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1992), walking in front of a
funeral home (e.g., Pyszczynski et al., 1996), or filling out a survey about personal fear of death
(Taubman-Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 1999, Study 2), and subliminal primes (e.g., Arndt,
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, et al., 1997).
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Furthermore, research supports the unique mediating role of DTA with findings that
threats to cultural worldview increase the accessibility of death thoughts only, but does not
increase availability to thoughts about other threats (e.g., Schimel, Hayes, Williams, & Jahrig,
2007). Conversely, when death primed, bolstering participants’ worldview by letting American
students judge the writers of pro- and anti-American essays reduces DTA compared to those who
were not given the worldview bolstering opportunity (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1997).
Furthermore, and most relevant to this dissertation, regardless of the discussion over the
uniqueness of the effects of MS, research over the years has demonstrated the consistent effects
of MS. I chose to investigate the effects of death priming in investigations because death priming
is a real issue in the realm of law enforcement and thus should be explored.

8
Chapter 3: Terror Management Theory and Violations of Outcome Fairness
As proposed by TMT, our cultural worldview serves as a buffer against thoughts of
mortality. One reason for this is that our cultural values reinforce the idea that the world is a just
place. Much research shows that we are motivated to view the world as a just place (Lerner,
1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978): a place where good things happen to people who deserve them
and bad things happen to bad people (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). When this belief is threatened, for
example by the idea of death – an ultimately unfair outcome – this makes the concept of fairness
more salient (Hafer & Bègue, 2005) and we might become more upset when exposed to
unfairness. This is indeed what research shows: when mortality is salient and people are
subjected to unfair procedures, they react with more negative and less positive affect than
without MS (van den Bos, 2001; van den Bos & Medina, 2000).
Previous Research on TMT and Fairness
Several studies have examined the effects of MS on reactions to procedural fairness. In
four experiments, van den Bos and Miedema (2000) and van den Bos (2001, Study 2) attempted
to understand the sources of motivation toward fairness. These researchers found that MS
focused people on concepts of fairness. Giving a voice to participants about how many lottery
tickets should be awarded to them versus another research participant increased their positive
affective responses to the procedure. This increase in positive affect was enhanced when
participants were primed with MS. MS had an even stronger effect in decreasing negative affect
in response to the procedure. Van den Bos furthered this research by investigating the effect of
MS on reactions to outcome fairness manipulations in 2001 (Study 1). He replicated the findings
of MS on procedural fairness: Participants who received more lottery tickets compared to an
“other” participant showed more negative affect in reaction to this unfair outcome than those
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who received more lottery tickets. The main effect was qualified by an interaction with MS,
increasing comparative negative affect in participants in the unfair compared to the fair group.
These results illustrated the power of MS to highlight the importance of not only procedural but
also outcome fairness. These effects were again replicated in five studies investigating the
comparative effects of MS, uncertainty, and television watching on reactions to unfairness (van
den Bos et al., 2005).
Cook, Arndt, and Lieberman (2004) indirectly tested the idea that MS makes concepts of
fairness salient by looking at “nullification” beliefs and jurors’ decision making. Nullification
refers to the distinction between jurors following the spirit versus the letter of the law (see
Wiener, Habert, Shkodriani, & Staebler, 1991). Those prone to nullification are more likely to
ignore substantive legal rules and instructions if they disagree with the spirit of the law – because
they do not see it as fair. Nullification proneness is especially important when evidence relevant
to a case is judged as inadmissible for procedural reasons (e.g., incriminating evidence that the
police gathered without a proper search warrant). People high in nullification belief would be
less likely to disregard this type of evidence because doing so would violate the spirit of the law
and their concept of fairness. Cook and her colleagues found that MS promoted fairness in
opposite ways depending on what different people considered fair (i.e., their proneness to
nullification). Indeed, MS enhanced propensity to follow the spirit of the law for those high in
nullification belief: these participants were more likely to ignore a judge’s rule to disregard
inadmissible incriminating information, compared to those low in nullification beliefs (Cook et
al., 2004).
Looking specifically at fairness in terms of belief in a just world and following the just
world rationale, Hirschberger (2006) evaluated the effects of MS on propensity to blame
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innocent victims. An innocent victim threatens the concept of belief in a just world and MS
should amplify this threat. This is what Hirschberger found (Study 3, 2006): When presented
with a story about an innocent driver being harmed in a car crash, participants primed with MS
assigned more blame to the victim. This was only the case, however, when the driver was
severely injured and only when it was specified that he had been driving carefully (i.e., a clearly
innocent badly injured victim). Thus, in an attempt to re-establish their threatened (by MS) belief
in a just world, participants saw the victim as more culpable than he was.
TMT and Violation of Outcome Fairness in an Investigation
Because investigators are a constant instrument in the judicial decision making process,
they are essentially part of the procedure. Investigators gather the information about a case,
evaluate it, decide whether or not to forward the information for prosecution and might even be
asked to testify in court. To that end, the investigators themselves will be concerned with the
outcome of a case being consistent (and fair) with their own assessment of it. Although past
research has mostly investigated procedural fairness as a worldview violation, perceptions of
fairness in general are ingrained in most people’s value systems (Haidt, 2007) and as such should
be considered an important cultural value (Tyler & Smith, 1998). This means that violating
someone’s principle of fairness should produce a negative affective response, in the same way
that a violation of procedural fairness (van den Bos, 2001, Study 2; van den Bos & Medina,
2000) and of outcome fairness (van den Bos, 2001, Study 1) do. Because MS yields negative
responses to worldview threats, MS should increase negative affect when exposed to an unfair
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verdict, especially if the defendant does not deserve it (Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, &
Weinblatt, 1999; Sunshine & Heuer, 2002)1. This is the idea that I tested in my first study.

1

It is also possible that MS would increase victim blaming in response to an unfair verdict, given
Hirschberger’s findings (2006). However, this is beyond the scope of the current studies.
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Chapter 4: Terror Management Theory and Out-Group Derogation
Research on TMT also demonstrates the effects that the threat of death can have on how
people treat others. Generally, we favor individuals who are similar to us (Capozza & Brown,
2000; Pinter & Greenwald, 2011). Several prominent identity theories (e.g., Social Identity
Theory; Tajfel & Bilig, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; self-categorization theory; Turner, Hogg,
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) posit that we like people in the groups we are a part of and
dislike people who are not in our groups (e.g., Struch & Schwartz, 1989) because it helps us
promote our own positive image. This can be explained by the idea that our identity has an
individual and a social component, both of which affect our self-esteem (Tajfel, 1982; Turner et
al., 1987). We can boost our social self-esteem by reinforcing the value of in-groups we identify
highly with (e.g., Crocker & Schwartz, 1985; for review, see Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000)
and derogating members of our out-group (e.g., increased dislike for, distancing from, and
decreased rated similarity to an out-group member; Branscombe & Wann, 1994; see also Fiske
& Taylor, 2013). Additionally, threats to our self-esteem (including the threat of death) can
increase the need for in-group favoritism (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012) and the striving for selfesteem (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992). Because self-esteem serves
as a buffer against the anxiety caused by thoughts of death (Simon et al., 1997) boosting our
social self-esteem could substitute for personal a self-esteem boost (Castano, Yzerbyt, &
Paladino, 2004) and act as a buffer against MS.
Threat Relevance, Group Identification, and Out-group Derogation
People tend to classify themselves into groups based on different factors such as age,
gender, and race (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Such groups become part of their members’ identities.
Out-group members generally threaten one’s worldview by their simple existence because a
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group other than one’s own implies differences (potentially in terms of worldview) between
people and thus their mere existence represents a threat to worldview. This threat is especially
concretized if a member of the out-group overtly threatens one’s worldview. Another important
factor for an out-group member to provoke a derogation response is identification with the
threatened group. For example, Branscombe and Wann (1994) found that when Americans were
exposed to a video that threatened American identity (Rocky, an American, being defeated in a
boxing match by a Soviet boxer), only those who identified highly as Americans derogated
Russian out-group members. Furthermore, only those who highly identified as Americans and
derogated Russians then saw a boost in their self-esteem. Thus, derogating an out-group member
relevant to the threat at hand can help restore people’s self-esteem when it is damaged (by, say,
death priming), especially when they identify highly with the threatened in-group (Wann &
Branscombe, 1990).
The minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) shows that these
out-group derogation effects hold even in groups that one has been randomly assigned to, as long
as one assigns value to the in-group. For example, Tajfel and his colleagues (1971) assigned
participants to groups based on a bogus status or preference for a certain type of art. Their
participants then allocated more funds to their in-group and less to their out-group, thus
illustrating intergroup bias based on random groups that they thought were meaningful. Further
strengthening the notion that group identity arouses out-group derogation, Billig and Tajfel
(1973) told some participants that they were randomly assigned to group. They found that the
simple explicit mention of grouping and group labels resulted in discrimination against out-group
members, even when participants were aware that they were randomly assigned to groups.
Finally, Crocker and Schwartz (1985) found that self-esteem interacted with group membership
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when measuring in-group bias, in these minimal, randomly assigned groups. These findings
show the general importance of relevance of threat and level of in-group identification on outgroup derogation, before even considering the effects of a threat to self-esteem, such as MS.
Previous Research on the Effects of MS on Out-group Derogation
Generally, MS increases our tendency to act favorably toward people we consider
members of our in-group (e.g., showing more positive attitudes toward charitable organizations
that were deemed important or even giving more money to domestic charities; Jonas, Schimel,
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002; see also Castano, 2004; Castano et al., 2002; Harmon-Jones,
Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 1996). MS also leads people to avoid and derogate members of
out-groups (e.g., ascribing negative traits, being unwilling to spend time with out-group
members; Greenberg et al., 1990), and even to act aggressively toward people who challenge
their belief system (e.g., choosing how much hot sauce to give an individual who does not like
spicy foods; McGregor et al., 1998). Early research on TMT by Greenberg and his colleagues
(1990) found that Christians showed more derogation of Jews (a clear out-group) than of
Christians (their in-group) when under MS. Research has also found that when death primed,
Scottish students showed more negative attributions toward the English (who are considered
their out-group; Castano, 2004) and Italian students rated Germans less positively than their own
group (i.e., Italians; Castano et al., 2002). Looking at ratings of art, Renkema, Stapel, and van
Yperen (2008) found that Dutch people conformed to other Dutch people’s attitudes about art,
but they contrasted away from the Germans’ taste in art, when mortality was salient.
Interestingly, this effect was not found for their conforming to art liked or disliked by Japanese
people. The explanation for this was that the Japanese were viewed as a neutral out-group to the
Dutch while the Germans were viewed as a negative out-group. Authors cautioned that this
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effect could have been comparative, as all participants rated art that was either liked or disliked
by Germans, Dutch, and Japanese. It is possible that, if presented alone, ratings of Japanese art
might have been more similar to those of German art. Regardless, however, this illustrates once
again, that effects are found when the out-group is viewed negatively or as a threat to the ingroup. Similarly, Kugler and Cooper (2010) found that under MS, suspected terrorists were
awarded less protection by Americans if they were Saudi Arabian than if they were American
(their in-group) or Bulgarian (an out-group not considered a threat). Although the findings
outlined above concern groups that are naturally occurring, in-group bias in minimal group
settings was also enhanced with MS (Harmon-Jones et al., 1996). Further, MS has been shown to
increase identification with one’s in-group (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002).
MS, self-esteem and out-group derogation. TMT theory predicts that under MS, selfesteem should have a moderating effect on out-group derogation. Low self-esteem should
increase out-group derogation in response to MS while high self-esteem should decrease it. This
is what findings confirm when manipulating self-esteem: When boosting self-esteem by, for
example, giving participants positive personality feedback, this attenuated the effects of MS on
out-group derogation (Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997, Study 1). Findings
on explicit trait self-esteem measures, however, show mixed results. Harmon-Jones and his
colleagues (1997, Study 2) found support for this idea: Their American students with high selfesteem rated an individual who wrote an anti-American essay less negatively than those with
moderate self-esteem – who were more willing to engage in out-group derogation. This outgroup derogation effect was replicated with Israeli children’s self-reported unwillingness to
engage in different activities with Russian immigrants (Florian & Mikulincer, 1998). The effect
was only in 11-year olds but not in 7-year olds because the younger children probably did not
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have full conceptual mastery of the concept of death (Wass, 1995). Out-group derogation was
also specific to those children with low self-esteem. Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, and
Vermeulen (2009) also found that prejudice against Arabs increased after watching news about
terrorist attacks2, especially for people low in self-esteem. This was found for people of
European descent (Study 2), but the authors also found that watching a news report about
terrorist attacks increased implicit prejudice against all out-group members, as measured by the
IAT: Europeans for Arabs and Arabs for Europeans (Das et al., 2009, Study 3). On the other
hand, Baldwin and Wesley (1996) found a reversed moderating effect of self-esteem, where
Canadian students with high self-esteem (vs. those with low self-esteem) saw an increase in
polarization of negative opinions toward an out-group member (American target) and positive
toward an in-group member (Canadian target).
Bridging the self-esteem and group identification literature, Hohman and Hogg (2015b)
found that out-group derogation only happened under MS when their participants did not have
their self-esteem enhanced. Further they found that in-group identification mediated the outgroup derogation effect. That is, among their participants (who were American), those who
identified most as Americans were those who showed the most in-group bias (as illustrated by a
larger difference between the evaluations of pro- vs. anti-American essay). Furthermore, research
on group identities shows that although people can embrace several identities, the most salient
identity (Halloran & Kashima, 2004) with the most salient norms (Giannakakis & Fritsche,
2011) is the one that is affected by MS.

2

In their study, they used Terrorism Salience (TS), which has shown similar effects as MS
(Landau, Solomon, et al., 2004)
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Law Enforcement as a Group Identity
Taking all of this research into consideration, when evaluating the effect of law
enforcement as a group identity, one should be sure to evaluate self-esteem and level of group
identification – that is the extent to which one identifies with the group they were assigned to.
Furthermore, the salience of both the in-group and the threat to the in-group should be clear.
Research on police culture seems to indicate that because of job experience, socialization
(Ankony & Kelley, 1999; Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998), and the often dangerous
circumstances officers are constantly exposed to (Skolnick, 1977; 2000), a sense of community
develops among officers, that protects them from the byproducts of their work (Paoline, Myers,
& Worden, 2000; Twersky-Glasner, 2005). This idea of culture supports the idea that law
enforcement officers should feel that their role as an investigator is an indication of their ingroup and that they would view suspects as out-group members. Therefore, in addition to more
typical and dominant in-group/out-group distinctions such as race (Ito & Urland, 2003; Yzerbyt
& Demoulin, 2010) the suspect/investigator group membership distinction should be researched.
This group identity has the potential to make investigators derogate all suspects, especially when
under threat of death, resulting in a negativity or even a guilt bias toward suspects. This might be
one explanation for the idea that criminal investigations themselves induce a guilt presumptive
approach (Findley & Scott, 2006). This idea is tested in my second study.
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Chapter 5: Terror Management Theory and the Use of Stereotypes
An extension of out-group derogation is the use of stereotypes – especially negative onestoward out-group members (Fein & Spencer, 1997; for review, see Greenberg & Kosloff, 2008).
Stereotypes are generalizations about certain groups of people that can help simplify the world
and, in the process, make out-group members appear more homogeneous, less individualized
(Park & Rothbart, 1982), and more negative (Kunda, 1999). Thus, thinking in a more
stereotypical way about out-group members can be a buffer for the threat that death has on one’s
self-esteem. Conversely, being threatened with thoughts of one’s own mortality can activate
stereotypes that might not be otherwise (Kunda & Spencer, 2003). And indeed, under MS,
people increase their use of stereotypes (e.g., interpreting behavior as stereotypically male;
Renkema, Stapel, Maringer, & van Yperen, 2008), are more prejudicial (Castano, 2004;
Greenberg et al., 1990), and show increased preference for members of out-groups who conform
to prevalent stereotypes (Schimel et al., 1999).
Past Research on TMT and Stereotypes
Research on the effects of MS on stereotyping began with Greenberg and his colleagues
investigating how Christian students rated members of their out-group (i.e., Jews; 1990, Study
1). Researchers found evidence of not only out-group derogation but also ascription of negative
stereotypical traits drawn from anti-Semitic literature (e.g., stingy, manipulative, arrogant,
snobbish, and obnoxious; Greenberg et al., 1990, p. 130). This effect was found only when
participants were asked to rate their own in-group first. Authors hypothesized that rating an ingroup member first could have reminded participants of the dimension being threatened or this
rating could have served as an anchor for their ratings of the out-group (Greenberg et al., 1990).
Following up on this research, Schimel and his colleagues investigated American students’
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propensity to stereotype Germans. They asked their participants to ascribe traits to Americans,
Italians, and Germans. There were several stereotypical traits among these (e.g., unemotional,
disciplined, proud, hardworking; Schimel et al., 1999) and the researchers found that MS did
increase the extent to which their participants attributed stereotypical traits (but not nonstereotypical traits) to Germans over both Americans and Italians. In a second study, Schimel
and colleagues (1999) examined people’s tendencies to explain gender stereotypical (e.g., “Tom
paid for their dinner”, p. 911) and counter-stereotypical behavior (“[Tom] baby-sat the
neighbor’s kids”, p. 911) as a measure of stereotypical thinking. Participants in this study
provided more explanations of counter-stereotypical behavior (e.g., completing “Mary paid for
dinner” with “because her boyfriend forgot his wallet”, p. 911) in the MS condition as compared
to a control. A third study showed that MS increased liking and positive impressions of
stereotype consistent Black students compared to stereotypically inconsistent Black students and
compared to control students (Study 3). Schimel and his colleagues replicated this finding with
stereotypically consistent and inconsistent gay men (Study 5) and males and females applying
for jobs that were stereotypically gender congruent and incongruent (Study 4). Building on
Schimel and his colleagues’ investigation of MS and gender stereotypes, Leka (2015) found that
participants were harsher when judging peers who violated stereotypical gender norms (e.g., a
woman engineer major) when primed with thoughts of death. Some of these studies showed the
link between MS and negative stereotyping and others did not find a distinction between the
increased use of positive and negative stereotypes.
Renkema, Stapel, Maringer, and colleagues (2008) developed a model to explain this
distinction. In the presence of only MS, people should seek out structure and try to comprehend
the world around them. Both positive and negative stereotypes aid in achieving this, as they
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provide a means to categorize the complex world and simplify it for easier understanding. The
authors claimed and supported with three studies that the use of negative stereotypes (and
negative stereotypes only) is most likely when one has a goal of enhancement, which happens
when a person’s self-esteem is threatened (Renkema, Stapel, Maringer, et al., 2008). This is
relevant to the current research because I am hypothesizing that the identity of the investigator
should be in conflict with that of the suspect in a way that, if set free, the suspect should threaten
an investigator’s identity and self-esteem. Thus, the use of negative stereotypes when judging the
suspect should be prevalent when under MS.
The “Black Criminal” Stereotype
Over the years, much research has investigated how the justice system treats racial groups
differently (e.g., Hagan, 1987). The overwhelming percentage of falsely convicted Black
exonerees in the United States is just one example of this disparity
(www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration; Innocence Project Report, 2000). This begs the
question of what factors influence false convictions of minorities. One answer is that MS biases
decision making processes against people stereotyped as criminals and out-group members, at
the time of investigation.
Race is a clear group that people tend to identify with and that evokes well-defined
stereotypes (Schneider, 2004). Relevant to the current proposal is the stereotype of the “Black
criminal” (Allport & Postman, 1947; Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Devine, 1989;
Duncan, 1976; Greenwald, Oakes, & Hoffman, 2003; Payne, 2001; Sagar & Schofield, 1980;
Sue et al., 2008). A variety of findings support the existence and pervasiveness of this stereotype.
In their investigation of juvenile sentencing decisions, Rattan, Levine, Dweck, and Eberhardt
(2012) found that being primed with the concept of “Black” resulted in more severe sentences
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when compared to being primed with the concept of “White” (Rattan et al., 2012). Additionally,
the more “stereotypically Black” prisoners looked, the more likely they were to have a longer
sentence (Viglione, Hannon, & DeFina, 2011) and be sentenced to death (Eberhardt, Davies,
Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006). Because the Black criminal stereotype is so prevalent, it is
important to investigate the effects that MS can have on investigating crimes where the suspects
are of different races. For example, Graham and Lowery (2004) showed the effects of
unconscious Black criminal stereotypes. The authors primed police and parole officers with
stereotypically Black terms (e.g., Harlem, basketball, Black, dreadlocks; Graham & Lowery,
2004, p. 489) and found that compared to officers in a neutral condition (where they were primed
with words such as hell, agony, birthday, rainbow; Graham & Lowery, 2004, p. 489) those
primed with Black terms judged a suspect as more culpable, more likely to recidivate, and
suggested harsher punishments.
Further, Glaser, Martin, and Kahn (2015) found that jurors were more likely to convict a
Black defendant than a white defendant when the death penalty was the harshest punishment
possible (compared to life without the possibility of parole). Although the authors did not
explicitly mention TMT in this study, these results reflect the possible impact of death priming.
Indeed, when life without the possibility of parole was the harshest possible sentence, no
differences between suspects of different races were found in conviction rates. This is a potential
illustration of increased use of stereotype (operationalized as increased conviction rates) under
MS, because the increase in convictions was only present when the death penalty was proposed –
possibly making people contemplate their own death and engage in worldview defense. The idea
that MS can increase the use of the Black criminal stereotype in criminal investigations is tested
in my second study.
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Chapter 6: Terror Management Theory and Legal Decision Making
The effects of MS have been shown across many areas (Burke et al., 2010; Greenberg et
al., 1997) such as tanning behavior (Routledge et al., 2004), mate selection and preference
(Smieja, Kalaska, & Adamczyk, 2006), and creativity (Routledge, Arndt, Vess, & Sheldon,
2008), to only mention a few. One area that has not been given much attention is that of criminal
investigations. Apart from looking at the effect of MS on variables related to fairness, research
on the effect of MS on legally applicable variables has typically been focused on measuring
decision making at the level of punishment and sentencing. That is to say, once a person is found
guilty, what kind of punishment do they deserve? Research shows that people who are death
primed inflict harsher punishments on criminals (Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 2001) and
set bail higher for prostitutes (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). The rationale is that criminals should get
what they deserve (i.e., be punished) because their guilt is a cultural worldview violation. Indeed,
death-primed people do not typically approve of law breaking, especially for crimes that violate
specific worldviews, such as prostitution.
In the first published study testing the MS hypothesis, Rosenblatt and his colleagues
(1989) found that judges who were death primed imposed on average much higher bonds than
those who were not. The explanation that these results were due to a violation in the judges’
belief system was supported with a second study where Rosenblatt replicated the finding with
students setting higher bonds when under MS, but only when students held negative beliefs
about prostitution. Although many studies found that MS increases punitiveness (i.e., how harsh
of a punishment people are willing to bestow upon others), some researchers found that for
certain types of crimes, the trend was reversed (see Greenberg, Schimel, Martens, Solomon, &
Pyszczynski, 2001; Lieberman, Arndt, Personius, & Cook, 2001). Greenberg and his colleagues
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(2001) found that white people were more lenient toward their racist in-group members when
primed with thoughts of death. The authors postulated that because hate crimes do not violate
people’s cultural worldview to the extent that other crimes do, leniency trends were reversed.
Other studies since the initial Rosenberg findings have evaluated the effect of MS on
punitiveness and how domain specific individual differences (e.g., personal hardiness (Florian,
Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 2001), social dominance orientation (Schimel, Wohl, & Williams,
2006), empathy (Crawley & Suarez, 2016); for review, see Arndt, Lieberman, Cook, & Solomon,
2005) might reduce or increase the impact of MS. To understand the effect of MS on
punitiveness in different types of crimes, Florian and Mikulincer (1997) developed a
Multidimensional Social Transgressions Scale (MSTS). The MSTS includes 20 vignette
descriptions of different transgressions (e.g., robbery, fraud, etc.) that are classified based on the
consequences of the crime. Each crime was considered as either intrapersonal (i.e., damaging to
an individual personally, for example getting hit by a car) or interpersonal (i.e., damaging to a
person’s image within their community, for example a famous pianist’s career being destroyed)
and rated on severity and degree of punishment warranted. Florian and Mikulincer (1997) used
this MSTS and replicated the Rosenberg et al. (1989) results: MS increased punitiveness toward
the culprit. They also found that MS increased perceived severity of the crimes and that
intrapersonal crimes were perceived as more severe and punished more heavily than
interpersonal crimes (specific focus of fear of death did moderate this effect, see Florian &
Mikulincer, 1997).
Although the effect on punitiveness has been the focus of much TMT in legal settings, it
is not that of mine. In the aforementioned studies, the guilt of the defendant had already been
determined. Because I am interested in the effects of MS during the process of investigation, I
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am more interested in dependent variables that assess probability of guilt of a defendant or
suspect. Several recent studies have evaluated assessment of guilt, typically finding effects for
punitiveness but not for guilt. However, these studies focus on jury decision making and not
investigations (e.g., Beck, 2011; Jones & Weiner, 2011; Knight, 2010). For example, GoodmanDelahunty, Martschuk, and Ockenden (2015) failed to find an effect of MS on verdict and
suggested the reasonable doubt standard might have forced rational processing of thoughts of
death, thus nullifying the effects of MS (Simon et al., 1997).
The research reviewed in this section is different from mine in two aspects. I mainly
reviewed literature on sentencing and juror decision making; however, MS could affect decision
making during an investigation, before a suspect is ever brought to court or convicted. Thus, the
first main difference is one of measurement. The outcome of a juror’s decision is a dichotomous
verdict which might not be sensitive enough to register the effects of MS. Indeed, when
investigating continuous guilt related dependent variables, results were more promising. For
example, Nelson, Moore, Olivetti, and Scott (1997) found that in a case involving a car accident,
blame placed on the car manufacturer increased as a function of mortality salience and
nationality of the manufacturer: Americans blamed a Japanese car company more than the
American car company, under MS, using a continuous scale of guilt assessment. The nature of
the investigator’s decision making is much more nuanced than this guilty/not guilty decision
jurors must make. A police investigator might eventually have to make a decision of whether to
forward the case to a prosecutor. However, the most important decisions for investigators are
whether to pursue different lines of investigations or more subtle impressions of suspects that
might influence the information gathering process.
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The second distinction relates to the context of the decision making. Participants in my
studies took on the role of the police investigator in an investigation. This role, as the police
investigator, is qualitatively different from that of the juror. For a juror, the primary purpose
should be justice and this might prime concepts of fairness to a higher extent. Conversely, a
police investigator might have different motivations and might have different norms they should
abide by as a police investigator. And TMT research shows that priming different norms can
interact with MS to increase behavior congruent with primed norms (Gailliot, Stillman,
Schmeichel, Maner, & Plant, 2008; Jonas et al., 2008). Furthermore, findings from basic research
on TMT emphasize the importance of out-group members being a threat to target’s worldview.
This is key because a guilty suspect going free should be more of a threat to a police
investigator’s worldview than that of a journalist (the comparison group used in my second
study).
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Chapter 7: Decision Making in Investigations
Although at times difficult to identify, mistakes in investigator decision making are at the
root of many miscarriages of justice (Innocence Project Report, 2000; Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka,
2013; Simon 2012). Research on this fairly new but important field spans from discussing the
overall process that police undergo during an investigation, to factors (internal and external) that
can impair the quality or increase the accuracy of the decisions. The research on this topic is
reviewed below.
Decision Making in Investigations – The Process
Drawing from Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, and Steller’s conception of decision making
phases (1990), O’Brien and Oyserman (2009) proposed that there were two distinctive stages of
investigatory decision making. The authors suggested that police investigators might start out in
a deliberative mindset, searching for information and evidence surrounding a crime without a
specific goal. However, once a potential suspect is found, they switch to an implemental mindset,
trying to prove that this suspect did indeed commit the crime (O’Brien & Oyserman, 2009).
Although both deliberative and implemental mindsets serve their purpose and are necessary to
solve a crime, issues in the process could arise in two ways. First, people in the implemental
mindset tend to be less open-minded and objective than when in the deliberative mindset
(Gollwitzer, Fujita, & Oetttingen, 2004). Thus, switching mindsets could be problematic if done
prematurely, before plausible alternative suspects have been properly ruled out. Second, once in
the implemental mindset, investigators would be less likely to consider criticism of their theory
about the crime and exculpating evidence. Consequently, engaging in this mindset in general
could lead to confirmation bias and tunnel vision (see Findley, 2012; Findley & Scott, 2006).
Timing of decisional tipping point. Because the timing of the decisional tipping point
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(i.e., switch between the aforementioned two mindsets) is so important, researchers have
explored when it occurs and what factors can set it in motion. For example, Fahsing and Ask
(2013) interviewed a sample of British and Norwegian investigators and found that they indeed
made decisions according to these two phases. All investigators who were interviewed identified
naming, arresting, or charging a suspect as a decisional tipping point in their investigations.
Slightly over half of the investigators also reported their decision to use a certain type of
investigatory technique to gather case information as a potential typing point. Finally,
investigators acknowledged that several factors had the potential to influence the timing of the
tipping point, including the availability of evidence and pressure (both external and internal).
Fahsing and Ask (2016b) tested whether the decision to arrest a suspect was a tipping point but
failed to find empirical support for their self-reported data. The presence of the information
about a suspect’s arrest did not result in the generation of fewer hypotheses, as entering the
implemental mindset would suggest.
Issues of bias in the implemental phase. When scrutinizing the quality of investigatory
decision making, much research with both lay people and actual investigators, focuses on
potential for confirmation bias (Evans, 1989; Nickerson, 1998) in the evaluation of investigative
information (Ask & Granhag, 2005). Criminal cases are typically investigated in a theory-driven
manner, establishing an initial hypothesis (when in the deliberative mindset) that is then tested in
a confirmatory way (during the implemental phase), guiding subsequent decisions about the
investigation (Innes, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 1996; Wagenaar, van Koppen, & Crombag,
1993). Because the fact-finding mission is almost entirely the responsibility of police, it is
important that they do not disregard important and potentially exonerating information. Such
information could be harder to find by the defense or could even be destroyed by the time a
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defendant goes to trial.
Experimentally testing this idea, O’Brien (2009) found that stating a hypothesis, and
effectively switching from deliberative to implemental mindset, increased confirmation bias – as
measured by the propensity to seek out confirmatory evidence and disregard disconfirmatory
evidence. In two studies, she found that stating a hypothesis about a particular suspect’s guilt
made participants more likely to choose to pursue lines of investigation that would result in
evidence confirming that suspect’s guilt. Rassin, Eerland, and Kuijpers (2010) also found that
when holding the hypothesis that a suspect is guilty, participants chose to pursue more
incriminating than exonerating lines of investigation. These findings suggest that initial ideas can
affect investigators’ interpretations of ensuing information in a consistent way, as seen in the
aforementioned studies.
Other studies have found evidence of confirmation bias investigations (see Eerland &
Rassin, 2012; Wallace, 2015). Taking these findings further, Eerland and Rassin (2012) found a
Feature Positive Effect (FPE; Newman, Wolff, & Hearst, 1980) where participants judged
incriminating evidence as more incriminating than exonerating evidence was exonerating. That is
to say, when presented with incriminating evidence participants increased their judgements of
guilt more so than they reduced them when faced with similarly exonerating evidence. If
investigators do indeed place more weight in incriminating than in exonerating evidence, this
would lead to an anti-suspect bias, increasing susceptibility to tunnel vision.
Of note, certain types of evidence are less prone to the influence of bias. Ask, Rebelius,
and Granhag (2008) were the first to explore this idea by measuring the elasticity of different
types of evidence. Elasticity is measured by providing investigators with a case for which they
are asked to form a judgement. They are then given either a consistent or inconsistent piece of
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evidence and asked to rate the reliability of said evidence. Ask and his colleagues (2008) found
that police officers showed signs of asymmetrical skepticism – judging inconsistent evidence as
less reliable than consistent evidence. Furthermore, this judgment spread to the evidence class in
general, not only for the specific evidence used in the experiment. Importantly, the authors found
that certain pieces of evidence were considered more “elastic” (e.g., eyewitness evidence) than
others (e.g., DNA).
Characteristics of Good Investigators
Some researchers have investigated what individual characteristics make an effective
investigative decision maker. Westera, Kebbell, Milne, and Green (2016) interviewed detectives
from Australia and New Zealand about their beliefs of what would make a competent detective.
Westera and her colleagues (2016) found that the skill rated as most useful was the ability to
communicate (i.e., that a detective can show empathy, easily establish rapport with people of
different backgrounds, and can achieve whatever their goal is through communication). Also
deemed important were motivation (e.g., being passionate about their role as a detective and
having a desire to seek out justice), thoroughness (e.g., attention to detail and all aspects of the
job), and decision making skills (e.g., ability to make clear decisions under pressure, openmindedness, and ability to consider the big picture; p.10). Interestingly, Fahsing and Ask (2013)
found that Norwegian investigators mentioned using their intuition as an important tool for good
decision making, while British investigators did not – and even cited it as source of error.
Although this difference could be due to variations in policy and training, it still begs the
question of how individual differences in law enforcement could affect decision making quality.
Dean, Fahsing, and Gottschalk (2006) surveyed law enforcement about the techniques
they used when making decisions and classified them according to styles that were considered
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more or less cognitively complex. For instance, the “skill” style, defined as “driven by personal
qualities and abilities of relating to people at different levels” (Dean et al., 2006, p. 224) is
considered higher level compared to the “method” style, which was “driven by procedural steps
and conceptual processes for gathering information” (Dean et al., 2006, p. 224). Investigators
reported using more sophisticated styles (e.g., skill and risk, being “driven by creativity in
discovering and developing information into evidence”; Dean at al. 2006, p. 224) when they
were more experienced. These higher investigative thinking styles were also correlated with
more creativity in detectives (Dean, Fahsing, & Gottschalk, 2007). More research showed that
professional experience increased the amount of investigative hypotheses and the number of
alternative explanations that investigators generated (Fahsing & Ask, 2016b). Other studies have
also shown benefits of experience (Santtila, Korpela, & Hakkanen, 2004; Wallace, 2015).
However, factors such as quality of initial training and amount of refresher trainings could also
be moderating the effect of experience on performance (Fahsing & Ask, 2016b).
In terms of cognitive ability, Fahsing and Ask (2016a) found that neither inductive nor
deductive reasoning ability was related to generation of “gold standard” hypotheses. Ask and
Granhag (2005) found that criminal investigators’ level of Need For Cognitive Closure (NFCC)
increased the tendency to ignore alternative explanations in a case where a hypothesis was
already given. Rassin (2010) replicated these effects with samples of police, district attorneys,
and judges but did not find the same association between NFCC proneness to bias; instead he
found an association between a scale of confirmation proneness (TSS) and blindness to
alternatives.
Motivational Factors Affecting Decision Making in Investigations
In addition to internal factors that could affect an investigators’ ability to make decisions
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accurately, researchers have also studied the effects of external motivational factors. For
example, Ask and Granhag (2007a) found that there were differences in information processing
when investigators were sad or angry. Whereas sad investigators were sensitive to consistencies
between facts of a case and a witness statement, angry investigators were not. This suggested
that the angry investigators were processing information heuristically, which would make them
more prone to error. In another study, anger increased punitiveness compared to sadness and a
neutral emotion condition (Ask & Pina, 2011).
Prior knowledge about an investigation can also bias investigators’ assessment of a
situation. This is a problem that Kerstholt and Eikelboom (2007) tackled in their study evaluating
crime analysts in the Netherlands. Crime analysts have a devil’s advocate role (Kray & Galinsky,
2003) in Dutch investigations. They are to be a neutral party that comes in to provide their
opinion of a crime and avoid issues of tunnel vision and group think. However, even this
supposedly neutral party can be influenced by knowledge of their team’s hypothesis. Kerstholt
and Eikelboom (2007) found that if crime analysts were informed of the hypothesis that their
team favored, they in turn favored it (i.e., mentioned it more, thought it more likely, and
considered the suspect of interest as an important person for further investigation).
Ask and Granhag (2007b) manipulated time pressure to examine its effect on
interpretation of evidence. The authors hypothesized and found support for the fact that time
pressure increased NFCC and asymmetrical skepticism. Alison, Doran, Long, Power, and
Humphrey (2013) also tested the effect of time pressure on police officers’ decision making. In
their study, officers who were told they had less time to complete their task, generated fewer
hypotheses meaning they would be less likely to think of alternative (potentially exculpatory)
explanations. Time urgency moderated this effect: Officers who perceived that time passes
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quickly were more affected by the authors’ time pressure manipulation.
Finally, Ask, Granhag, and Rebelius (2011) non-consciously activated goals of efficiency
or thoroughness to examine their effect on investigations. The authors had criminal investigators
read statements (e.g., “A good investigator often sees the solution to a crime early in the
investigation”, to prime the goal of efficiency and “a good investigator has the ability to avoid
premature conclusions about a crime” to prime the goal of thoroughness; Ask et al., 2011, p.
549) and were told that their colleagues had previously rated and agreed upon these statements.
Participants in the efficiency condition were not as open to exonerating information as those in
the thoroughness condition. This was the first study examining non-conscious goal activation
and the rationale is similar to that of my studies. Because motivational factors have the power to
affect decision making, even non-consciously, it is important to investigate the effects of death,
especially given previous findings of TMT research.
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Chapter 8: The Current Studies
As an extension of prior TMT research, in this dissertation I examined the effect of a
potentially powerful biasing factor: death. Specifically, drawing from the findings of TMT
research, I explored how thoughts of death affected people’s feelings about what they might
consider an unfair outcome in a case they investigated and how MS affected people’s perceptions
of a suspect from their in-group or out-group and a suspect who represents certain stereotypes.
Unconscious influences on the interpretation of evidence are an important issue, one that requires
research. Knowing what factors can bias the outcome of a case can help prevent these factors
from impeding investigations in the future and can help educate police officers. This research
will help understand how MS affects decision making during an investigation.
The objective of this research was to study the role of MS when lay people, adopting the
role of police investigators, evaluate case information. Research on the effects of death priming
on investigatory processes is important for two reasons: Firstly, investigations often involve
death, which could be affecting investigators. Indeed, thinking about another person’s death can
cause similar effects as thinking about one’s own death (Pickel & Brown, 2002). However, it is
true that others found smaller effects when thinking about someone else’s death (Greenberg et
al., 1994; see also Nelson et al., 1997) and Jones and Weiner (2011) found entirely different
effects when asking participants to focus on their own death, a victim’s death and a defendant’s
death. Secondly, and importantly, investigations are performed by law enforcement officers who
have a very dangerous job. The peril associated with their job might make officers contemplate
their own mortality to a higher extent than others with safer occupations, leading them to be
regularly death primed. Finally, this research will increase the applicability of Terror
Management Theory to yet another setting with severe consequences. The proposed research will

34
answer the questions brought forth in the introductory review by evaluating the variables
discussed below.
Variables of Interest
This research will attempt to answer the following questions: Does thinking about one’s
own death increase negative affective responses to an unfair outcome for a case that one has
investigated (Study 1)? Do these negative emotions then increase motivational bias (specifically,
confirmation bias) in future investigations (Study 1)? Also, does thinking about one’s own death
increase out-group derogation of the suspect (when considering one’s own race and professional
group membership) in an investigation (Study 2)? Finally, does considering one’s own death
increase the use of the Black criminal stereotype when considering the suspect in an
investigation (Study 2)? The three main variables of interest when considering these questions
were adopted from TMT research as they are typically strongly affected by death priming (Burke
et al., 2010): affective responses to a worldview threat (i.e., unfairness), attitude toward an outgroup member, and stereotypic thinking.
The first measure of interest in this work was affect. I was interested in whether
participants became angry in response to a worldview threat, here an unfair outcome of the case
they were just investigating. I asked participants their opinion about a case after evaluating the
evidence. Following this assessment, participants were provided with a narrative of the actual
outcome of the case (as found by a court of law). I then asked participants to report their
affective reactions (both positive and negative) to this verdict. The assumption here was that
when a participant made a judgment about the suspect’s guilt, a fair outcome – that the suspect
deserved – should be consistent with the participant’s decision about the case. Examining how
investigators react to a fair or unfair outcome in a case (i.e., verdict) that they had investigated
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will give insight into their motivation to obtain a certain outcome. Failure to obtain this
important goal should create negative affect (Kruglanski et al., 2002), and, given that MS should
make concepts of fairness particularly salient, unfairness should provoke an increase in negative
affect when people are death primed. This is something that needs to be considered carefully.
When evaluating a case, an investigator will probably have the final outcome of the case in mind,
at some level. Knowing that an unfair outcome would be displeasing should motivate
investigators to avoid this at all costs (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Higgins, 1997). This would
make them more prone to confirmation biases and tunnel vision (Findley, 2012; Findley & Scott,
2006) especially once they have a hypothesis (Ask & Granhag, 2007b), both of which were
assessed.
To research attitudes toward out-group members and stereotyping, in the context of a
police investigation, I measured participants’ judgments of guilt of a member of their out-group,
conceptualized in two different ways. First, the role of investigator should have created an
identity for participants in which they were identified as a part of the investigation team. Framing
the role of investigator as an identity was manipulated to amplify the salience of this group
membership. This type of social identity should have accentuated investigators’ perception of a
suspect, any suspect, as an out-group member. If this is the case, MS should increase negative
impressions and derogation of suspects in general. Second, the race of the suspect was varied.
This served as a second type of out-group manipulation as I was able to compare the
participants’ (i.e., investigators’) race to the suspect’s race in order to determine whether they
would be considered an in-group or out-group member.
Furthermore, I measured use of racially based criminal stereotypes by assessing how MS
and the suspect’s race affected the perceived likelihood of him being guilty. Indeed, if
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participants were using the “Black criminal” stereotype, they should have had a higher number
of highly confident guilty ratings of Black suspects compared to Hispanic and White suspects.
As MS increases the use of stereotypes, this effect of guilty Black suspects should have been
greater when people were death primed. Guilt ratings served as a measurement of stereotype
activation but also as a measure of out-group derogation. Because the guilt rating was so
specific, I also used measures of out-group derogation by asking more standard questions to
evaluate participants’ appraisals of the suspect as a person (e.g., how intelligent and likeable the
suspect was).
The main independent variable of interest in this work was Mortality Salience. That is, I
manipulated how available death thoughts were. For MS to be most effective, death thoughts
need to be easily accessible, but below our conscious awareness and not the focus of attention
(Pyszczynski et al., 1999). I included a distraction task between the death priming task and the
dependent measure(s) to avoid overt reactions to death thoughts (Greenberg et al., 2000). Indeed,
when dealing with thoughts of death consciously, we use coping mechanism that are considered
more rational than those described above (Epstein, 1995), such as distracting oneself to minimize
the thoughts about the threat of death (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1997; Greenberg et al.,
1994). The main dependent variables of interest are affective responses to fair or unfair
outcomes, susceptibility to confirmation bias (Study 1), perceived culpability, impressions of a
suspect, and use of stereotypes (Study 2).
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Chapter 9: Study 1
The purpose of this study was to investigate how MS affected reactions toward the
verdict in a case participants had made a judgment about. More specifically, I investigated
whether MS increased affective responses to what could be considered a “fair” (consistent with
participants’ assessment of the case) or “unfair” (inconsistent with participants’ assessment of
the case) outcome. Priming people with the idea of their own mortality should impact reactions
to threats to outcome fairness. In this study, participants were required to make a dichotomous
decision of whether the main suspect in a case they investigated was guilty or innocent. If, for
example a participant decided that the suspect was most likely guilty, a fair outcome was
operationalized by telling participants that the suspect was actually convicted by a court of law.
An unfair outcome, in this case, was learning that the suspect was cleared of all charges by a
court of law. This is important because once an investigator makes a decision about the guilt or
innocence of a suspect they should want to pursue what they consider fair, especially when under
the influence of MS and in turn be more prone to confirmation bias.
Hypotheses
Main hypotheses. As an extension of TMT research on threats to worldview (Rosenblatt
et al., 1989), I expected that a threat to participants’ worldview (here, outcome fairness) should
be received with negative affect. Conversely, an outcome that upholds their worldviews should
be welcomed positively. These differences should be enhanced by MS. More precisely, I
predicted a main effect for the case outcome where participants should react generally more
positively (and less negatively) to a fair verdict than to an unfair verdict. This main effect should
be qualified by an interaction between prime and case outcome where MS should increase
positive ratings of affect toward the outcome of a case (and decrease negative ratings of affect
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toward the outcome of a case) when it is fair. MS will also increase negative ratings of affect
toward the outcome of a case (and decrease positive ratings of affect toward the outcome of a
case) if it is unfair (H1a and H1b). For a graphic representation of this interaction, see Figure 1.
Furthermore, because I proposed that negative affective responses to the case outcome should
provoke confirmation bias, I hypothesized that affective responses should be related to
individuals’ tendency toward confirmation bias (H2). Finally, as an illustration of increased
confirmation bias, I predicted that participants in the unfair condition would seek out more
incriminating information than exonerating information than those in the fair condition and that
this effect should be amplified by MS (H3).
Moderator hypothesis. My hypotheses rest on the assumption that we are motivated to
see the world as a just place (Lerner, 1980). However, there are individual differences in this
motivation (Furnham, 2003). Research on Belief in a Just World (BJW) as an individual
difference has shown that the more someone endorses BJW (i.e., the higher they are on a BJW
scale) the more likely they are to help to rectify an injustice (e.g., Bierhoff, Klein, & Kramp,
1991). Those high in BJW would be highly motivated to see the world as a just place and be
more upset by injustice than those low in BJW, especially if this injustice was made more salient
by MS. Thus, I predicted a three-way interaction between prime, outcome, and BJW, where
those high in BJW would react more positively to a fair outcome, under MS (compared to those
low in BJW; H4a). I also predicted a similar three-way interaction between prime, outcome, and
BJW, where those high in BJW would react more negatively to an unfair outcome, under MS
(compared to those low in BJW; H4b) .
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Chapter 10: Study 1 Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 299 community members recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) and paid $1.00 for approximately 20 minutes of their time (M = 22.38 minutes, SD =
8.68 minutes). Sample size was determined using a power analysis for an expected small effect
based on previous TMT research on affect dependent variables (r = .21, 95% CI [.10, .32]; Burke
et al., 2010, p. 29), using non-student populations (r = .25, 95% CI [.18, .32]; Burke et al., 2010,
p. 29). The sample was 50.2% females and 49.5% males, with an age span from 18 to 73 years
(M = 36.71, SD = 11.67), and predominantly White (82.3%), then Black (9.7%), Asian (4.3%),
Hispanic (2%), and other (1.7%).The design was a two (prime: MS vs. Dental Pain (DP)) by two
(case outcome: fair vs. unfair) between subjects factorial design.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were told that they would be taking part in
a study on personality and decision making. They were given the “personality assessment”
portion of the study first. This was a mock personality assessment that incorporated the priming
manipulation in order to mask its intent. Then, participants were given a case summary to study,
which is described below. They were then asked to provide their assessment of the suspect in the
case (guilty or not guilty). This was followed by a short statement telling participants that the
case was in fact real, that it had gone to court and a jury had provided a verdict (i.e., the outcome
of the case). This outcome was manipulated depending on which condition the participant was
randomly assigned to. In the fair condition, they were told that the judgment they provided to the
court was upheld. In the unfair condition, participants read that the outcome of the case was the
opposite of their assessment. The verdict was provided without context so as to limit the
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potential for participants to justify the jury’s decision (e.g., a not guilty verdict resulting from a
procedural mistake in an otherwise strong case against the suspect might be considered fair for
someone who has a strong belief in the legitimacy of legal procedures or might not be considered
fair for someone high in nullification). Finally, participants were asked how they felt about the
outcome of the case and how they would proceed in the future, given a similar case. The entire
procedure was administered through an online survey program (Qualtrics), so that participants
had to go through the materials in order and were reminded if they accidentally skipped
questions.
Materials
Mock personality assessment. The mock assessment contained questions from the
Abbreviated form of the Revised Eysenk Personality Questionnaire (EPQR-A; Francis, Brown,
& Philipchalk, 1992), the Belief in a Just World scale (BJW; Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt,
1987), questions from the five-factor model of personality measurement (OCEAN; McCrae &
Costa, 1987), the priming manipulation, followed by a word search task (to distract those in the
MS group from overt thoughts of death), and the DTA word fragment completion task as a check
for the MS manipulation and to assess the level of death thought accessibility.
EPQR-A and OCEAN. These measures are typically used to assess personality in
different ways, but here were used to mask the intent of the MS manipulation and the BJW scale.
The entire EPQR-A and OCEAN questionnaires were not used because participants’ responses to
these assessments were not important and I was concerned with losing participants’ interest if the
personality portion was too lengthy. I only selected 11 questions from the EPQR-A and 14 from
the OCEAN. Care was taken to take out questions that assessed similar traits, so that the
questions were not considered too repetitive. Those used for the study are listed in Appendix A.
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Belief in a Just World (BJW) scale. The BJW scale assesses the extent to which
individuals subscribe to the belief that the world is a just place (Dalbert, Lipkus, Sallay, & Goch,
2001; for review, see Hafer & Bègue, 2005). This scale was used to test for individual
differences that might have affected how people respond to outcome fairness.
Participants were given the 6 item scale developed by Dalbert and her colleagues (1987)
to assess their level of BJW by asking them to agree or disagree with statements such as “I am
confident that justice always prevails over injustice” (α = .90; Full list of questions is in
Appendix A). Participants’ responses were averaged, resulting in a seven point scale from 1
(lowest level of BJW) to 7 (highest level of BJW).
Priming manipulation. For the priming manipulation, I had participants reflect on and
write about a topic. Consistent with previous TMT research, the manipulation was framed to
minimize suspicion. Participants were told that this open-ended assessment was a new type of
personality test (for the details of this description, see Appendix A). The topic of the open-ended
questions was either participants’ own death (MS) or another affectively negative experience,
dental pain (DP). The MS prime involved participants imagining themselves experiencing their
own death. I asked participants to answer two questions, typically used in TMT research
(Greenberg et al., 1990, 1993; Rosenblatt et al., 1989): “Please briefly describe the emotions that
the thought of [your own death/going to the dentist] arouses in you.” and “Jot down, as
specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically [die/go to the
dentist] and once you are physically [dead/at the dentist] (Full manipulation is described in
Appendix A).
Distraction task. All participants were given a word search task where they were to find
six words in a puzzle (the task is displayed in Appendix A). This task was used in order to

42
distract participants in the MS condition from thinking about death and allow time for proximal
defenses to fade. Participants took on average 110.44 seconds (SD = 65.34) on the distraction
task.
Death Though Access (DTA) manipulation check. After they completed the word search
task, participants completed a word fragment completion task, in a manner similar to Greenberg
et al. (1994, Study 4) and Harmon-Jones et al. (1997, Study 3). Participants were asked to
complete 23 word fragments missing two letters each. Five of these fragments could be filled in
as either neutral or death related (“buried”/”burned”, “dead”/”deal”, “grave”/”grape”,
“corpse”/”course”, and “coffin”/”coffee”; Greenberg et al. (1994, p. 634); see Appendix A for a
list of all the word fragments). For example, coff _ _ could be filled out as coffee or coffin. This
word fragment completion task served as a manipulation check to ensure that thoughts of death
were accessible for participants in the MS condition. I summed the number of words that were
completed in a death related manner in order create a DTA measure with a possible minimum of
0 and a maximum of 5 – if none or all of the word fragments were filled out with death related
words.
Case summary. The case that was provided to all participants was loosely based on a
real robbery case retrieved from the National Registry of Exonerations
(www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration). In my studies, I chose to investigate a case that
involved no death, so that no thoughts of death, peripheral or proximal, would interfere with my
manipulation. Furthermore, it was a case that damaged the victim’s personal domain as these are
typically judged more harshly and given more severe punishments (Florian & Mikulincer, 1997).
The case involved a clearly intrapersonal crime: the victim in the study was assaulted and
transported to the hospital for traumatic brain injury and the burglar also stole several of her

43
belongings. The case file included a report that described the facts of the case, statements from
the main suspects’ family members providing him with an alibi, and a forensic report detailing
DNA evidence found from a mask the robber was thought to be wearing during the robbery. All
of these pieces of evidence, except for the forensic report, were somewhat ambiguous, with
elements that seemed to implicate the suspect and elements that exculpated him. The forensic
report, however, clearly implied the suspect’s guilt so that regardless of any individual
differences among participants, they should all judge the suspect as guilty and be confident in
this assessment. For the complete case materials, see Appendix B. The case was pilot tested to
ensure that we obtained an overwhelming majority of guilty judgments. In a pilot (n = 38), I
obtained 100% guilty judgments, with fairly high confidence on a scale from 0 to 100 (M =
87.24, SD = 14.13).
Dependent Measures
Except for the BJW measure, the results of the “personality assessment” portion of the
study were not used in analyses. In response to the case file, participants provided a dichotomous
guilt/innocence judgment and their confidence in their guilt assessment. The guilt/innocence
choice forced participants to commit to one or the other so that when presented with the
outcome, it clearly contradicted or was consistent with their assessment.
The dependent variables provided after participants were told of the outcome of the case
measured positive (see van den Bos & Miedema, 2000) and negative affect (see van den Bos &
van Prooijen, 2001) in response to the outcome (“Please rate how you feel about M.'s
[conviction/acquittal]”). Participants rated the following emotions about the outcome of the case
on 9 point scales (1 = not all; 9 = extremely): happy, content, satisfied, proud, angry, furious,
disappointed, guilty, and sad. The negative emotions listed are typically expressed by people in
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response to unfair outcomes (Barsky & Kaplan, 2007; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). In
order to assess generally negative and positive reactions to the outcome, two composites were
created, averaging all positive emotions (happy, content, satisfied, and proud, α = .91; with 1
being least positive and 9 most positive) and negative emotions (angry, furious, disappointed,
guilty, and sad, α = .89, with 1 being least negative and 9 most negative). See Table 1 for a
correlation matrix of these ratings.
Additionally, in order to gauge participants’ future intentions regarding investigations
and potential for motivational bias, I asked them about a hypothetical future case. I asked them
whether they would gather more evidence in the future before forwarding a similar case to the
prosecutor (1 = very unlikely; 7 = very likely). I then asked them to rate how useful they thought
pursuing different types of evidence would be (1 = very useless; 7 = very useful). In order to
assess for confirmation bias, I asked specifically about twelve pieces of evidence of three types:
incriminating, exonerating, and neutral. For a specific list of what these pieces of evidence were,
see Appendix C). Among these lines of investigation, I included the statement: “This is not a line
of investigation please select very useful to prove that you are not a robot taking this survey” as
an attention check – those who responded anything other than “very useful” to this question were
eliminated from my sample.
As a manipulation check to be sure that participants were aware that the verdict in the
case matched (in the fair condition) or did not match (in the unfair condition) the guilty decision
they made about the case, I asked them “Did the outcome of the case in court match your
decision?” Additionally, I asked about participants’ perceptions of the case (how realistic they
thought it was, how motivated they were to solve it, how much they identified with the role of
lead investigator) and of the outcome of the case (how fair they found the court’s decision, how
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deserving they thought the suspect was of the verdict that he received).
Finally participants were asked a series of questions about facts that they remembered
about the case and a series of demographic questions. They were then debriefed, thanked and
paid through MTurk.
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Chapter 11: Study 1 Results
Participants who failed the attention check (n = 24 total), judged the suspect as innocent
(n = 20 total; n = 16 in addition to those who failed the attention check), and the fairness
manipulation check (n = 30 total; n = 21 in addition to those who failed the attention check and
judged the suspect as innocent) were dropped from analyses. This left us with a sample of 238
participants with which all of the analyses were conducted.
Outcome Fairness Manipulation
The manipulation of outcome fairness was successful as participants in the fair condition
(M = 6.08, SD = 1.04) thought that the verdict was fairer than those in the unfair condition (M =
3.16, SD = 1.39), t (216.57) = 18.30, p < .001, d = 2.38, 95% CI [2.05, 2.72]. Further, those in
the fair condition (M = 6.10, SD = .99) also thought that the suspect was more deserving of the
verdict than those in the unfair condition (M = 2.88, SD = 1.42), t (208.68) = 20.24, p < .001, d =
2.63, 95% CI [2.29, 2.98].
MS Manipulation Check (DTA)
I ran an independent samples t-test on DTA to compare the MS group to the DP group.
Results showed that there was no effect on the overall DTA measure, with no significant
difference between the MS group (M = 1.32, SD = .88) and the DP group (M = 1.30, SD = .87), t
(236) = .16, p =.88, d = .02, 95% CI [-.23, .28]. Upon further inspection, none of the individual
word fragments showed any differences between groups (for more detailed results, see Table 2).
Main Hypothesis Test (Affect)
In order to test my main hypothesis about the effect of MS on affective reactions to a fair
or unfair outcome (H1), I ran two-way ANOVAs on both positive and negative affect ratings. On
the positive affect composite, there was a significant main effect for fairness manipulation, F (1,
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234) = 175.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .43, but no effect for priming, F (1, 234) = .83, p = .61, ηp2 = .001,
d = .06, 95% CI [-.19, .32], and no significant interaction between manipulations, F (1, 234) =
.83, p = .36, ηp2 = .004. ). Pairwise comparisons for the ANOVA showed that participants in the
fair outcome condition responded more positively than those in the unfair condition, d = 1.78,
95% CI [1.48, 2.08]. No other differences were significant. Bayesian analyses confirmed these
findings, showing decisive support (Jeffereys, 1961) in favor of the alternative hypothesis for the
fairness main effect, BF10 = 1.35e +27, but only anecdotal evidence for the priming main effect,
BF10 = .16, and the interaction between the two, BF10 = .28. However, even though there is
substantial evidence for the null hypothesis when considering the main effect of priming (BF01 =
6.33), the results were fairly weak when considering the null hypothesis for the interaction (BF01
= 3.62). Descriptives for these tests are displayed in Table 3.
On the negative affect composite, there was a significant main effect for the fairness
manipulation, F (1, 234) = 111.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .32, but again no effect for priming, F (1, 234)
= 1.57, p = .21, ηp2 = .007, d = .13, 95% CI [-.13, .38], and no significant interaction between
manipulations, F (1, 234) = .50, p = .48, ηp2 = .002. Pairwise comparisons showed that
participants in the fair outcome condition responded less negatively than those in the unfair
condition, d = 1.36, 95% CI [1.08, 1.65]. No other differences were significant. Again, Bayesian
analyses confirmed these findings, with decisive evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis
concerning the fairness main effect, BF10 = 1.81e +18, but only anecdotal evidence for the
priming main effect, BF10 = .22, and the interaction, BF10 = .24. Again however there was some
evidence for the null hypothesis when considering the priming main effect (BF01 = 4.53) and the
interaction effect (BF01 = 4.23). Thus, although there was an effect of fairness on the affect
measures, H1a and H1b were not supported. Descriptives for these tests are displayed in Table 3
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(Overall) and Table 4 (broken down by condition).
Confirmation Bias
Results of a 2 by 2 ANOVA showed that generally, participants reported wanting to
gather more information in the unfair condition (M = 5.72, SD = 1.35) compared to the fair
condition (M = 3.37, SD = 1.72), F (1, 234) = 138.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .37, d = 1.52, 95% CI [1.23,
1.81], but there were no significant effects for prime or the interaction between prime and
outcome. There was also a general tendency toward confirmation bias, illustrated by a weak but
significant positive correlation between confidence in verdict and incriminating information (r
(238) = .16, p = .017) and a weak but significant negative correlation between confidence and
exonerating information (r (238) = -.15, p = .025). See correlation matrix in Table 5.
In order to test my proposition that confirmation bias would be engendered by affective
responses to case outcome (H2), I ran correlations between affect measures and ratings of
evidence. Ratings of negative affect were significantly positively related to ratings of usefulness
of incriminating evidence (r (236) = .25, p < .001), exonerating evidence (r (236) = .22, p =
.001), and neutral evidence (r (236) = .38, p < .001). Further, ratings of positive affect were
slightly significantly negatively correlated with ratings of usefulness of neutral evidence (r (236)
= -.24, p < .001). Full correlation matrix is displayed in Table 5.
To examine the effect of my manipulations on my measures of confirmation bias (and to
test H3), I ran a 2 by 2 by 3 mixed-measures ANOVA on ratings of usefulness of evidence with
prime and outcome manipulations as between subject variables and type of evidence as a withinsubjects variable. There was a main effect for the outcome manipulation, F (1, 234) = 21.21, p <
.001, ηp2 = .083. Participants in the unfair condition were more likely to find gathering all types
of evidence useful, d = .60, 95% CI [.34, .86]. There was also a main effect for evidence type, F
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(2, 468) = 90.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .28. Pairwise comparisons showed that all participants thought
that gathering incriminating information would be more useful than neutral evidence, d = .60,
95% CI [.41, .78] and exonerating evidence, d = .88, 95% CI [.69, 1.07]. They also thought that
gathering neutral evidence would be more useful than exonerating evidence, d = .35, 95% CI
[.17, .53]. There was also a significant interaction between outcome manipulation and evidence
type, F (2, 468) = 3.37, p = .035, ηp2 = .01. Pairwise comparisons showed that all differences
were significant. However, because there was no interaction with my prime manipulation, H3
was not supported. Descriptives for pieces of evidence by condition are in Table 6.
The Role of Belief in a Just World
ANOVAs. In order to examine the effects of BJW (H4a and H4b), I performed a median
split of participants’ BJW scores. I then conducted two (BJW: High vs. Low) by two (prime: MS
vs. DP) by two (case outcome: fair vs. unfair) ANOVAs on negative and positive affect. For the
negative affect composite, again, there was only a main effect for case outcome, where
participants felt more negatively in the unfair condition (M = 4.75, SD = 1.91) than in the fair
condition (M = 2.36, SD = 1.59), F (1, 230) = 109.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .32, d = 1.36, 95% CI [1.08,
1.64]. No other effects were significant and thus H4a was not supported. Descriptives for this test
are in Table 7.
On the positive affect composite, there was again a main effect of the case outcome
manipulation. Participants in the fair condition showed more positive emotions (M = 5.98, SD =
1.91) than those in the unfair condition (M = 2.98, SD = 1.54), F (1, 230) = 184.90, p < .001, ηp2
= .45, d = 1.73, 95% CI [1.43, 2.03]. There was also a main effect for BJW: Those higher in
dispositional BJW generally showed more positive affective responses (M = 4.76, SD = 2.40)
than those low in BJW (M = 4.28, SD = 2.20), F (1, 230) = 6.77, p = .010, ηp2 = .03, d = .21, 95%
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CI [-.05, .47]. There was also a marginally significant interaction between BJW and the outcome
fairness manipulation, F (1, 230) = 3.39, p = .067, ηp2 = .015. Post hoc analyses showed that both
high (d = 2.11, 95% CI [1.63, 2.58]) and low BJW individuals (d = 1.51, 95% CI [1.13, 1.90])
showed more positive emotions in the fair condition compared to the unfair condition. However,
high BJW participants showed significantly more positive emotions than those low in BJW in the
fair condition (d = .54, 95% CI [.17, .91]) but not the unfair condition (d = .11, 95% CI [-.26,
.47]). No other effects were significant and thus H4b was not supported either. Descriptives for
this ANOVA are in Table 8.
Regressions. In order to account for the variability in individuals’ level of BJW, I
conducted two multiple regressions. I used the same factors as in my ANOVAs (prime and
outcome) and included BJW as a continuous predictor of negative and positive affect (on scales
from 1 to 9). The model for the negative emotions composite was significant, F (7, 230) = 18.65,
p <.001, R2 = .36 and both BJW and outcome fairness significantly predicted negative emotions.
Participants in the unfair condition reacted significantly more negatively to the verdict than those
in the fair condition by 2.32, p = .029, and for every increase on the BJW scale, participants
reacted more negatively to the outcome by .40, p = .028.
The model for the positive emotions composite was also significant, F (7, 230) = 28.47, p
< .001, R2 = .46. BJW was again a significant predictor, with every increase in BJW predicting
an increase in positive emotions of .43, p = .017. The interaction factors of outcome fairness and
BJW was marginally significant, predicting a decrease in positive affect of .45, p = .070.
Follow up Questions
In order to assess the study for potential confounds and possibly uncover an explanation
for the lack of effect of the MS manipulation, I ran two-way ANOVAs using prime and fairness
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outcome as the independent variables and as dependent variables, the follow up questions about
participants’ assessment of their experience of the case, specifically how realistic the case was,
how motivated they were to solve the case, and how much they identified with the role of lead
investigator. See Table 9 for descriptives.
Perceived realism of the case. There was a main effect for outcome on perceived
realism of the case, F (1, 234) = 11.67, p = .001, ηp2 = .048, d = .45, 95% CI [.19, .70], where
those in the fair outcome condition (M = 6.38, SD = .93) thought that the case was more realistic
than those in the unfair outcome condition (M = 5.95, SD = 1.00). No other effects were
significant.
Motivation to solve the case. There was a marginally significant main effect for
outcome on participants’ motivation to solve the case, F (1, 234) = 3.55, p = .061, ηp2 = .015, d =
.24, 95% CI [-.02, .50]. Participants in the fair condition (M = 6.05, SD = 1.14) reported being
marginally more motivated to solve the case than those in the unfair condition (M = 5.78, SD =
1.10). No other effects were significant.
Level of identification with role of the investigator. Again, there was a marginally
significant main effect for outcome on identification with the investigator role, F (1, 234) = 3.32,
p = .07, ηp2 = .014, d = .23, 95% CI [-.03, .49]. Participants reported identifying more with the
role of the investigator in the fair condition (M = 5.53, SD = 1.43) compared to the unfair
condition (M = 5.19, SD = 1.51). No other effects were significant.
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Chapter 12: Study 1 Discussion
For Study 1, I predicted a main effect for case outcome on affective responses to the
outcome of a case that participants had investigated – this was supported. Participants reacted
more positively and less negatively to the fair verdict than to the unfair verdict in the case for
which they judged a suspect. However, there was no interaction between outcome and prime and
thus H1 was not supported. There was no significant interaction between conditions on the
confirmation bias measures, thus H2 was also rejected. BJW interacted with case outcome but
not with prime, thus also contradicting the idea that dispositional BJW might moderate the effect
of MS on reactions to unfairness.
The main effects that the case outcome had on the follow up questions regarding realism
of the case, motivation to solve the case, and identification with the role of the investigator could
partially explain the lack of effects in the unfair condition. If participants did not see the case
they read as real, were not motivated to solve it, and did not identify with the investigator, they
might not have seen the unfair outcome as an actual worldview violation. This is especially true
because lack of realism has been seen as an attenuator of threats to BJW (e.g., Anderson, 1992;
Gruman & Sloan, 1983). Furthermore, in previous literature, MS had effects on people’s
reactions to unfair events that affected them personally. It is possible that being personally
removed from the unfairness mitigated participants’ reactions. It could also be that seeing an
injustice done to someone else does not threaten an individual’s concept of fairness.
The lack of effect of the MS manipulation on DTA is also problematic and suggests that
participants were not properly death primed. An overview of what participants wrote in response
to the manipulation questions showed that participants were indeed writing (and thus thinking)
about their own death. Conversely, those in the DP condition did not write about their death, thus
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the MS manipulation and control (DP) should have resulted in different levels of DTA. The lack
of effect of the prime manipulation could possibly be explained by an insufficient distraction
time. Participants might not have had enough time during the word search task to engage in the
proximal defenses that are necessary to observe distal defenses such as those I was expecting
(see Greenberg et al., 1994). Perhaps this potential lack of suppression for those in the MS group,
coupled with the possibility of those with high DTA in the DP group being death primed through
the word completion task could have diluted the predicted effects of MS. The word completion
task could have also brought thoughts of death back to MS participants’ attention, not giving
them enough time to suppress them again (see Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1997). This is
especially true since word completion tasks have been successfully used as a death prime (Zhou,
Liu, Chen, & Yu, 2008), although these researchers used ten word fragments that could only be
filled in with death related terms.
The lack of effect could also be an issue with the use of affect as a dependent variable. As
reported by Burke and his colleagues, effects of the MS manipulation on affect measures are not
as strong as other dependent variables (Burke et al., 2010, p.184) and using a sample of
participants other than college students also results in smaller effects. Power analyses were
adjusted for this expected smaller effect size, yet Bayesian analyses found weak support for the
null hypothesis when testing the interaction between prime and outcome fairness. In contrast
with previous research on this topic, although my study targeted fairness conceptually, the
injustice was not experienced by the participants themselves.
Finally, one last reason for the lack of effect could be that our fairness manipulation did
not expose the alternative: In the unfair condition, participants were not explicitly told of the
alternative to the not guilty verdict (i.e., that the jury could have found the suspect guilty, but did
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not), although it was implied. This might have made the threat to fairness not as salient for
participants. Perhaps a better fairness manipulation would have explicitly stated that the jury
could have chosen to exonerate the suspect but they did not, they convicted him. This would be
in line with previous research where participants were cognizant of the outcome/procedures that
the other students experienced (e.g., van den Bos, 2001; van den Bos, & Miedema, 2000). This
could reflect the findings of Greenberg and his colleagues (1990) where they did not find effects
when participants were not reminded of the threatened dimension.
Given these findings, MS appears not to have affected my mock investigators in the
predicted ways. However, several limitations may have been caused by the procedures necessary
to set up the study itself, such as the perceived lack of realism of the unfair verdict. Based on my
results, several methodological changes were made to the MS manipulation in Study 2 (i.e.,
removing the DTA, adding a distraction task after the MS manipulation). However, I still
thought it important to investigate the potentially biasing effect of MS on the role of the
investigator and the identity of the suspect.

55
Chapter 13: Study 2
The purpose of Study 2 was to examine another possible way thoughts of death could
impact decision making in investigations: the effect of MS on evaluations of the suspect in a
case. TMT research typically finds that under the threat of thoughts of death, people increase
their out-group derogation (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg, Simon, et al., 1992), ingroup favoritism (e.g., Jonas et al., 2002) and stereotype usage (e.g., Schimel et al., 1999). With
Study 2, I applied the findings of TMT research to investigatory decision making to answer the
following questions: How do death-primed participants respond to a suspect who is a member of
their out-group? How do death-primed people respond to a suspect who represents a certain
stereotype?
I investigated group membership on two levels: The suspect’s and the investigator’s
group membership. I manipulated what race the suspect was, both because racial identity can be
a relevant group membership and because I wanted to test for a change in the use of the Black
criminal stereotype, as discussed above. In order to control for racial in-group/out-group status, I
asked participants to disclose their race, among other demographics (for more details, see
Appendix D) and randomly assigned race of the suspect accordingly. Another group that
participants might have identified with is that of the investigator. By increasing the salience of
participants’ group membership I attempted to mimic the identity and group membership that
law enforcement officers experience.
One notable difference between Study 1 and Study 2 is that the case that participants
assessed. All pieces of evidence, including the DNA report, were ambiguous (i.e., did not
obviously indicate guilt or innocence). Ambiguity of the case was important for several reasons.
Judgments under ambiguous circumstances are susceptible to biases (Kahneman, Slovic, &
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Tversky, 1982, see also Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Pryce, 2001) that stem from
motivated cognition (Fiske & Taylor, 2013; Kunda, 1990; Trope & Liberman, 1996). As such,
judgments of an ambiguous case are best for an initial test of the effect of MS on perceptions of
the suspect. Another reason for the ambiguity of the case was in terms of external validity, when
considering miscarriages of justice such as innocent suspects being erroneously convicted. One
would hope that straightforward cases – where a suspect’s guilt or innocence is clear due to the
amount of incriminating or exculpating evidence – are solved accurately and with little risk of
false conviction. In cases with potentially ambiguous information, an innocent suspect might run
the risk of being seen as guilty due to extraneous factors. For an example of the updated case
used for Study 2, see Appendix E.
Hypotheses
Main hypotheses. Following the results of the TMT research on out-group derogation, I
predicted that people who were explicitly told to embrace the role of investigator would consider
the suspect an out-group member to a higher extent than those who were not explicitly engulfed
in the role. Thus, I predicted a main effect for group membership where participants told to
embrace the role of police investigator should have more negative and disfavorable views toward
the suspect and give higher guilt ratings (H1a). This main effect would be amplified by an
interaction between MS and group membership, in which MS should increase the negative
perceptions investigators have of the suspects (H1b). Furthermore, there should be a three-way
interaction of MS, salience of group membership and racial group membership (when
considering race of participants with race of the suspect) on measures of derogation (H1c).
Participants for whom mortality is salient and are in the investigator group should be assessing
the suspect negatively in general, however when the suspect belongs to the participants' racial in-
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group, participants will be motivated to distance themselves from their racial in-group (see
Arndt, Greenberg, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2002) and thus rate in-group suspects
even more negatively than suspects of their racial out-group. This will be contrasted with the
interaction of the journalist group membership and MS where, participants will not be motivated
to assess the suspects in their in-group negatively. For a graph of the three-way interaction
predicted by H1c, see Figure 3.
Research on TMT and stereotypes shows that people have a preference for people who
conform to the stereotypes they hold. The stereotype of African-Americans being criminals is
prominent (Bodenhausen, 1988; Duncan, 1976; Rector, Bagby, & Nicholson, 1993), more so
than for Hispanic and White people (Dixon & Rosenbaum, 2004; Smith & Dempsey, 1983;
Wilson, 1996). Furthermore, as participants will be given an ambiguous case, this should
increase their reliance on stereotypes to inform their decision. Thus, I predicted that when death
primed and given the opportunity to stereotype, participants will use existing stereotypes to the
highest extent (H2): There should be an interaction between race of the suspect and prime where
participants find the Black suspect guilty to a higher extent than other races when participants are
primed with MS (compared to when primed with DP). For a graph of the interaction predicted in
H2, see Figure 4.
Moderator hypotheses. Several moderating variables have shown effects in TMT
research and I investigated those most relevant to this study. Self-esteem is at the core of TMT,
predicting that those low in self-esteem should derogate out-group members to a higher extent
than those high in self-esteem (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Thus, I predicted that under MS,
my participants who are low in self-esteem would derogate an out-group suspect (professional or
racial) more than those high in self-esteem. This should result in three-way interactions between
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prime, self-esteem, and professional group membership (H3a) and prime, self-esteem, and racial
group membership (H3b) on measures of out-group derogation.
I also hypothesized that following the research on group identification (e.g., Hohman &
Hogg, 2015b) the effects of MS on out-group derogation will be seen most for those high in ingroup identification, whether it be their level of identification with their assigned professional
group membership or with their racial in-group. Thus I predicted an interaction between prime,
professional group membership, and level of identification with their assigned professional group
(H4a) and another interaction between prime, racial group membership, and level of
identification with their own race (H4b).
Past TMT research has also found that the order in which participants rate their own ingroup and an out-group member moderates MS effects (Greenberg et al., 1990). Reminding
participants of the dimension being threatened by having them rate their own in-group first
should increase out-group derogation under MS. Thus, when rating their level of identification
with their own in-group (either professional or racial) first participants should increase their
derogation of the suspect. Accordingly, I predicted an interaction between professional group
membership, order of presentation (i.e., whether participants rated their in-group first or not), and
prime where those in the police investigator group under MS who rated their professional ingroup first will derogate the suspect to a higher extent than those in the journalist group under
DP and those who rated the suspect first (H5a). I predicted a similar interaction for those who
rated their racial in-group first, where those under MS will derogate the (racial) out-group
suspect to a higher extent than those under DP, rating an out-group suspect first (H5b).
Secondary hypotheses. Given previous results examining the effect of MS on
punitiveness (Arndt et al., 2005), I predicted that MS would increase punitiveness in general and
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thus there would be a main effect of prime on punitiveness (H6). As an extension of
punitiveness, I also predicted that MS would increase predictions of recidivism, and there would
be a main effect of prime on this variable as well (H7).
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Chapter 14: Study 2 Method
Participants
Participants were 403 community members recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). Sample size was determined using a power analysis for an expected medium effect
based on previous TMT research using attitudinal dependent variables (r = .42, 95% CI [.37,
.46]; Burke et al., 2010, p. 29) on non-student populations (r = .25, 95% CI [.18, .32]; Burke et
al., 2010, p. 29). Participants were paid $2.00 for approximately 30 minutes of their time (M =
23.23, SD = 8.44). The sample was 52.1% females and 46.9% males, between the ages of 19 and
68 years (M = 37.51, SD = 11.78). Racial breakdown was as follows: 79.4% White, 8.4% Black,
6.2% Asian, 4.5% Hispanic, and 1.5% other.
Design
This study was a two (prime: MS vs. DP) by two (professional group membership:
investigator vs. journalist) by three (suspect race: Black vs. Hispanic vs. White). The suspect
race manipulation was collapsed into two conditions (racial group membership: in-group vs. outgroup) for certain analyses. This was done by considering participants’ race as well as the race of
the suspect to which they had been assigned to (e.g., a participant who is White in the Black
suspect race condition would be in the racial out-group condition).
Procedure
The procedure was similar to Study 1 with several small differences: Participants’ were
given a mock personality assessment (including the prime manipulation), but after they were
given feedback on their assessment (to manipulate professional group membership), they were
then given a case summary to evaluate (that was slightly modified from Study 1), they were then
asked to provide their judgement of the suspect’s guilt, and impressions of him along with
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measures of racial and professional group identification. Additionally, I did not manipulate
fairness of the outcome in this study and thus participants were not informed of the final verdict
in the case. Details of the procedure are described below.
MS was manipulated in the same manner as in Study 1 but the personality assessment
was slightly different: it started with a demographics survey (including a question about the race
of the participant), questions from the EPQR-A (Francis et al., 1992), the Rosenberg self-esteem
scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and questions from the five-factor personality assessment (OCEAN;
McCrae & Costa, 1987), after which feedback was given, providing the manipulation of
professional group membership. The police investigator group membership manipulation was
used to increase the salience of participants’ group identification as a police investigator. This
was done by providing them with bogus feedback for the personality test telling them that their
personality fit that of a law enforcement investigator. The personality feedback was given before
the MS to avoid any effects of potentially positive feedback boosting participants’ self-esteem,
thus nullifying the effects of the MS manipulation (see Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; Harmon-Jones
et al., 1997, Study 1).
After the personality feedback, I gave the priming manipulation – in the same manner as
in Study 1, followed by both the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and the word search
(same as in Study 1). This additional task (the PANAS) was given to allow for further distraction
from thoughts of death, which might have been needed given the lack of effects in Study 1.
Indeed, research shows that more distraction tasks between prime and dependent measures
increase the effects of MS (Burke et al., 2010). Furthermore, because of the concern raised in the
discussion of Study 1, I did not ask participants to respond to the DTA.
Once participants completed the mock personality assessment described above, they were
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informed that the personality portion was over and that they would now be asked to assess a case
file. The bogus feedback was followed by short immersion instructions asking participants to
imagine themselves in the role as the police investigator or the journalist. These instructions
were used to help ensure that participants assimilated their identity (police investigator or
journalist) when evaluating the case. The profession of journalist was chosen because it had a
similar investigative tone to it, without the hypothesized group membership of the police
investigator identity. To see the exact instructions, see Appendix H.
The case used in Study 2 was ambiguous, including the forensic report about the DNA
evidence found on the perpetrator’s mask. The case summary was pilot tested using MTurk
workers (n = 71), in order to be sure it was fairly ambiguous in terms of probability of guilt (M =
61.42%, SD = 26.37; on a scale from 0% to 100%). The case summary was identical for all
participants except for the suspect race manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to
either a suspect that was of their racial in-group or out-group. Within the group of participants
assigned to their racial out-group, half were assigned to a suspect of either race (e.g., if a
participant was White and assigned to a suspect that was in his or her out-group they had an
equal likelihood of being assigned to a Black or Hispanic suspect). Participants who reported
their race as anything other than “Black”, “Hispanic”, or “White”, were randomly assigned to
race as any race would be considered an outgroup member. The suspect’s racial information was
subtly incorporated in the case by using stereotypically Black (Jerome, Terrell, and Tyrone),
Hispanic (Miguel, Ramiro, and Ramon), and White (Marty, Hank, and Brad) names. This type of
unobtrusive race manipulation has been used successfully in other studies (e.g., Glaser et al.,
2015). Further, the race (Black, Hispanic, or White) was indicated discreetly among other
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suspect demographic information at the top of the police report to bolster the race manipulation3.
Materials
Self-esteem measure. Self-esteem was measured in order to assess for its effects on outgroup derogation, given the mixed results in previous research (see Burke et al., 2010). The
Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) was used as it is a highly reliable scale that
measures global self-worth (Gray-Little, Williams, & Hancock, 1997), and is used very often in
TMT research (e.g., Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1992; Burke et al., 2010, p. 185). The scale is
comprised of 10 items gaging participants’ feelings about themselves (e.g., “On the whole, I am
satisfied with myself”). Participants were asked to respond to these items on 4-point Likert scales
from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. Self-esteem scores were calculated by adding all
items to each other resulting in scores ranging from 10 to 50 with higher scores indicating higher
self-esteem (α = .94). For the full scale, see Appendix F.
Personality feedback manipulation. This feedback was provided to participants after
they answered the mock personality assessment and informed participants that given their
responses to our questions, their personality matched that of a police investigator or a journalist.
The exact feedback scripts are displayed in Appendix H. The feedback was written to be fairly
vague and neutral, and was pilot tested (n = 148 MTurk workers) in order to ensure that it did not
boost participants’ self-esteem and that it did indeed increase identification with the intended
professional group (i.e., police investigator or journalist).
Feedback was piloted in a similar manner as the feedback in Arndt and Greenberg (1999)
3

Pilot testing indicated that although using stereotypically Black and Hispanic names was
enough to clearly indicate race for Black and Hispanic suspects, the stereotypically White names
were not perceived as White the majority of the time. Adding the mention of race on its own was
also not enough to ensure identification of the suspect’s race. However the combination of name
and race mention increased pilot participants’ correct identification of the suspect’s race, without
them being suspicious of the race manipulation.
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and Harmon-Jones et al. (1997) using Arndt and Greenberg’s single item (“How good did the
personality feedback make you feel about yourself?”; 1999, p. 1334), appropriate elements from
Heatherton and Polivy’s state self-esteem scale (1991)4 and Rosenberg’s self-esteem scale
(1965). Although Rosenberg’s scale has historically not been a valid measure of changes in state
self-esteem, I thought it important to measure for changes in this scale after my feedback since
this was the measure used to assess global self-esteem in my study. I also used items from the
state self-esteem scale because this scale is more sensitive to temporary changes and thus might
detect changes that Rosenberg’s scale would not have. Items from these scales were split in half
by even (Rosenberg, α = .87; State self-esteem, α = .82) and odd numbered questions
(Rosenberg, α = .89; State self-esteem, α = .78). I used one half as a pretest and the other half as
a posttest after the feedback was given (order was counterbalanced). The specific items used are
listed in Appendix F.
Results from the pilot showed that the feedback significantly increased identification with
the group. Participants who were given personality feedback (M = 5.96, SD = 2.16) identified
significantly more with their group than those who were not given personality feedback (M =
4.04, SD = 2.02), F (1, 144) = 9.84, p = .002, ηp2 = .06, d = .50, 95% CI [.17, .83]. There was no
significant main effect for group (police investigator vs. journalist, F (1, 144) = 2.10, p = .149,
ηp2 = .01, d = .22, 95% CI [-.11, .55]) and no significant interaction between group and feedback,
F (1, 144) = 2.36, p = .126, ηp2 = .02, thus people did not feel more affiliated with one group
more than the other. Results from the pilot also showed that there were no significant differences
on either self-esteem measure, pre and post feedback. Participants’ scores on Rosenberg’s pretest
4

In their study, Heatherton and Polivy (1991) used elements that asked specifically about
academic performance (e.g., “I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read”, p.
898) and appearance (e.g., “I feel unattractive”, p. 898) that were not appropriate here as the
interest was more general perceptions of the self.
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(M = 9.69, SD = 3.46) were no different than their scores on the posttest (M = 9.76, SD = 3.30), t
(76) = -.23, p = .817, d = .02, 95% CI [-.21, .25]. Participants’ scores on State self-esteem
questions were no different on the pretest (M = 3.69, SD = .77) than on the posttest (M = 3.62,
SD = .88), t (76) = 1.13, p = .262, d = .08, 95% CI [-.14, .31].
PANAS. Immediately after the prime, participants were given a PANAS questionnaire.
The PANAS is a tool that assesses participants’ positive and negative affect by asking them to
rate on 5-point scales (1 = very slightly or not at all; 5 = extremely) to what extent they are
experiencing, at the moment, each of twenty words that describe different feelings and emotions
(e.g., “strong”, “active”, “nervous”, etc.; Watson et al., 1988). Scores for this measure were
calculated by averaging negative and positive items into two scales: the Positive Affect scale
(from 1 to 5 with higher scores meaning more positive affect, α = .92) and the Negative Affect
scale (from 1 to 5 with higher scores meaning more negative affect, α = .93). This was to serve
as a filler task, so thoughts of death were not the focal point of attention by the time participants
viewed the case. It also served to make the personality assessment more plausible and to control
for differences between priming conditions (typically, research finds no differences in affect
between MS and DP manipulations, Greenberg et al., 2008).
Race (name) manipulation. To manipulate race within the case summary, I changed the
name of the suspect that participants read about, using three stereotypically Black, Hispanic, and
White names. Past research has used stereotypical names of different races as a successfully
unobtrusive manipulation of race (e.g., Bertrand & Mulainathan, 2004; Cotton, O'Neill, &
Griffin, 2008; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). However, the literature does raise
several issues that were taken into account when choosing names for this study. Research has
indicated that Black names might prime concepts other than just race such as socio-economic
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class. Indeed sociologic research shows that the stereotypical names that are used in research
(e.g., Lamar, Darnel) were not always used in the African-American culture and that their
emergence was fairly recent. Data also shows that these types of names are more prevalent in
Black and African-American males who are of lower socio-economic status (Fryer & Levitt,
2004). Furthermore, from a simple numbers perspective, it is more likely that Black and
Hispanic names will be less common than stereotypically White names. This could impact
perceptions of uniqueness and likeability of an individual since familiarity breeds liking
(Bornstein, 1989).
These three factors (socio-economic status, uniqueness, and likeability) were taken into
account when choosing the names to use in my study. I created a list from names previously used
in the literature and informally polled people on what stereotypically White, Black, and Hispanic
names might be. I then consulted the 1990 census list ranking male name popularity
(http://www2.census.gov/topics/genealogy/1990surnames/dist.male.first) and rejected names that
were very popular. For example, Peter had been used in previous research but was ranked 43rd,
whereas the most popular stereotypically Black name (Leroy) was ranked 144th. I produced a list
of 25 names that I then pilot tested with 50 MTurk participants who were each given 6 names to
rate on 11 items to assess different characteristics of each name that might be a concern for this
study (i.e., likeability, uniqueness, perceived wealth/class, and perceived race) of each name.
Questions and response items for each name are displayed in Appendix G.
I matched names in terms of perceived likeability, uniqueness, and wealth as well as
distinctive racial implication (e.g., for a Black name, how Black of a name it was viewed as,
compared to Hispanic and White). The final names I chose based on this pilot were Jerome,
Tyrone, Terrell (Black), Miguel, Ramiro, Ramon (Hispanic), and Marty, Hank, and Brad
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(White), because they were distinctively representative of their racial identity (see Table 10) and
together they did not differ significantly based on perceived likeability (F (2, 103) = 1.56, p =
.22, ηp2 = .03), uniqueness (F (2, 103) = 1.51, p =.23, ηp2 = .03) or wealth (F (2, 103) = .72, p =
.49, ηp2 = .01), see Table 11 for descriptives.
Dependent Measures
In Study 2, I was interested in the effect of MS on participants’ assessment of a member
of their out-group that was a suspect in a crime. Furthermore, I was interested in how participants
assessed people who fulfill certain stereotypes, regardless of group membership. Thus, my
primary dependent variables assessed judgment and impressions of the suspect in the case.
Unlike in Study 1, I did not measure a dichotomous guilt measure, rather I used a continuous
measure of probability of guilt (0% = not at all guilty; 100% = completely guilty).
The subsequent ratings about the suspect were mapped after Ask and Granhag’s research
(2005, 2007a, 2007b): “To what extent does the available evidence link the suspect to the
crime?” (1 = to a very low degree; 9 = to a very high degree); “To what extent were the criteria
for probable cause fulfilled?” (1 = not at all fulfilled; 9 = completely fulfilled); “How adequate
was the evidence to prosecute the suspect?” (1 = not at all adequate; 9 = completely adequate).
These items were highly related and were averaged into a legal decision making scale (α = .92).
Further assessing participants’ impressions of the suspect, I asked them to rate him on 9point scales of honesty, likeability, intelligence, success, wealth, and dangerousness, adapted
from Cook and her colleagues’ investigation of jury decision making under MS (2004). In
addition to these traits I had participants rate traits that could reflect a more stereotypical
assessment of the suspect, adapted from Graham and Lowery (2004): vulnerability, violence and
badness. I also added several questions to assess identification with the suspect (adapted from
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Hohman & Hogg, 2011): “How much would you stand up for the suspect?”, “How much do you
identify with the suspect?”, and “How similar do you feel to the suspect?”
Salience of identity is important for self-categorization purposes (Oakes, 1987; Stets &
Burke, 2000) and my hypotheses for out-group derogation were based on the fact that police
investigators should view suspects as out-group members, more so than others (here, journalists).
I measured the extent to which participants identified with the professional in-group they were
assigned to during the study and own racial in-group.
I evaluated identification with professional group (i.e., journalist or police investigator
depending on random assignment to condition) using a scale of 8 items, adapted from Hohman
and Hogg (2011). Participants responded to items such as “How much of a feeling of belonging
do you have as a [police investigator/journalist]?” on 9-point scales. An additional question was
added as an attention check (“This is just a test question, select six to show you are not robot.”).
For the list of specific questions, see Appendix I. Both scales were highly reliable (For the police
investigator scale, α = .94, and for the journalist scale, α = .95). To assess racial in-group
identification, I had participants respond to the same items as for professional in-group adapted
for their racial in-group (i.e., as they reported, Black (α = .97), Hispanic (α = .93), or White (α =
.94)).
Order in which people judge a target and their own in-group has shown some effects in
the past (Greenberg et al., 1990): Making a target out-group (and threat to in-group) salient is
important for the threat to be perceived. This can be done by asking people to rate their in-group
first, before the target. Thus, the order in which the scales were presented was counterbalanced
with the judgment of the suspect. Half of the time, the suspect was rated first, and the other half
the suspect was rated second, after either the professional identification scale (a quarter of the
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time) or the racial identification scale (a quarter of the time).
Finally as most reliable results of TMT research have been found on punitiveness, I asked
participants the severity of the punishment they would recommend for the suspect in the event
they were found guilty: Participants responded to the question “If found guilty of the armed
robbery, how severe should the suspect’s punishment be?” on a 7-point scale (1 = very light
punishment, 7 = very heavy punishment; Florian & Mikulincer, 1997). Further, mapped onto
Graham and Lowery’s likelihood of recidivism scale (2004), I asked participants how likely they
thought it was that the suspect would commit similar or worse crimes in the future, averaged into
a measure of likelihood of recidivism (from 1 to 7 with higher values meaning higher likelihood
of recidivism, α = .91).
As manipulation checks, participants were asked which profession the personality
feedback said they matched with. Participants were also asked how accurate the feedback from
the personality assessment was, how the feedback made them feel, how motivated they were to
solve the case, how realistic the case was. They were also asked if they had any prior or current
law enforcement/investigation experience or if they had ever been a suspect in a crime, and if so,
whether they were convicted. Finally, participants were asked a series of questions about facts
that they remembered about the case, including what race the suspect (as a manipulation check)
and victim were. They were then debriefed, thanked, and paid through MTurk.
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Chapter 15: Study 2 Results
Participants who failed the attention check (n = 10 total), failed the professional group
manipulation (n = 5 total; n = 4 in addition to those who failed the attention check), and those
who failed the suspect race manipulation (n = 55 total; n = 50 in addition to those who failed the
attention check and the suspect race manipulation only) were dropped from analyses. All
analyses were conducted with this reduced sample of 339 participants.
PANAS
Concordant with TMT research, there were no differences between MS and DP
conditions on either the Positive (t (337) = .27, p = .791, d = .02, 95% CI [-.20, .23]) or the
Negative PANAS Scale (t (337) = .14, p = .890, d = .03, 95% CI [-.18, .24]). Thus, the MS
manipulation had no effect on participants’ reported emotions after thinking about death.
Suspect Ratings
Because the items that I used to assess participants’ impressions of the suspect were taken
from different research, I thought it necessary to evaluate which variables, if any, formed
coherent subsets. I performed a principal components analysis with orthogonal (Varimax)
rotation. Inspection of eigenvalues revealed three components with values higher than 1. The
correlation matrix is displayed in Table 12 and factor loadings are in Table 13. The first
component (Negative impressions, α = .94) accounted for 45% of the total variance of the
original variables and included ratings of dangerousness, violence, and badness. The second
component (Positive impressions, α = .81) accounted for 16% of the variance and included
ratings of honesty, likeability, intelligence, success, and wealth. The third component (Perceived
similarity, α = .86) accounted for 10% of the variance and contained the three answers to
questions about similarity to suspect. Given the results of this factor analysis I averaged items of
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each component to analyze them separately. Only perceived vulnerability was left out of these
scales (and subsequent analyses) because this characteristic did not map well onto any of the
components.
Main Hypotheses Testing – Outgroup Derogation
In order to test for increased outgroup derogation under MS (H1a, H1b, and H1c), I ran 2
(prime: MS vs. DP) by 2 (professional group membership: investigator vs. journalist) by 2 (racial
group membership: in-group vs. out-group) ANOVAs on the probability of guilt, legal decision
making measure, positive impression measure, negative impression measure, and perceived
similarity to suspect.
Probability of guilt. There was only a significant interaction between professional group
and prime on probability of guilt ratings, F (1, 331) = 4.45, p = .036, ηp2 = .01. Post hoc tests
indicated that probability of guilt was lower for mock police investigators under MS (M = 50.99,
SD = 25.07) than under DP (M = 60.78, SD = 24.60), d = .39, 95% CI [.09, .70]. Furthermore,
mock police investigators also had lower probability of guilt under MS than mock journalist
under MS (M = 60.13, SD = 24.48), d = .37, 95% CI [.07, .67]. No other effects were significant.
Results did not support any of my hypotheses: although prime and professional group interacted,
the effect was not in the predicted direction as MS decreased probability of guilt ratings for mock
police investigators, compared to mock journalists and mock police investigators under DP. See
descriptives for this test in Table 14.
Legal decision making measure. There were no significant effects of the same 2 by 2 by
2 ANOVA as above on the legal decision making measure, thus H1a, H1b, and H1c were not
supported using this dependent variable either. See descriptives in Table 14.
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Positive impressions of the suspect. There was a marginally significant main effect for
professional group membership, where those acting as police investigators (M = 3.09, SD = 1.20)
had more positive impressions than those in the journalist group (M = 2.88, SD = 1.19), F (1,
331) = 3.06, p = .081, ηp2 = .01, d = .18, 95% CI [-.04, .39]. There was also a marginally
significant interaction between professional group membership and prime, F (1, 331) = 3.60, p =
.059, ηp2 = .01. Post hoc tests revealed that those evaluating the case as a journalist in DP
condition (M = 2.68, SD = 1.07) viewed the suspects significantly less positively than those in
the police investigator DP condition (M = 3.14, SD = 1.19), d = .41, 95% CI [.10, .71]. Those in
the journalist DP condition also viewed the suspect less positively than the mock journalists in
the MS condition (M = 3.05, SD = 1.27), d = .31, 95% CI [.01, .62]. No other effects were
significant, and thus, again H1a, H1b, and H1c were not supported, and again, results were
trending in the opposite direction of what I had predicted. For descriptives, see Table 15.
Negative impressions of the suspect. On negative impressions of the suspect, there was
a main effect for professional group membership, F (1, 331) = 9.13, p = .003, ηp2 = .03, d = .31,
95% CI [.09, .52]. Again, mock journalists (M = 5.58, SD = 2.21) viewed the suspect more
negatively than mock police investigators (M = 4.91, SD = 2.13). There was also an interaction
between prime and racial group membership, F (1, 331) = 5.57, p = .019, ηp2 = .02. Post hoc tests
revealed that those who responded to an out-group member under MS (M = 4.97, SD = 2.27)
rated the suspect significantly less negatively than those in the DP group (M = 5.56, SD = 2.10),
d = .27, 95% CI [-.02, .56]. There was also a marginally significant effect where participants had
less negative impressions of racial in-group member under DP (M = 4.97, SD = 2.25) than of
racial out-group member under DP, d = .27, 95% CI [-.04, .58]. No other effects were significant,
and similarly to with positive impressions of the suspect, there was no support for H1a, H1b, or
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H1c. In fact, there was again a seemingly ironic effect of MS where it decreased negative ratings
of out-group suspects (compared to out-group members rated under DP). See descriptives in
Table 15.
Perceived similarity to suspect. Participants rating how similar they felt to the suspect
showed a main effect for professional group membership, F (1, 331) = 9.41, p = .002, ηp2 = .03, d
= .34, 95% CI [.12, .55]. Those who were told they matched with the personality profile of a
police investigator (M = 2.90, SD = 1.56) identified with the suspect to a higher extent than those
who matched with the profile of a journalist (M = 2.39, SD = 1.47). No other effects were
significant, thus again H1a, H1b, and H1c were not supported. See descriptives in Table 15.
Main Hypotheses Testing – Stereotypes
In order to test for the enhanced use of the Black criminal stereotype under MS (H2), I
ran two 2 (prime: MS vs. DP) by 2 (professional group membership: investigator vs. journalist)
by 3 (suspect race: Black vs. Hispanic vs. White) ANOVAs on probability of guilt and legal
decision making measures.
Probability of guilt. There was a significant interaction between prime and professional
group membership, F (1, 327) = 7.16, p = .008, ηp2 = .02. Post hoc tests revealed that mock
police investigators under MS (M = 50.99, SD = 25.07) thought that it was significantly less
likely that the suspect was guilty than the mock journalists under MS (M = 60.13, SD = 24.48), d
= .37, 95% CI [.07, .67]. Furthermore, mock police investigators under MS rated the suspect as
less guilty than when primed with DP (M = 60.78, SD = 24.60), d = .39, 95% CI [.09, .70].
There was also a significant three-way interaction between all independent variables on
probability of guilt. F (2, 327) = 3.34, p = .037, ηp2 = .02. Post hoc tests revealed a marginally
significant effect in the journalist under DP group, where White suspects (M = 64.23, SD =24.50)
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were viewed as more guilty than Hispanic suspects (M = 51.05, SD = 24.35), d = .54, 95% CI [.03, 1.11]. Hispanic suspects rated by mock police investigators were viewed as less guilty under
MS (M = 47.93, SD = 27.71) than under DP (M = 60.66, SD = 23.75), d = .50, 95% CI [-.04,
1.03]. Hispanic suspects rated by mock journalists saw the opposite trend where mock journalists
rating them under MS (M = 64.25, SD = 17.69) saw them as more guilty than under DP (M =
51.05, SD = 24.35), d = .62, 95% CI [-.02, 1.27]. And, under MS, mock police investigators rated
Hispanic suspects as significantly less guilty than mock journalist did, d = .68, 95% CI [.09,
1.28]. Furthermore, Black suspects were rated significantly less guilty by mock police
investigators when under MS (M = 49.16, SD = 21.99) than when they were under DP (M =
64.32, SD = 27.14), d = .60, 95% CI [.01, 1.20]. There was also a marginally significant
difference between mock journalists under MS (M = 61.91, SD = 28.19) and mock police
investigators under MS, with the latter rating Black suspects lower on probability of guilt, d =
.49, 95% CI [-.09, 1.06]. None of the existing effects supported H2 and no other effects were
significant. Descriptives are in Table 16 and a graph of the three-way interaction can be seen in
Figure 4.
Legal decision making measures. The only noteworthy effect on the same ANOVA on
the legal decision making measure was a marginally significant interaction of prime and
professional group membership, F (1, 327) = 3.13, p = .078, ηp2 = .01. Post hoc tests revealed
only one similar simple effect as above: Under MS, mock police investigators (M = 4.65, SD =
2.18) thought that the evidence against the suspect was not as strong as mock journalists did (M
= 5.33, SD = 2.27), d = .31, 95% CI [.01, .61]. No other effects were significant, and again these
findings did not support H2. Descriptives can be found in Table 16.
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The Effect of Self-Esteem on Out-group Derogation
MANOVA. In order to assess how self-esteem affected propensity to derogate out-group
members, I performed a median split of participants based on self-esteem. Scores ranged from 10
to 39 (M = 19.42, SD = 6.62) with a median score of 20. Low self-esteem participants had scores
between 10 and 19 and in the high self-esteem group participants had scores of 20 and above.
Because the suspect rating measures were correlated (see Table 17 for correlation matrix) and I
was more interested in the overall effect of self-esteem on general impression of the suspect, than
each individual dependent variable, I conducted a 2 (self-esteem: low vs. high) by 2 (prime: MS
vs. DP) by 2 (professional group membership: investigator vs. journalist) by 2 (racial group
membership: in-group vs. out-group) MANOVA on the ratings of the suspect to test H3a and
H3b.
There was a significant main effect for professional group membership, F (3, 321) = 4.14,
p = .007, Wilks’ λ = .96, ηp2 = .04. Multivariate contrasts showed significant effects for negative
impressions of the suspect, F (1, 323) = 8.43, p = .004, ηp2 = .03, d = .31, 95% CI [.10, .53],
perceived similarity to the suspects, F (1, 323) = 8.43, p = .003, ηp2 = .03, d = .34, 95% CI [.12,
.55], and a marginally significant effect on positive impressions of suspect, F (1, 323) = 3.24, p =
.073, ηp2 = .073, d = .18, 95% CI [-.04, .39]. Participants assigned to the police investigator
group rated suspects less negatively (M = 4.91, SD = 2.00) than those in the journalist condition
(M = 5.57, SD = 2.21) identified with the suspect more (M = 2.90, SD = 1.56) than in the
journalist condition (M = 2.39, SD = 1.47) and gave the suspect more positive ratings (M = 3.09,
SD = 1.20) than those in the journalist group (M = 2.88, SD = 1.19).
There was also a significant interaction between prime and professional group
membership, F (3, 321) = 3.39, p = .018, Wilks’ λ = .97, ηp2 = .03. Multivariate contrasts showed
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that there was only a significant effect for positive impressions of suspect, F (1, 323) = 4.97, p =
.026, ηp2 = .02. Post hoc tests were similar to those in the main analyses: Mock journalists rated
the suspect less positively under DP (M = 2.68, SD = 1.07) than under MS (M = 3.05, SD =
1.27), d = .31, 95% CI [.01, .62] and mock police investigators under DP (M = 3.14, SD = 1.19)
rated suspects more positively compared to mock journalists under DP, d = .41, 95% CI [.10,
.71].
There was another significant interaction between prime and self-esteem, F (3, 321) =
2.82, p = .039, Wilks’ λ = .97, ηp2 = .03. Multivariate contrasts showed significant effects for
positive impressions of the suspect, F (1, 323) = 6.47, p = .009, ηp2 = .02, and perceived
similarity with the suspect, F (1, 323) = 6.86, p = .011, ηp2 = .02. Those high in self-esteem
under MS showed more positive impressions of the suspect than under DP (MMS = 3.23, SDMS =
1.20 and MDP = 2.83 SDDP = 1.15), d = .34, 95% CI [.04, .64]. They also showed an increase in
perceived similarity with the suspect when compared to those in the DP condition (MMS = 3.06,
SDMS = 1.66 and MDP = 2.53, SDDP = 1.49), d = .34, 95% CI [.03, .64]. Ratings of positive
characteristics (Mlow = 2.86, SDlow = 1.24), d = .30, 95% CI [.00, .60] and perceived similarity
(Mlow = 2.40, SDlow = 1.49), d = .42, 95% CI [.12, .72] were also higher for those high in selfesteem when primed with MS (compared to those low in self-esteem). This was not the
interaction I had predicted in H3a or H3b. However, because those high in self-esteem showed
less derogation of the suspect under MS when compared to DP and those low in self-esteem, this
interaction could be viewed as support for my hypotheses, if all participants viewed the suspect
as an out-group member.
Finally there was a marginally significant three-way interaction between professional
group membership, self-esteem, and racial group membership, F (3, 321) = 2.30, p = .078,
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Wilks’ λ = .98, ηp2 = .02. Multivariate contrasts showed only a significant effect for identification
with the suspect, F (1, 323) = 4.86, p = .028, ηp2 = .02. Those high in self-esteem who rated
racial out-group suspects, identified more with the suspect when taking on the role of police
investigators (M = 3.01, SD = 1.64) than when taking on the role of journalists (M = 2.18, SD =
1.31), d = .55, 95% CI [.13, .97]. Those low in self-esteem, rating in-group members identified
more with the suspect when taking on the role of the police investigator (M = 2.98, SD = 1.79)
than when taking on the role of the journalist (M = 2.21, SD = 1.41), d = .48, 95% CI [.02, .95].
For mock journalists rating in-group members, those with low self-esteem identified less with the
suspect (M = 2.21, SD = 1.41) than those high in self-esteem (M = 3.05, SD = 1.81), d = .52, 95%
CI [.06, .98]. Finally mock journalists with high-self-esteem identified more with the suspect
when he was an in-group member then when he was an out-group members, d = .55, 95% CI
[.09, 1.02]. However, again, this was not the three-way interaction predicted by H3a or H3b.
Descriptives for the dependent variables evaluated in this MANOVA, broken down by
conditions, are displayed in Tables 18 (positive impressions), 19 (negative impressions), and 20
(perceived similarity to suspect).
Regressions. In order to account for the variability in individuals’ self-esteem, I also
conducted three multiple regressions using the same factors as above (prime, professional group
membership, and racial group membership), including self-esteem and interactions as factors to
predict positive and negative impressions of suspect and perceived similarity to the suspect (all
on scales from 1 to 9).
Positive impressions of the suspect. This model was not significant, F (15, 323) = 1.48, p
= .111, R2 = .02, and prime, professional group membership, racial group membership, and selfesteem did not predict positive impressions of the suspect.
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Negative impressions of the suspect. This model was marginally significant, F (15, 323)
= 1.57, p =.079, R2 = .03. Only the interaction between prime and racial group membership
significantly predicted an increase in of 4.22 in negative impressions of the suspect (p = .035).
Perceived similarity to the suspect. This model was significant, F (15, 323) = 2.20, p
=.007, R2 = .05. Prime significantly predicted perceived similarity to the suspect (p = .018) where
those in the MS condition saw themselves as less similar to the suspect than those in the DP
condition by 2.61. The interaction between prime and self-esteem also significantly predicted an
increase of 1.27 in perceived similarity to the suspect (p = .027). The three-way interaction
between professional group membership, racial group membership and self-esteem was also
marginally significant (p = .093) and predicted a decrease in perceived similarity to the suspect
of .86.
The Effect of Identification with Professional Group Membership on Out-group Derogation
MANOVA. In order to account for participants’ level of identification with the
professional group they were assigned to, scores on the professional identification scale were
divided by a median split to assess the effect of identification. Scores ranged between 1 and 9 (M
= 4.41, SD = 2.13) with a median score of 4.00. Low identification participants had scores
between 1 and 4 and the high identification group had scores of 4.13 and above. Because the
order in which participants rate their in-group and the target is also important (see Greenberg et
al., 1990) it was included in the analyses. In order to test H4a and H5a, I ran a 2 (prime: MS vs.
DP) by 2 (professional group membership: investigator vs. journalist) by 2 (identification level:
high vs. low) by 2 (order of presentation: suspect first vs. suspect second) MANOVA on positive
and negative impressions and identification with the suspect, including only participants who
rated their level of professional identification first or second (n = 185).
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There was a significant main effects for level of professional group membership, F (3,
167) = 3.41, p = .019, Wilks’ λ = .94, ηp2 = .06, and a marginal main effect for identification with
profession, F (3, 167) = 2.65, p = .051, Wilks’ λ = .96, ηp2 = .05. Multivariate contrasts showed
that the main effect of level of identification was significant for negative characteristics only, F
(1, 169) = 7.97, p = .005, ηp2 = .05. Participants who identified highly with their assigned
profession (M = 5.55, SD = 2.16) rated suspects more negatively than those who did not identify
highly with their assigned profession (M = 4.67, SD = 2.23), d = .40, 95% CI [.11, .7]. The main
effect on professional group membership was significant for negative impressions of the suspect,
F (1, 169) = 6.27, p = .013, ηp2 = .04, and perceived similarity with the suspect, F (1, 169) =
6.89, p = .009, ηp2 = .04. Mock police investigators (M = 4.82, SD = 2.20) rated suspects less
negatively than mock journalists (M = 5.47, SD = 2.23), d = -.29, 95% CI [-.51, -.08]. Mock
police investigators (M = 2.77, SD = 1.56) also identified more with suspects than did the mock
journalists (M = 2.30, SD = 1.41), d = .32, 95% CI [.10, .53].
There was also an interaction between prime and order of presentation, F (3, 167) = 3.26,
p = .023, Wilks’ λ = .95, ηp2 = .06. Multivariate contrasts showed that there was a significant
effect for perceived similarity with the suspect, F (1, 169) = 12.58, p = .016, ηp2 = .03, and there
was a marginally significant effect for negative impressions of the suspect, F (1, 169) = 16.41, p
= .057, ηp2 = .02. Post hoc tests showed significantly higher ratings in perceived similarity with
the suspect for participants who rated the suspect second in the MS condition (M = 2.99, SD =
1.75) compared to the DP condition (M = 2.36, SD = 1.51), d = .39, 95% CI [-.01, .78].
Similarly, those rating the suspect second in the MS condition also rated the suspect marginally
less negatively (M = 4.81, SD = 2.34) than those in the DP condition (M = 5.42, SD = 2.07), d =
.28, 95% CI [-.12, .67]. Participants under MS who rated the suspect first (M = 2.21, SD = 1.13)
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also perceived themselves as less similar to them than those who rated him second, under MS, d
= .52, 95% CI [.10, .95]. And, again there was a similar marginal effect for negative perceptions,
where participants who rated the suspect first, perceived him more negatively than if they rated
him second, under MS (M = 5.41, SD = 2.30), d = .26, 95% CI [-.16, .68].
There was also a marginally significant interaction between professional group
membership and level of identification, F (3, 167) = 2.13, p = .098, Wilks’ λ = .96, ηp2 = .04,
driven by significant effects on positive impressions, F (1, 169) = 5.43, p = .021, ηp2 = .03, and
perceived similarity with the suspect, F (1, 169) = 4.53, p = .035, ηp2 = .03. Post hoc tests
revealed that for both dependent variables, mock police investigators showed significant
differences from mock journalists among those low in professional identification. Mock police
investigators in the low identification group rated the suspect more positively (M = 3.25, SD =
1.01) than mock journalists in the low identification group (M = 2.78, SD = 1.25), d = .41, 95%
CI [-.04, 86]. They also saw themselves as more similar to the suspect (M = 3.16, SD = 1.64)
than the mock journalists in the low identification group (M = 2.13, SD = 1.18), d = .74, 95% CI
[.28, 1.20]. Post hoc tests also revealed that, again, for both dependent variables there were
similar differences between high and low identification for participants assigned to the police
investigator role. Mock police investigators in the high identification group (M = 2.76, SD =
1.16) rated the suspect less positively than those in the low identification group, d = .45, 95% CI
[.01, .89] and reported feeling less similar to the suspect (M = 2.50, SD = 1.45) than those in the
low identification group, d = .43, 95% CI [-.01, .87].
Finally there was a significant four-way interaction between prime, professional group
membership, order of presentation, and level of identification, F (3, 167) = 4.96, p = .003, Wilks’
λ = .92, ηp2 = .08, driven by an effect on negative impressions, F (1, 169) = 10.68, p = .001, ηp2 =
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.06. This interaction is graphed in Figure 5, and, very briefly summarized, post hoc tests showed
very few effects under DP but several complex effects under MS, suggesting that although
results were not according to my predictions (neither H4a nor H5a) MS caused interaction effects
with all variables of interest.
For descriptives, see Table 21 (ratings of positive impressions), Table 22 (ratings of
negative impressions), and Table 23 (perceived similarity to suspect).
Regressions. In order to account for the variability in individuals’ level of identification
with their assigned profession, I conducted three multiple regressions in a similar way as for selfesteem. I used the same factors as in my MANOVA (prime, professional group membership,
order of presentation) and included level of identification with their profession as a continuous
predictor of predict positive and negative impressions of suspect and perceived similarity to the
suspect (again, all on a scale from 1 to 9).
Positive impressions of the suspect. This model was not significant, F (15, 169) = .93, p
= .534, R2 = -.01, and prime, professional group membership, order of presentation, and level of
group identification did not predict positive impressions of the suspect.
Negative impressions of the suspect. This model was significant, F (15, 169) = 2.58, p
=.002, R2 = .11. Two-way interaction factors prime by professional group membership
interaction (p = .042) and prime by level of group identification (p = .053) were significant and
predicted increases in negative impressions of the suspect of respectfully 5.89 and 2.55. The
three-way interaction factors of prime by professional group membership by level of group
identification (p = .016), prime by professional group membership by order of presentation (p =
.016) significantly predicted increases in negative impressions of the suspect by respectfully 6.90
and 2.97. The three-way interaction factor of professional group membership by level of group
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by order of presentation (p = .061) marginally significantly predicted an increase in negative
impressions of the suspect by 6.56. Finally, the four-way interaction term also significantly
predicted an increase in negative impressions of the suspect by 3.46, p = .002.
Perceived similarity to the suspect. The model was not significant, F (15, 169) = 1.31, p
= .20, R2 = .02, and prime, professional group membership, order of presentation, and level of
group identification did not predict perceived similarity to the suspect.
The Effect of Identification with Racial Group Membership on Out-group Derogation
MANOVA. Scores on the racial identification scale were divided by median split to
assess for the effect of participants’ level of identification with their own race. Scores ranged
between 1 and 9 (M = 6.56, SD = 1.79) and a median score of 6.75. Low identification
participants had scores between 1 and 6.75 and the high identification group had scores of 6.88
and above. To test H4b and H5b, I ran a 2 (prime: MS vs. DP) by 2 (racial group membership:
in-group vs. out-group) by 2 (identification level: high vs. low) by 2 (order of presentation:
suspect first vs. suspect second) MANOVA, including only participants who rated their level of
racial identification first or second (n = 154).
There was a main effect for order of presentation, F (3, 136) = 3.05, p = .031, Wilks’ λ =
.94, ηp2 = .06. Multivariate contrasts showed that this effect was significant for participants’
positive impressions of suspects, F (1, 138) = 8.27, p = .005, ηp2 = .06, perceived similarity with
the suspect, F (1, 138) = 6.15, p = .014, ηp2 = .04, and marginally significant for negative
impressions. F (1, 138) = 3.17, p = .077, ηp2 = .02. Those rating the suspect second rated him
more positively (M = 3.35, SD = 1.25) than those rating the suspect first (M = 2.79, SD = 1.15), d
= .47, 95% CI [.14, .79]. Similarly, they identified more with him (M = 3.13, SD = 1.62) than
those who rated him first (M = 2.45, SD = 1.45), d = .44, 95% CI [.12, .76], and rated the suspect
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marginally less negatively (M = 5.10, SD = 2.21) than those rating him first (M = 5.56, SD =
2.08), d = -.21, 95% CI [-.53, .11].
There was another main effect for level of racial identification, F (3, 136) = 3.44, p =
.019, Wilks’ λ = .93, ηp2 = .07. Multivariate contrasts showed a significant effect for ratings of
negative impressions only, F (1, 138) = 9.82, p = .002, ηp2 = .07. Those who identified highly
with their own race (M = 5.80, SD = 2.47) rated suspects more negatively than those who did not
identify highly with their own race (M = 4.90, SD = 1.75), d = .43, 95% CI [.10, .75].
Lastly, there was a three-way interaction between racial group membership, identification
level, and order of presentation, F (3, 136) = 2.84, p = .040, Wilks’ λ = .94, ηp2 = .06.
Multivariate contrasts showed that this effect was significant for positive impression, F (1, 138)
= 6.27, p = .013, ηp2 = .04, and perceived similarity with the suspect, F (1, 138) = 5.69, p = .018,
ηp2 = .04. Post hoc tests showed similar simple effects for both dependent variables and are
respectively illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. No other effects were significant, thus, again, there
was no support for H4b or H5b. Descriptives for these tests are displayed in Table 24 (for ratings
of suspect on positive characteristics), Table 25 (ratings of negative characteristics), and Table
26 (perceived similarity to suspect).
Regressions. In order to account for the variability in individuals’ level of identification
with their race, I conducted three multiple regressions. I used the same factors as in my
MANOVA (prime, racial group membership, and order of presentation) and included level of
identification with their race as a continuous predictor of positive and negative impressions of
suspect and perceived similarity to the suspect (on scales from 1 to 9).
Positive impressions of the suspect. This model was significant, F (15, 138) = 1.78, p =
.043, R2 = .07; however no factors significantly predicted positive impressions of the suspect.
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Negative impressions of the suspect. This model was not significant, F (15, 138) = 1.45,
p =.134, R2 = .04.
Perceived similarity to the suspect. The model was significant, F (15, 138) = 1.91, p
=.027, R2 = .08. Racial group membership significantly predicted perceived similarity to the
suspect where participants rating an out-group member viewed themselves as more significantly
more similar to them (p = .044) than the suspect in their in-group by 4.09. The two-way
interaction factor of racial group membership by level of racial identification significantly
predicted an increase in perceived similarity to the suspect by 6.26, p = .040. Finally, the prime
by level racial identification (p = .088) and prime by level of racial identification by order of
presentation (p = .093) interaction factors were marginally significant and respectfully predicted
increases in .58 and 6.06 in perceived similarity to the suspect.
The Effect of MS on Punitiveness
I ran a 2 (prime: MS vs. DP) by 2 (professional group membership: investigator vs.
journalist) by 2 (racial group membership: in-group vs. out-group) ANOVA on proposed
severity of punishment to test H6. There was only a marginally significant interaction between
prime and professional group membership, F (1, 331) = 3.70, p = .055, ηp2 = .01. The trend was
driven by a significant difference between mock police investigators (M = 5.50, SD = 1.15) who
suggested a higher punishment than mock journalists (M = 5.11, SD = 1.28) under DP, d = .32,
95% CI [.02, .63]. No other effects were significant, thus H6 was not supported. Descriptives can
be found in Table 27.
The Effect of MS on Recidivism
I also ran a 2 (prime: MS vs. DP) by 2 (professional group membership: investigator vs.
journalist) by 2 (racial group membership: in-group vs. out-group) ANOVA on the recidivism
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composite to test H7. Results supported this hypothesis, showing a significant main effect for
prime, F (1, 331) = 5.01, p = .026, ηp2 = .02, d = .24, 95% CI [.02, .45], where participants under
MS (M = 2.91, SD = 1.48) thought that the suspect was more likely to recidivate than those in the
DP condition (M = 2.58, SD = 1.32).
There was also a marginally significant interaction effect between prime and professional
group membership, F (1, 331) = 3.54, p = .061, ηp2 = .01. This trend was driven by mock police
investigators thinking that if found guilty, the suspect was more likely to recidivate (M = 3.15,
SD = 1.54) than mock journalists (M = 2.70, SD = 1.48) under MS, d = .30, 95% CI [-.002, .60],
and mock police investigators under MS thinking that recidivism was more likely than police
investigators under DP (M = 2.51, SD = 1.22), d = .46, 95% CI [.16, .77]. Descriptives are
displayed in Table 37.
Follow up Questions
In an attempt to understand the counter-intuitive findings that MS decreased probability
of guilt and increased positive impressions and perceived similarity with the suspect in several of
my main analyses, I ran analyses directed at assessing potential confounds in the design. I used
my manipulations as independent variables to run 2 (prime: MS vs. DP) by 2 (professional group
membership: investigator vs. journalist) by 3 (suspect race: Black vs. Hispanic vs. White)
ANOVAs, on the follow up questions about the case and the feedback. Descriptives for these
variables are displayed in Table 28.
Perceived realism of the case. Unlike in Study 1, there were no effects for perceived
realism of the case.
Motivation to solve the case. The participants’ motivation to solve the case could have
been a potential moderator, affecting participants’ assessment of the suspect in the case, as
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someone playing the role of police investigator might be more motivated to solve the case and
somehow evaluate evidence more rigorously, giving more weight to exonerating information.
However, although it might have affected mock police investigators in general, it is unlikely that
motivation would be affected by MS. And indeed, there was a marginally significant main effect
for professional group membership, F (1, 327) = 3.60, p = .059, ηp2 = .01, d = .15, 95% CI [-.07,
.36], where mock police investigators (M = 5.70, SD = 1.35) were more motivated to solve the
case than mock journalists (M = 5.49, SD = 1.49). However, there was no significant interaction
between prime and professional group membership, F (1, 327) = .40, p = .529, ηp2 = .001.
Interestingly, there was a significant interaction between race of the suspect and
professional group membership, F (1, 327) = 3.20, p = .042, ηp2 = .02. Post hoc tests showed that
for cases concerning a Black suspect, mock police investigators (M = 6.00, SD = 1.23) reported
being more motivated than mock journalists (M = 5.39, SD = 1.61), d = .42, 95% CI [.03, .82].
Mock police investigators also reported being less motivated to solve the case when the suspect
was White (M = 5.39, SD = 1.47) compared to when he was Black, d = .44, 95% CI [.07, .82].
Finally, there was also a marginally significant simple effect where mock police investigators
reported being more motivated to solve the case with a Black suspect than for a case with a
Hispanic suspect (M = 5.84, SD = 1.22) and a White suspect, d = .33, 95% CI [-.03, .69].
There was also a marginally significant interaction between race of the suspect and
prime, F (1, 327) = 2.67, p = .070, ηp2 = .02. The trend was driven by participants who were less
motivated to solve the case with a White suspect under MS (M = 5.24, SD = 1.27) than when
under DP (M = 5.79, SD = 1.49), d = .40, 95% CI [.07, .73]. Further, participants under MS
given a case with a White suspect were less motivated to solve the case than when the suspect
was Black (M = 5.75, SD = 1.38), d = .39, 95% CI [.03, .75].
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Perceived accuracy of the personality feedback. There were no significant effects for
perceived accuracy of the personality feedback.
Reaction to the personality feedback. There was a significant interaction effect between
prime and professional group membership, F (1, 327) = 4.11, p = .043, ηp2 = .01. Post hoc tests
showed a significant simple effect between mock police investigators and mock journalist under
DP where mock police investigators (M = 5.61, SD = 2.10) reported feeling better about the
feedback than mock journalists (M = 4.93, SD = 1.96), d = .33, 95% CI [.03, .64]. There was also
a marginally significant simple effect for mock police investigators who felt better about the
feedback in the DP condition than in the MS (M = 5.06, SD = 2.05), d = .27, 95% CI [-.04, .57].
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Chapter 16: Study 2 Discussion
For Study 2, I had predicted a main effect of professional group membership, where
participants told to act like police investigators would view the suspect more negatively and have
higher guilt ratings than those acting as journalists, and that this effect would be enhanced by an
interaction with MS. This hypothesis was not supported, as I found that there was no effect of
professional group membership on the measures of guilt. Furthermore there was a reverse effect
where participants acting as police investigators had more positive (and less negative) views of
the suspect and even identified to a higher extent with the suspect than those playing the part of a
journalist. The interaction effects seen in the analyses were also opposite to what I had predicted.
Indeed the only significant effect on the guilt dependent variable was an interaction driven by
mock police investigator participants who showed much lower probability of guilt ratings under
MS (compared to mock journalists under MS and mock police investigators under DP).
Furthermore, there was no evidence of the predicted three-way interaction.
I had also predicted an interaction between race of the suspect and prime. This interaction
was not significant. However, there was a significant three-way interaction between race of the
suspect, professional group membership, and prime, driven by mock police investigators under
MS assigning lower probability of guilt to Black and Hispanic suspects (compared to mock
journalists under MS and mock police investigators under MS).
Several of the measures that were expected to moderate the effects of MS (e.g., selfesteem, level of group identification, and order of presentation of suspect rating) did indeed
interact with MS; however these effects were not always straightforward. For example, there
were interactions between prime and self-esteem (in both MANOVA and regression analyses),
where high self-esteem increased positive ratings of the suspect. However, there were no three-
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way interaction involving group membership and thus, there seemed to be no effect for high or
low self-esteem increasing or decreasing out-group derogation. Given these results, it is possible
that all participants, regardless of their racial or assigned professional group membership could
have conceptualized the suspect as an out-group member, taking away the power of my group
membership manipulations.
Furthermore, the main effects of level of group identification replicated in both analyses
of professional and racial group identification. Those high in professional identification and
racial identification viewed the suspect more negatively thus generally derogating the suspect
(perhaps again suggesting that all participants considered the suspect an out-group member) and
only interacting with prime or group membership in regression analyses. The differences
between results found between the MANOVA and regression analyses could indicate issues with
median split technique but could have also indicated that each dependent variable might have
played significant parts in the MANOVAs, despite not being individually significant.
Measures of punitiveness also did not show typical MS effects as there was no increased
demand for severity of punishment under MS. On the other hand, predicted recidivism was
higher for participants in the MS group as compared to those in the DP group.
These results are interesting and seem to indicate a more prevalent role of Mortality
Salience in this study than in Study 1. However, the exact meaning of these results could be
understood in several ways. When interpreting the results of my analyses on the probability of
guilt measure, one should consider that the case was piloted at 61.42% probability of guilt and
thus the recurrent interaction effects seen between prime and professional group membership
should be interpreted as MS causing a decrease in guilt ratings for those in the police investigator
condition. One explanation for this effect might be that, unlike what seems to have happened in
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Study 1, and contrary to what I predicted, taking on the role of a police investigator primed
thoughts of fairness, made more salient by MS. This in turn might have made mock police
investigators more attuned to exonerating information and led them to rate the suspect lower on
probability of guilt. However, this does not fully explain the effects of professional group
membership on ratings of the suspect. If participants were more attuned to exonerating
information, why would this result in an increase in perceived similarity with the suspect?
Given the results of the analyses examining the effects of the race manipulation, it is clear
that MS had an effect on participants’ assessments’ of the minority suspects (i.e., Black and
Hispanic). Again, however, this was contingent on professional group membership, where asking
participants to take on the role of a police investigator somehow made them rate minorities (but
not White suspects) lower in probability of guilt under MS. It is true that most of my sample was
White, and therefore this effect might be interpreted as an out-group effect, however the same
three-way interaction was not significant when analyzing probability of guilt and taking into
account strictly participants’ racial group membership (as was done in the first set of analyses).
Alternative explanations for the counter-intuitive findings of the police investigator group
were explored by analyzing follow up questions. However, findings regarding participants’
motivation to solve the case and feelings about the feedback, although interesting did not provide
an explanation for my results.

91
Chapter 17: General Discussion
Results from these studies provide limited support for the idea that thinking about one’s
own death can affect a police investigation. In my first study, I wanted to determine whether
thinking about death would increase mock police investigators’ negative reaction to an unfair
outcome for a case they had investigated and if these negative emotions would then lead to
increased confirmation bias in future investigations. Contrary to my main hypotheses, there were
no effects at all for my MS manipulation. Participants who were asked to think about their own
death did not show an increase of negative affect in response to an unfair outcome of the case
they investigated when compared to those asked to think about going to the dentist. There was
also limited evidence of increased confirmation bias when faced with an unfair outcome. I did
find evidence of confirmation bias generally in response to my case – that had been piloted for
the suspect to be found guilty, however the unfair outcome only increased the likelihood to
search for any information, not specifically incriminating information. Finally, I had
hypothesized that individuals’ BJW would moderate my MS effects, however BJW only
interacted with my fairness manipulation showing that those high in BJW responded more
positively to a fair outcome than those low in BJW. This finding supports the connection
between dispositional BJW and differential reactions to outcome fairness, however the lack of
interaction with MS sheds doubt on the role of dispositional BJW as a moderator for MS.
In my second study, I attempted to answer questions concerning the role of MS on outgroup derogation (when considering one’s own race and professional group membership) and the
use of the Black criminal stereotype when considering the suspect in an investigation. In this
study, I did find effects for MS, however not in the hypothesized direction. Indeed, I had
hypothesized that taking on the role of police investigator would create a group membership for
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my participants who would then view all suspects as out-group members, more so than
journalists. However, participants who acted as police investigators were generally less harsh
toward the suspect and viewed him more positively than mock journalists did. Furthermore, there
was no evidence of increased use of stereotypes as I had predicted. Race of the suspect did
interact with the prime and professional group; however this interaction seemed to indicate
harsher treatment of minorities for mock journalists under MS and less harsh treatment of
minorities for mock police investigators under MS.
This counter-intuitive effect of the participants in the police investigator condition could
be due to participants being primed with fairness within this context. They could have been
taking on a “justice role” and as such be primed with consistent norms, promoting them to a
higher extent under MS (see Gailliot et al., 2008; Jonas et al., 2008). This could explain why they
would have judged suspects less harshly under MS and could be a potential explanation for their
treatment of minority suspects. Participants might have been aware of the current climate of
police-minority relations and want to remedy by taking on their role. Interestingly, however, this
would mean that I would have primed fairness through my professional group membership
manipulation in Study 2. This primed norm would have interacted with MS to produce effects on
my probability of guilt dependent variable, where in Study 1 my fairness manipulation did not
interact with MS.
My predictions regarding moderators in this study were also mostly not supported by the
analyses. There were some effects of MS interacting with moderators. However, these effects
were inconsistent and not perfectly aligned with my hypotheses. Self-esteem interacted with the
prime showing increased derogation of the suspect, in general, but this was not contingent on the
group membership of the suspect. This, again, might indicate that all participants were regarded
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as out-group members. It is clear from this second study that MS interacted with several of the
variables I predicted it would. However, these interactions were rarely in the direction expected,
and the explanation for these effects has yet to be elucidated.
The reason for the difference of MS effects in Study 1 and 2 could be explained by the
methodological adjustments made to the MS manipulation (removal of the DTA measure and
adding a second distraction task) or the difference in dependent variables, as past research does
show smaller effects of MS on affective measures compared to attitudinal measures (see Burke et
al., 2010). Of note, Study 1 took place a month after the terrorist attacks in Paris and thus, this
could have resulted in a general increase in DTA for both MS and DTA groups, as has been seen
in past research (e.g., Das et al., 2009; Landau, Solomon, et al., 2004). However there is no way
to know if the DTA scores in my study are particularly high as DTA scores vary widely between
studies and there is no standardized measure of what is considered “high” or “low” DTA.
Because of the difference in dependent variables and rationale between my two studies,
the lack of effect in Study 1 could be more than just due to methodological adjustments. It could
also be an indication that the effects seen in previous research on TMT and fairness (e.g., van
den Bos, 2001) could indeed be due to the confounding effects of being primed with uncertainty
when contemplating one’s own death. The results of my first study could be seen as more
support for the idea that the effects seen in past TMT research on reactions to unfairness were
due to the concept of fairness being particularly important for people facing uncertainty
specifically, but not death. Reviewing participants’ open-ended responses to the MS
manipulation, not all participants evoked uncertainty when writing about death. Additionally,
several participants in the DP condition referred to uncertainty when writing about going to the
dentist. This overlap could have interfered with my ability to replicate previous findings. A
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clearer distinction between the thoughts brought about by the control condition and thoughts of
uncertainty might have been responsible for the past effects of MS on reactions to outcome
fairness (see van den Bos et al., 2005).
Limitations and Future Direction
This body of work is a starting point for examining the effects of MS in police
investigations. This research, of course, is not without flaws. As stated above, the lack of realism
in the unfair condition in Study 1 could have been responsible for the lack of effects of MS,
which would not be an issue if this research was conducted with real cases. Indeed, in reality, a
police investigator would not question the realism of a case based on an unlikely outcome in
court. For Study 2, participants were mostly community members asked to take on the role of a
police investigator (or a journalist) and thus they would have acted in a way that they think a
police investigator would act, which obviously might be different from the way that police
investigators actually act. Some doubts have been raised about there being a true police
personality (Balch, 1972) and research on law enforcement decision making using law
enforcement samples has found similar effects as studies using lay people (e.g., Ask & Granhag,
2005; Correll et al., 2007). Thus the way police investigators behave and people think that they
do might not be that different, however this has yet to be tested. There is however, some
evidence for organizational socialization, during the police academy and over the years of
working as a police officer, where motivation declines (e.g., van Maanen, 1975). It is possible
that my participants acted as enthusiastic young idealistic police investigators motivated to seek
out justice and primed with fairness which might have made them more conscientious in their
assessment of the case facts, more careful in guarding against bias, and less likely to ascribe
guilt, especially toward minorities.
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The issues in these studies can be addressed in several ways. Taking on the role of police
investigator did affect participants, and the effects of the role taken, although opposite of my
predictions, were amplified by MS. The role of police investigator could have affected these
participants’ responses by priming fairness norms, which would have been enhanced by MS (see
Gailliot et al., 2008). Future research could seek to identify what norms taking on the role of
police investigator primed, using a simpler design aimed at examining only MS and possible
norms that playing the role of a police investigator could prime. A simpler design might also
help understand the seemingly complex effects of race in this context. Furthermore, a more
diverse sample might help to understand the racial group dynamics at play.
Simpler designs and more experimental control would be helpful to resolve the issues in
my second study. On the other hand, issues with both studies (i.e., lack of realism of the unfair
outcome in Study 1 and the potentially inaccurate conceptualization of the police investigator’s
role in Study 2) underscore the importance of pursuing this research in more externally valid
environments with more specialized populations (i.e., actual law enforcement officers). Although
this would not allow for as much experimental control, it would be very interesting to consider
how actual police investigators react to unfair outcomes in cases that they investigate, and how
their identity as law enforcement influences their assessments of suspects and, of course, whether
thinking about their own death affects these processes.
Taking into consideration actual law enforcement populations does raise the question of
whether or not they would be subject to the effects of MS in the same way that civilians are.
Indeed, if they are contemplating their own death at higher rates than other populations, law
enforcement officers could be constantly subject to the effects of death priming. It is also
possible that they could develop alternative coping mechanism such as dealing with death in a
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rational manner – which decreases the typical effects of MS as predicted by TMT (e.g., Simon et
al., 1997). Some research has shown similar effects of MS on active duty military as on general
population (e.g., van den Berg & Soeters, 2009) however, there is limited research on this topic.
Further, when considering law enforcement populations and how MS affects them, one would
have to also take into account factors such as their role in the institution (i.e., beat cop, detective
in homicide, detective in a white-collar crime division, etc.) and the relative dangerousness of the
neighborhood they work in to assess the extent to which their job might increase their daily MS
and change their reactions to death priming.
Concluding Remarks
This body of work is the first to examine Terror Management Theory in the context of
decision making in police investigations, thus filling a gap in the literature. Ultimately, bringing
these two literatures together could be used to create safeguards against the biasing effects of
MS. Indeed, this type of work has the potential to identify a source of motivational bias (i.e.,
MS) likely to affect decision making, which is particularly important for law enforcement
officers considering their work environment. Finding that the effects generally observed in TMT
research are corroborated for investigative decision making could lead to a deeper understanding
of the source of bias in context, and improved decision making for law enforcement. In turn,
knowledge about how MS interacts with factors important to the law enforcement decision
making process could then help create methods to prevent the influence of MS.
Nevertheless, it is also important to contemplate the utility of such an endeavor. If it is
true that thoughts of death bias decision making in investigation, are the types of effects found in
the literature (and even some found in this research, e.g., order of target rating) really important
to consider? Would the situations set up in the present body of work arise in the real world? For
instance, would the concept of a police investigator’s own in-group(s) be particularly salient
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before he or she judges a suspect, and would this impression of the suspect in turn affect the
investigator’s decision making about the case? These questions are important to consider when
thinking about the value of applied research.
Regardless, it is difficult to imagine that sources of motivational bias, especially those
like death priming, would not arise in law enforcement contexts, which are reputed to be
particularly dangerous and likely to provoke thoughts of death. In fact, past TMT research has
found effects of MS on a large amount of variables, beyond those considered in this dissertation
(e.g., Burke et al., 2010). With this many different ways that thoughts of death could affect
decision making, this type of research is invaluable and should be pursued beyond this
dissertation.
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Table 1
Correlation matrix for affect composites and individual affect ratings
2
3
4
5
1
6
Variable
1. Positive affect
.91*
2. Happy
.90*
.72*
3. Content
.91*
.77*
.85*
4. Satisfied
.85*
.77*
.65*
.62*
5. Proud
-.45*
-.54*
-.57*
-.27*
6. Negative affect -.52*
-.52*
-.45*
-.55*
-.55*
-.28* .94*
7. Anger
-.47*
-.41*
-.51*
-.53*
-.21* .92*
8. Fury
-.59*
-.66*
-.69*
-.42* .87*
9. Disappointment -.67*
-.05
-.01
-.07
-.09
.02
.61*
10. Guilt
-.45*
-.41*
-.46*
-.50*
-.22* .86*
11. Sadness
Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

7

.90*
.81*
.46*
.76*

8

9

10

.76*
.42* .31*
.77* .71* .36*
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Table 2
Descriptives and comparisons of DTA measure and all word fragment between priming groups
Mortality Salience (MS)
Dental Pain (DP)
t-test
n = 122
n = 116
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
1.32
0.88
1.3
0.87
t (236) = .16, p = .88
DTA
Buried
0.79
0.41
0.74
0.44
t (236) = .83, p = .41
Dead
0.32
0.47
0.34
0.48
t (236) = -.41, p = .68
Grave
0.03
0.18
0.08
0.27
t (198.76) = -1.51, p = .13 *
Corpse
0.16
0.37
0.11
0.32
t (233.26) = 1.16, p = .25 *
Coffin
0.02
0.13
0.03
0.16
t (236) = -.51, p = .61
Note. * For these tests, Levene's test for equality of variances was significant, thus equal
variances was not assumed
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Table 3
Descriptives for composites and individual emotions, overall (n = 238)
Mean
SD
4.49
2.30
Positive
4.21
2.44
Happy
5.13
2.57
Content
4.88
2.79
Satisfied
3.76
2.50
Proud
3.54
2.12
Negative
3.50
2.43
Angry
3.33
2.48
Furious
4.21
2.81
Disappointed
3.64
2.43
Sad
3.03
2.54
Guilty
Note. Higher values indicate higher levels of each dependent variable
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Table 4
Descriptives for composites broken down by condition
Mortality Salience (MS)
Fair (n = 62)
Unfair (n = 60)
Mean SD
Mean
SD
Positive affect
6.14 1.85
2.94
1.29
Negative affect
2.57 1.73
4.81
1.62

Dental Pain (DP)
Fair (n = 58)
Unfair (n = 58)
Mean SD
Mean
SD
5.81 1.98
3.03
1.78
2.12 1.40
4.69
2.19
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Table 5
Correlation matrix for affect composites, evidence ratings, and confidence in verdict
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
Affect composite
1. Negative affect
2. Positive affect
-.52**
Type of evidence
3. Incriminating
.25**
-0.04
4. Neutral
.38**
-.24**
.47**
5. Exonerating
.22**
-0.06
.35**
.55**
0.08
0.07
.16*
-0.08
-.15*
6. Confidence
Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the
0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 6
Descriptives of ratings of the utility of pursuing different evidence types broken down by
condition
Evidence type
Incriminating
Neutral
Exonerating
Condition
n
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Fair
Death
62
5.25
0.93
4.70
0.93
4.26
1.21
Dentist
58
5.36
0.87
4.49
0.99
4.34
1.14
Total
120
5.30
0.90
4.60
0.96
4.30
1.17
Unfair
Death
60
5.60
0.75
5.27
0.65
4.80
1.08
Dentist
58
5.54
0.86
5.15
0.89
4.75
1.12
Total
118
5.57
0.80
5.21
0.77
4.78
1.10
Total
Death
122
5.42
0.86
4.98
0.85
4.52
1.18
Dentist
116
5.45
0.87
4.82
0.99
4.55
1.14
Total
238
5.44
0.86
4.90
0.92
4.53
1.16
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Table 7
Descriptives of negative affect composite broken down by condition and Belief in a Just World
Mortality Salience
(MS)
Dental Pain (DP)
Total
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Fair
36
2.39
1.40
33
2.13
1.47
69
2.27
1.43
Low BJW
26
2.82
2.10
25
2.11
1.33
51
2.47
1.79
High BJW
62
2.57
1.73
58
2.12
1.40
120
2.36
1.59
Total
Unfair
30
4.58
1.79
34
4.42
2.36
64
4.49
2.10
Low BJW
30
5.04
1.43
24
5.07
1.91
54
5.05
1.64
High BJW
60
4.81
1.62
58
4.69
2.19
118
4.75
1.91
Total
Total
66
3.38
1.92
67
3.29
2.27
133
3.34
2.10
Low BJW
56
4.01
2.08
49
3.56
2.20
105
3.80
2.14
High BJW
122
3.67
2.01
116
3.41
2.24
238
3.54
2.12
Total
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Table 8
Descriptives of positive affect composite broken down by condition and Belief in a Just World
Mortality Salience (MS)
Dental Pain (DP)
Total
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Fair
36
5.73
1.79
33
5.37
2.15
69
5.56
1.96
Low BJW
26
6.70
1.82
25
6.40
1.59
51
6.55
1.71
High BJW
62
6.14
1.85
58
5.81
1.98
120
5.98
1.91
Total
Unfair
30
2.84
1.39
34
2.96
1.60
64
2.91
1.49
Low BJW
30
3.03
1.19
24
3.11
2.03
54
3.07
1.61
High BJW
60
2.94
1.29
58
3.03
1.78
118
2.98
1.54
Total
Total
66
4.42
2.16
67
4.15
2.23
133
4.28
2.19
Low BJW
56
4.74
2.38
49
4.79
2.45
105
4.76
2.40
High BJW
122
4.56
2.26
116
4.42
2.34
238
4.49
2.30
Total
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Table 9
Descriptives for Study 1 follow up questions, broken down by condition
Mortality Salience (MS)
Dental Pain (DP)
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Perceived realism of case
Fair
62
6.34
1.01
58
6.43
0.84
Unfair
60
5.92
1.00
58
5.98
1.07
Total
122
6.13
1.02
116
6.21
0.98
Motivation to solve case
Fair
62
6.02
1.19
58
6.09
1.08
Unfair
60
5.88
1.01
58
5.67
1.18
Total
122
5.95
1.11
116
5.88
1.14
Identification with the lead investigator role
Fair
62
5.48
1.41
58
5.59
1.45
Unfair
60
5.18
1.51
58
5.19
1.53
Total
122
5.34
1.46
116
5.39
1.50

n

Total
Mean

SD

120
118
238

6.38
5.95
6.17

0.93
1.03
1.00

120
118
238

6.05
5.78
5.92

1.14
1.1
1.12

120
118
238

5.53
5.19
5.36

1.43
1.51
1.48
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Table 10
Descriptives for perceived racial identity of names, broken down by stereotypically Black,
Hispanic, and White names
Hispanic
Comparative
Black ratings
White ratings
ratings
race
n
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Blackness
Black names
Lamar
12
6.08
1.00
2.67
1.44
2.33
1.37
1.08
3.03
Terrell
11
5.82
0.87
2.45
1.21
2.27
1.27
1.09
3.21
Darnel
12
5.00
1.76
2.42
1.83
2.67
1.15
-0.08
3.75
Jerome
11
5.36
1.29
2.45
1.69
2.91
1.51
0.00
3.55
Tyrone
12
6.00
0.95
2.50
1.17
2.33
1.07
1.17
2.86
Leroy
13
5.31
1.18
2.69
1.49
3.38
1.76
-0.77
3.17
Total
71
5.59
1.24
2.54
1.44
2.66
1.39
0.39
3.24
Hispanicness
Hispanic names
Fernando
11
2.36
1.12
6.09
0.83
2.27
1.01
1.45
2.84
Roberto
12
2.58
1.31
6.00
1.04
2.75
1.36
0.67
2.53
Miguel
13
2.31
1.11
6.15
0.90
2.23
1.24
1.62
3.15
Ramiro
11
2.36
1.36
6.00
1.26
2.36
1.43
1.27
3.72
Gustavo
12
2.42
1.24
5.67
1.23
2.75
1.48
0.50
3.71
Ramon
12
3.00
1.71
5.92
1.16
2.33
1.30
0.58
3.58
Total
71
2.51
1.30
5.97
1.06
2.45
1.28
1.01
3.20
Whiteness
White names
Connor
14
2.00
1.11
1.71
1.07
6.14
0.95
2.43
2.90
Bradley
13
3.15
1.63
2.54
1.45
5.85
0.90
0.15
3.63
Holden
13
2.15
1.46
1.85
1.34
6.23
1.09
2.23
3.14
Cody
10
2.60
1.35
2.00
1.05
5.80
1.03
1.20
3.19
Brendan
14
3.50
1.61
2.93
1.69
5.71
0.73
-0.71
3.34
Brett
13
2.38
1.19
2.38
1.12
6.08
0.86
1.31
2.84
Greg
10
3.70
1.42
2.40
1.26
5.80
1.14
-0.30
2.75
Brad
12
2.17
1.11
2.00
1.13
6.08
1.31
1.92
3.29
Josh
12
3.58
1.16
2.67
1.07
5.25
1.14
-1.00
2.73
Ian
11
2.45
1.13
2.09
1.30
5.91
0.94
1.36
3.07
Marty
12
3.08
1.51
1.92
1.08
5.83
1.27
0.83
3.04
Chip
12
2.00
0.85
1.92
1.00
5.75
1.14
1.83
2.55
Hank
12
3.25
1.42
2.17
0.94
5.50
1.09
0.08
2.61
Total
158
2.76
1.41
2.20
1.22
5.85
1.04
0.89
3.12
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Table 11
Descriptives for perceived characteristics of names, broken down by stereotypically
Black, Hispanic, and White names
Likeability
Uniqueness
Wealth
n
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Black names
Lamar
12
3.92
1.24
4.25
0.73
3.25
0.81
Terrell
11
3.30
1.27
3.79
1.52
3.41
1.11
Darnel
12
3.69
1.05
4.08
1.33
3.42
1.04
Jerome
11
3.55
0.91
3.15
0.78
3.64
0.60
Tyrone
12
3.97
1.57
3.31
1.16
3.42
0.95
Leroy
13
3.36
1.56
2.87
1.13
3.23
1.09
Total
71
3.63
1.28
3.57
1.21
3.39
0.93
Hispanic names
Fernando
11
4.39
1.20
3.30
1.29
3.73
1.15
Roberto
12
4.06
1.02
4.06
1.20
3.79
0.94
Miguel
13
4.08
1.28
2.74
1.44
3.73
0.63
Ramiro
11
4.24
1.11
4.39
1.35
3.45
0.88
Gustavo
12
3.86
1.47
4.92
1.26
3.75
1.03
Ramon
12
3.97
1.62
3.92
1.52
3.63
0.98
Total
71
4.09
1.27
3.87
1.49
3.68
0.92
White names
Connor
14
4.88
1.09
3.40
1.13
4.36
0.66
Bradley
13
4.41
1.26
2.92
1.00
4.77
1.32
Holden
13
3.64
1.55
4.64
1.00
4.54
0.80
Cody
10
4.30
1.29
3.03
1.18
4.45
1.19
Brendan
14
4.05
1.30
3.26
1.28
4.00
0.76
Brett
13
3.41
1.10
2.95
1.17
4.38
0.79
Greg
10
3.57
1.32
2.43
1.07
3.90
0.66
Brad
12
3.72
0.74
2.61
1.10
3.96
0.92
Josh
12
4.22
1.16
3.00
0.97
4.13
0.38
Ian
11
4.76
0.92
3.24
1.36
4.55
0.69
Marty
12
3.14
1.42
3.69
1.37
3.63
0.53
Chip
12
2.75
1.23
4.17
1.18
4.25
1.52
Hank
12
4.08
1.26
2.97
0.98
3.58
0.79
Total
158
3.92
1.32
3.28
1.25
4.20
0.93
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Table 12
Correlation matrix for impressions of suspects (n = 339)
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1. Honest
2. Likeable
.71**
3. Intelligent
.49**
.55**
4. Successful
.43**
.49**
.43**
5. Wealthy
.33**
.32**
.26**
.65**
6. Dangerous
-.59** -.46** -.18** -.19** -0.09
7. Vulnerable
.30**
.27**
.14*
.22** .25** -.14*
8. Violent
-.59** -.45** -.18** -.18** -0.08 .90** -.14*
9. Bad
-.58** -.44** -.25** -.21** -0.11 .80** -.13* .83**
10. Stand up
.65**
.54**
.31**
.30** .25** -.55** .31** -.55** -.51**
11. Identify
.49**
.45**
.30**
.35** .32** -.31** .21** -.30** -.26** .62**
12. Similar
.46**
.43**
.29**
.36** .33** -.31** .20** -.29** -.26** .56** .91**
Note. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 13
Rotated component matrix for impressions of suspects
Component
Negative characteristics
Positive characteristics
Identification
Variable
1. Honest
0.61
0.52
0.32
2. Likeable
0.46
0.62
0.26
3. Intelligent
0.19
0.66
0.09
4. Successful
0.06
0.84
0.13
5. Wealthy
-0.07
0.76
0.16
6. Dangerous
0.92
0.07
0.16
7. Vulnerable
0.10
0.39
0.17
8. Violent
0.93
0.06
0.14
9. Bad
0.89
0.13
0.08
10. Stand up
0.53
0.27
0.58
11. Identify
0.15
0.24
0.92
12. Similar
0.14
0.24
0.91
Note. Extraction method: Principal component analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser
normalization.
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Table 14
Descriptives for probability of guilt and legal decision making composite broken down by prime, professional group membership and
racial group membership
Mortality Salience (MS)
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Probability of guilt
Out-group
43
48.58
25.71
In-group
39
53.64
24.39
Total
82
50.99
25.07
Legal decision making composite
Out-group
43
4.58
2.11
In-group
39
4.72
2.28
Total
82
4.65
2.18

Dental Pain (DP)
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD

53
38
91

60.87
59.11
60.13

24.89
24.19
24.48

52
38
90

60.31
61.42
60.78

26.01
22.86
24.60

40
36
76

55.50
61.08
58.14

23.77
25.44
24.57

53
38
91

5.23
5.47
5.33

2.37
2.16
2.27

52
38
90

5.25
4.93
5.11

2.30
1.96
2.16

40
36
76

4.96
5.22
5.08

2.11
2.33
2.20

112

Table 15
Descriptives for ratings of the suspect broken down by condition
Mortality Salience (MS)
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
Positive characteristics
Out-group
43
3.13
1.17
53
2.97
In-group
39
2.95
1.28
38
3.15
Total
82
3.05
1.22
91
3.05
Negative characteristics
Out-group
43
4.41
2.27
53
5.42
In-group
39
4.97
2.10
38
5.93
Total
82
4.67
2.20
91
5.63
Level of identification
Out-group
43
3.07
1.67
53
2.38
In-group
39
2.78
1.59
38
2.79
Total
82
2.93
1.63
91
2.55

SD

Dental Pain (DP)
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD

1.11
1.47
1.27

52
38
90

2.99
3.33
3.14

1.21
1.16
1.19

40
36
76

2.60
2.77
2.68

1.03
1.12
1.07

2.18
2.08
2.14

52
38
90

5.49
4.61
5.12

2.11
1.90
2.06

40
36
76

5.64
5.35
5.50

2.11
2.54
2.31

1.39
1.79
1.58

52
38
90

2.72
3.06
2.86

1.39
1.65
1.51

40
36
76

1.98
2.44
2.20

1.08
1.51
1.31
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Table 16
Descriptives for culpability measures broken down by race of suspect
Mortality Salience (MS)
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Probability of guilt
Black
19
49.16
21.99
32
61.91
28.19
Hispanic
27
47.93
27.71
20
64.25
17.69
White
36
54.25
24.80
39
56.56
24.30
Total
82
50.99
25.07
91
60.13
24.48
Legal decision making composite
Black
19
4.91
1.46
32
5.66
2.31
Hispanic
27
4.23
2.46
20
5.52
2.16
White
36
4.81
2.29
39
4.97
2.30
Total
82
4.65
2.18
91
5.33
2.27

Dental Pain (DP)
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
28
29
33
90

64.32
60.66
57.88
60.78

27.14
23.75
23.42
24.60

22
19
35
76

54.59
51.05
64.23
58.14

23.57
24.35
24.50
24.57

28
29
33
90

5.50
5.03
4.86
5.11

2.38
2.15
1.99
2.16

22
19
35
76

5.20
4.35
5.41
5.08

2.01
2.17
2.30
2.20
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Table 17
Correlation matrix for impressions of suspects (n = 339)
1
2
1. Positive impression
-.45**
2. Negative impression
.59**
-.45**
3. Perceived similarity to suspect
Note. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 18
Descriptives for ratings of suspect's positive characteristics broken down by conditions and participants' self-esteem levels
Mortality Salience (MS)
Dental Pain (DP)
Police investigator
Journalist
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Participants with high self-esteem
Out-group suspect
23
3.30
1.24
24
3.05
1.17
32
2.88
1.15
14
2.29
0.94
In-group suspect
22
3.26
1.22
18
3.36
1.38
20
3.24
1.08
18
2.71
1.28
Total
45
3.28
1.21
42
3.18
1.25
52
3.02
1.13
32
2.53
1.15
Participants with low self-esteem
Out-group suspect
20
2.95
1.09
29
2.90
1.08
20
3.18
1.30
26
2.76
1.06
In-group suspect
17
2.54
1.28
20
2.97
1.57
18
3.43
1.26
18
2.83
0.96
Total
37
2.76
1.18
49
2.93
1.29
38
3.30
1.27
44
2.79
1.01
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Table 19
Descriptives for ratings of suspect's negative characteristics broken down by conditions and participants' self-esteem levels
Mortality Salience (MS)
Dental Pain (DP)
Police investigator
Journalist
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Participants with high self-esteem
Out-group suspect
23
4.23
2.15
24
5.36
2.22
32
5.35
2.04
14
5.90
2.27
In-group suspect
22
4.62
1.88
18
5.56
1.96
20
4.73
1.77
18
5.43
2.42
Total
45
4.42
2.01
42
5.44
2.09
52
5.12
1.95
32
5.64
2.33
Participants with low self-esteem
Out-group suspect
20
4.62
2.45
29
5.47
2.18
20
5.72
2.24
26
5.50
2.06
In-group suspect
17
5.41
2.34
20
6.27
2.17
18
4.46
2.09
18
5.28
2.72
Total
37
4.98
2.40
49
5.80
2.19
38
5.12
2.23
44
5.41
2.32
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Table 20
Descriptives for ratings of perceived similarity to the suspect broken down by conditions and participants' self-esteem levels
Mortality Salience (MS)
Dental Pain (DP)
Police investigator
Journalist
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
Participants with high self-esteem
23
3.43
1.79
24
2.47
1.43
32
2.71
1.49
14
1.69
Out-group suspect
22
2.98
1.43
18
3.46
1.91
20
2.73
1.55
18
2.63
In-group suspect
45
3.21
1.62
42
2.90
1.71
52
2.72
1.50
32
2.22
Total
Participants with low self-esteem
20
2.65
1.44
29
2.31
1.38
20
2.73
1.25
26
2.14
Out-group suspect
17
2.51
1.78
20
2.18
1.48
18
3.43
1.73
18
2.24
In-group suspect
37
2.59
1.59
49
2.26
1.41
38
3.06
1.52
44
2.18
Total

SD
0.89
1.66
1.44
1.16
1.36
1.23
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Table 21
Descriptives for ratings of positive characteristics broken down by conditions, level of professional group identification, and order of
presentation
Mortality Salience (MS)
Dental Pain (DP)
Police investigator
Journalist
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Participants with high professional group identification
12
2.70
1.15
11
3.05
0.91
11
2.45
1.15
13
2.89
1.02
Suspect rated first
11
2.80
1.22
15
2.97
1.67
17
2.96
1.19
15
2.88
1.12
Suspect rated second
23
2.75
1.16
26
3.01
1.38
28
2.76
1.18
28
2.89
1.05
Total
Participants with low professional group identification
10
2.64
1.06
10
3.16
1.54
9
2.98
0.73
9
2.58
1.38
Suspect rated first
7
3.91
1.06
14
3.03
1.09
9
3.69
0.73
12
2.33
1.01
Suspect rated second
17
3.16
1.21
24
3.08
1.26
18
3.33
0.80
21
2.44
1.16
Total
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Table 22
Descriptives for ratings of negative characteristics broken down by conditions, level of professional group identification, and order of
presentation
Mortality Salience (MS)
Dental Pain (DP)
Police investigator
Journalist
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Participants with high professional group identification
12
6.56
1.62
11
5.18
2.45
11
4.70
2.46
13
5.95
1.69
Suspect rated first
11
4.48
2.10
15
6.33
2.19
17
5.57
2.28
15
5.24
2.10
Suspect rated second
23
5.57
2.11
26
5.85
2.33
28
5.23
2.35
28
5.57
1.92
Total
Participants with low professional group identification
10
3.50
1.72
10
6.20
2.31
9
4.56
2.39
9
4.44
2.42
Suspect rated first
7
3.33
1.74
14
4.17
2.25
9
4.52
1.62
12
6.08
2.00
Suspect rated second
17
3.43
1.68
24
5.01
2.45
18
4.54
1.98
21
5.38
2.29
Total
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Table 23
Descriptives for perceived similarity to the suspect broken down by conditions, level of professional group identification, and order of
presentation
Mortality Salience (MS)
Dental Pain (DP)
Police investigator
Journalist
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Participants with high professional group identification
Suspect rated first
12
1.81
0.86
11
2.15
1.10
11
2.55
1.31
13
2.18
1.40
Suspect rated second
11
2.79
1.71
15
3.04
2.13
17
2.78
1.64
15
2.29
1.29
Total
23
2.28
1.40
26
2.67
1.80
28
2.69
1.50
28
2.24
1.32
Participants with low professional group identification
Suspect rated first
10
3.07
1.15
10
1.90
1.10
9
2.89
1.12
9
2.59
1.89
Suspect rated second
7
4.00
2.19
14
2.57
0.78
9
2.89
2.07
12
1.44
0.50
Total
17
3.45
1.67
24
2.29
0.96
18
2.89
1.62
21
1.94
1.38
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Table 24
Descriptives for ratings of suspect's positive characteristics broken down by prime, racial group, level of racial group
identification, and order of presentation
Mortality Salience (MS)
Dental Pain (DP)
In-group suspect
Out-group suspect
In-group suspect
Out-group suspect
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Participants with high racial group identification
5
3.84
1.82
5
2.00
0.99
8
2.80
1.64
9
2.16
0.76
Suspect rated first
11
2.56
1.27
14
3.63
1.04
8
3.58
1.24
12
3.00
1.16
Suspect rated second
16
2.96
1.53
19
3.20
1.24
16
3.19
1.46
21
2.64
1.07
Total
Participants with low racial group identification
Suspect rated first
Suspect rated second
Total

10
11
21

2.64
3.64
3.16

1.29
1.19
1.31

16
11
27

2.94
3.29
3.08

0.84
1.29
1.04

13
5
18

2.75
3.64
3.00

0.72
0.91
0.85

8
8
16

3.28
3.73
3.50

1.13
1.75
1.44
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Table 25
Descriptives for ratings of suspect's negative characteristics broken down by prime, racial group, level of racial group identification,
and order of presentation
Mortality Salience (MS)
Dental Pain (DP)
In-group suspect
Out-group suspect
In-group suspect
Out-group suspect
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Participants with high racial group identification
5
6.13
1.99
5
5.73
2.95
8
5.92
3.54
9
7.37
0.63
Suspect rated first
11
5.82
2.81
14
4.38
2.47
8
5.42
1.76
12
6.31
2.26
Suspect rated second
16
5.92
2.52
19
4.74
2.59
16
5.67
2.71
21
6.76
1.81
Total
Participants with low racial group identification
10
5.20
1.74
16
5.63
1.94
13
4.62
1.60
8
4.54
1.01
Suspect rated first
11
5.03
1.19
11
5.03
1.72
5
3.80
1.80
8
4.25
2.62
Suspect rated second
21
5.11
1.44
27
5.38
1.84
18
4.39
1.65
16
4.40
1.93
Total
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Table 26
Descriptives for ratings of suspect's perceived similarity with the suspect broken down by prime, racial group, level of racial group
identification, and order of presentation
Mortality Salience (MS)
In-group suspect
Out-group suspect
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Participants with high racial group identification
5
3.87
2.12
5
1.47
0.73
Suspect rated first
11
2.91
1.89
14
3.62
1.88
Suspect rated second
16
3.21
1.95
19
3.05
1.90
Total
Participants with low racial group identification
10
2.30
1.45
16
2.19
1.31
Suspect rated first
11
3.45
1.74
11
2.91
1.43
Suspect rated second
21
2.90
1.68
27
2.48
1.38
Total

Dental Pain (DP)
In-group suspect
Out-group suspect
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
8
8
16

2.38
3.67
3.02

1.54
1.78
1.74

9
12
21

1.48
2.50
2.06

0.41
1.34
1.15

13
5
18

2.67
3.33
2.85

1.28
1.27
1.28

8
8
16

3.67
2.71
3.19

1.43
1.31
1.41
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Table 27
Descriptives for punitiveness and recidivism broken down by condition
Mortality Salience (MS)
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Punitiveness
Out-group
43
5.40
1.31
53
5.26
1.30
In-group
39
5.18
1.05
38
5.55
1.18
Total
82
5.29
1.19
91
5.38
1.25
Predicted receidivism
Out-group
43
2.97
1.65
53
2.60
1.34
In-group
39
3.35
1.40
38
2.83
1.48
Total
82
3.15
1.54
91
2.70
1.39

Dental Pain (DP)
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
52
38
90

5.40
5.63
5.50

1.21
1.08
1.15

40
36
76

4.98
5.25
5.11

1.25
1.54
1.39

52
38
90

2.43
2.62
2.51

1.01
1.45
1.22

40
36
76

2.84
2.49
2.67

1.59
1.23
1.43
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Table 28
Descriptives for Study 2 follow up questions broken down by condition
Mortality Salience (MS)
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
Perceived case realism
Black
19
5.42
1.35
32
5.72
1.59
Hispanic
27
6.00
1.11
20
6.10
0.79
White
36
5.36
1.25
39
6.00
1.24
Total
82
5.59
1.25
91
5.92
1.29
Motivation to solve case
Black
19
6.11
0.99
32
5.53
1.55
Hispanic
27
5.78
1.22
20
5.45
1.67
White
36
5.08
1.25
39
5.38
1.29
Total
82
5.55
1.25
91
5.45
1.46
Ratings of feedback accuracy
Black
19
3.84
2.65
32
4.16
2.53
Hispanic
27
4.00
2.54
20
4.15
2.58
White
36
3.75
2.18
39
4.08
2.46
Total
82
3.85
2.39
91
4.12
2.49
Reaction to feedback
Black
19
4.84
2.32
32
5.31
2.28
Hispanic
27
5.48
2.49
20
5.40
1.93
White
36
4.86
1.48
39
5.13
2.26
Total
82
5.06
2.05
91
5.25
2.18

Dental Pain (DP)
Police investigator
Journalist
n
Mean
SD
n
Mean
SD
28
29
33
90

6.07
6.21
5.67
5.97

0.81
1.08
1.32
1.12

22
19
35
76

5.77
6.00
6.11
5.99

1.31
1.45
1.13
1.26

28
29
33
90

5.93
5.90
5.73
5.84

1.39
1.24
1.63
1.42

22
19
35
76

5.18
5.32
5.86
5.53

1.71
1.57
1.38
1.54

28
29
33
90

4.07
4.34
4.30
4.24

2.52
2.41
2.76
2.55

22
19
35
76

3.68
4.42
4.03
4.03

2.70
1.98
2.47
2.41

28
29
33
90

5.39
6.00
5.45
5.61

2.04
2.12
2.14
2.10

22
19
35
76

4.91
4.63
5.11
4.93

2.09
2.01
1.89
1.96
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Affective response (1 = most negative;
7 = most positive)

7
6
5
Fair Outcome

4

Unfair Outcome
3
2
1
Dental Pain

Mortality Salience

Figure 1. Graph of predicted main effect of case outcome and interaction between prime and
case outcome on affective reactions to the outcome of the case, in Study 1.
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Derogation of the suspect (1 = lowest
derogation; 9 = highest derogation)

9
8
7
6

Investigator & OG
Journalist & OG

5

Investigator & IG

4

Journalist & IG

3
2
1
Dental Pain

Mortality Salience

Figure 2. Graph of predicted three-way interaction for Study 2 between prime, group
membership, and racial group membership on measures of derogation of the suspect.
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Probability of guilt (1 = lowest
probability; 9 = highest probability)

9
8
7
6
Mortality Salience

5

Dental Pain

4
3
2
1
White Suspect

Hispanic Suspect

Black Suspect

Figure 3. Graph of the predicted two-way interaction for Study 2 between prime and race of the
suspect on judgment of guilt.
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DP

Probability of guilt (0 = not guilty at all; 100 =
completely guilty)

MS
80
70

61.911

64.25b2

64.32a

64.233
60.66c

56.56

60

57.88
50
40

49.16a1

47.93bc

Black

Hispanic

54.25

54.59

White

Black

51.0523

30
20
Police investigator

Hispanic

White

Journalist

Note. Shared letter superscripts indicate significant differences at p < .05. Shared number superscripts indicate significant
differences at p < .05
Figure 4. Graph of the three-way interaction found in Study 2 between prime, suspect race, and professional group membership on
probability of guilt.
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MS

DP

Negative impressions of the suspect
(1 = least negative; 9 = most negative)

9
8

7
6

5

6.56aeg
6.2ch

6.33bd

5.95

6.08f
5.57

5.18
4.48dg

4
3.5ac
3

4.17bfh

4.7e
4.56

5.24
4.52

4.44

3.33

2
1
Suspect first

Suspect second

High ID (Police investigator)

Low ID (Police investigator)

High ID (Journalist)

Low ID (Journalist)

Suspect first

Suspect second

Note. Shared superscripts indicate significant differences at p < .05
Figure 5. Graph of the four-way interaction found in Study 2 between prime, order of presentation, level of professional identification,
and professional group membership on negative impressions of the suspect.
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Out-group

In-group

Positive impressions of the suspect
(1 = least positive; 9 = most positive)

9
8
7
6
5
4

3.47

3.05a
3

3.2b

3.34c
2.7d

2

3.64d
2.99

2.1abc
1
Suspect first
High ID

Suspect second

Suspect first

Suspect second

Low ID

Note. Shared superscripts indicate significant differences at p < .05
Figure 6. Graph of the three-way interaction found in Study 2 between racial group membership, order of presentation, and level of
professional identification on positive impressions of the suspect.
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Out-group

In-group

Perceived similarity to the suspect
(1 = least similar; 9 = most similar)

9
8
7
6
5
4
3

3.1c

2.68a

3.42
2.95b
3.23

2.82
2

2.51

1.48abc
1
Suspect first
High ID

Suspect second

Suspect first

Suspect second

Low ID

Note. Shared superscripts indicate significant differences at p < .05
Figure 7. Graph of the three-way interaction found in Study 2 between racial group membership, order of presentation, and level of
professional identification on perceived similarity to the suspect.
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APPENDIX A. Bogus Personality Assessment5
EPQR-A questionnaire (Francis, Brown, & Philipchalk, 1992)
Please select Yes or No to answer each question about yourself in general.
1. Does your mood often go up and down? **
2. Are you a talkative person?
3. Would being in debt worry you? **
4. Are you rather lively?
5. Were you ever greedy by helping yourself to more than your share of anything?
6. Would you take drugs which may have strange or dangerous effects?
7. Have you ever blamed someone for doing something you knew was really your fault? **
8. Do you always practice what you preach? **
9. Do you prefer to go your own way rather than act by the rules? **
10. Do you often feel ‘fed-up’? **
11. Have you ever taken anything (even a pin or button) that belonged to someone else?
12. Would you call yourself a nervous person?
13. Do you think marriage is old-fashioned and should be done away with? **
14. Can you easily get some life into a rather dull party?
15. Are you a worrier?
16. Do you tend to keep in the background on social occasions? **
17. Does it worry you if you know there are mistakes in your work?
18. Have you ever cheated at a game?
19. Do you suffer from ‘nerves’?
20. Have you ever taken advantage of someone? **
21. Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people? **
22. Do you often feel lonely?
23. Is it better to follow society’s rules than go your own way?
24. Do other people think of you as being very lively? **
Belief in a Just World Scale (Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987)
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements by choosing the item
on the scale corresponding to your belief6.
1. I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice.
2. I firmly believe that injustices in all areas of life (e.g., professional, family, politics) are the
exception rather than the rule.
3. I think that people try to be fair when making important decisions.
4. I am convinced in the long run people will be compensated for injustices.
5. I believe that, by and large, people get what they fairly deserve.
6. I think basically the world is a just place.
5
6

Questions that were included in Study 1 are marked **. All questions were included in Study 2.
Participants responded on a 7-point scale from “totally disagree” to “totally agree”
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OCEAN questionnaire (McCrae & Costa, 1987)
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe
yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as
you are, and roughly your same age7.
1. I am the life of the party **
2. I feel little concern for others **
3. I am always prepared **
4. I get stressed out easily **
5. I have a rich vocabulary
6. I don't talk a lot **
7. I am interested in people **
8. I leave my belongings around **
9. I am relaxed most of the time **
10. I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas **
11. I feel comfortable around people **
12. I insult people
13. I pay attention to details **
14. I worry about things **
15. I have a vivid imagination **
16. I keep in the background
17. I sympathize with others' feelings
18. I make a mess of things
19. I seldom feel blue
20. I am not interested in abstract ideas
21. I start conversations
22. I am not interested in other people's problems
23. I get chores done right away
24. I am easily disturbed
25. I have excellent ideas **
26. I have little to say
27. I have a soft heart
28. I often forget to put things back in their proper place
29. I get upset easily
30. I do not have a good imagination

7

Participants responded on a 5-point scale from “very accurate” to “very inaccurate”
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Priming manipulation
The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment
This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality assessment. Recent research
suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell us a considerable amount
about the individual’s personality. Your responses to this survey will be content-analyzed in
order to assess certain dimensions of your personality. Your honest responses to the following
questions will be appreciated.
1. Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of [your own death/ going to the dentist]
arouses in you.
2. Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically
[die/go to the dentist] and once you are physically [dead/at the dentist].

Word search distraction task
Find and write down 6 words in this puzzle that have more than 3 letters. The words can be in
any direction.
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Word stem completion task (Manipulation check for the MS manipulation)
Please complete the following by filling letters in the blanks to create words. Please fill in the
blanks with the first word that comes to mind, as fast as you can. If you cannot think of a word,
move on to the next word. Some words may be plural.
1. BUR _ _ D (buried)
2. PL _ _
3. _ _ OK
4. WAT _ _
5. DE _ _ (dead)
6. MU _ _
7. _ _ NG
8. B _ T _ LE

9. M _ J _ R
10. P _ _ TURE
11. FL _ W _ R
12. GRA _ _ (grave)
13. K _ _ GS
14. CHA _ _
15. CO _ _ SE
(corpse)
16. TAB _ _

17. W _ _ DOW
18. TR _ _
19. P _ P _ R
20. COFF _ _ (coffin)
21. _ O _ SE
22. POST _ _
23. R _ DI _
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APPENDIX B. Study 1 – Case File
The personality portion of the survey is now over.
You are now going to read the case file for a police investigation of an armed robbery case. All
names in this case have been removed for anonymity purposes. Suspect #1 is referred to as M.
While reading through the materials, please imagine that you are the lead investigator in this
case. You responded to the initial call with your partner, Officer Young. You are responsible for
making the decisions in the investigation and you are responsible for the outcome of this case.
The materials you are about to read are what you have collected so far.
Please review the pages carefully, as the website does not permit you to go back to previously
viewed pages.
As you review the case, feel free to take notes to help with your investigation.
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APPENDIX C. Study 1 – Lines of Investigation Dependent Variables
If you had to investigate this case over again, knowing what you now know, would you gather
more evidence before sending this case to the prosecutor? (Very Unlikely to Very Likely, 7-point
scale)

If you could investigate this case over, how useful would you find pursuing each of the following
lines of evidence?
Incriminating lines:
1. Interrogating M. to try to get him to confess to committing the crime.
2. Looking through J.'s apartment for more physical evidence tying M. to the crime.
3. Questioning M.'s cousins further to poke holes in his alibi.
4. Searching M.'s criminal record to find similar past offenses.
Exonerating lines:
1. Asking M. if he had any enemies who might have tried to frame him.
2. Questioning J.'s family and friends to find if anyone other than M. might have a motive to hurt
her.
3. Having J. tested to identify any residual effects from the traumatic brain injury that might have
distorted her memory of the crime.
4. Questioning J. about other potential suspects.
Neutral lines:
1. Trying to locate the cell phone and/or laptop.
2. Sending M. for a psychological evaluation.
3. Finding out what the make and model B.'s car was.
4. Interviewing M.'s Aunt.

If you had to investigate this case over again, knowing what you now know, would you gather
more evidence before sending this case to the prosecutor? (Open-ended)
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Appendix D. Demographics Questionnaire
What is your gender?
 Male
 Female
 Other
What is your age? ____________________
What is your race?
 White/Caucasian
 Black/African American
 Hispanic
 Asian
 Native American
 Pacific Islander
 Other (please specify) ____________________
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
 Less than High School
 High School / GED
 Some College
 2-year College Degree
 4-year College Degree
 Masters Degree
 Doctoral Degree
 Professional Degree (JD, MD)
 Other
What is your employment status?
 Full time
 Part time
 Student
 Retired
 Unemployed
 Other (please specify) ____________________
How would you evaluate your political views?
 Liberal
 Slightly Liberal
 Slightly Conservative
 Conservative
 Other

147
Appendix E. Study 2 – Sample Case File
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Appendix F. Study 2 and Feedback Pilot – Self-esteem Scales and PANAS
Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965)
Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Please indicate
how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement8.
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
2. At times I think I am no good at all. (R)
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. (R)
6. I certainly feel useless at times. (R)
7. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. (R)
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. (R)
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
Social self-esteem subscale of Heatherton and Polivy’s State self-esteem scale (1991)9
This is a questionnaire designed to measure what you are thinking at this moment. There is, of
course, no right answer for any statement. The best answer is what you feel is true of yourself at
this moment. Be sure to answer all of the items, even if you are not certain of the best answer.
Again, answer these questions as they are true for you RIGHT NOW10.
1. I feel confident about my abilities.
2. I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure. (R)
3. I feel that others respect and admire me.
4. I feel self-conscious. (R)
5. I feel displeased with myself. (R)
6. I feel good about myself.
7. I am worried about what other people think of me. (R)
8. I feel inferior to others at this moment. (R)
9. I feel concerned about the impression I am making. (R)
10. I am worried about looking foolish. (R)

8

Participants responded on a 4-point scale from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”. In the
personality feedback pilot, questions were split between even and odd numbers. Half of the
participants were asked the even numbered questions as a pretest and odd numbers as a posttest
the other half saw the odd numbered questions as pretest and even numbered questions as
posttest.
9

Used only to pilot the personality feedback
Participants responded on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 2 = a little bit, 3 = somewhat, 4 = very
much, and 5 = extremely). Questions were also split in half (by even and odd question numbers)
and order of which half was used as a pretest and posttest was counterbalanced.
10
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PANAS (Watson et al., 1988)
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each
item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent
you generally feel this way, that is, how you feel at this time. Use the following scale to record
your answers11.
Interested
Distressed
Excited
Upset

11

Strong
Guilty
Scared
Hostile

Enthusiastic
Proud
Irritable
Alert

Ashamed
Inspired
Nervous
Determined

Attentive
Jittery
Active
Afraid

Participants responded on a 5-point scale from “Very slightly or not at all” to “Extremely”.
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Appendix G. Names Pilot – Questionnaire
We are trying to gather people's honest first impressions of different names. You will be
presented with six different names. Please indicate on the scales presented how much you
disagree or agree with the statements about each name12.

1. I dislike this name
2. This name seems different
3. I think that this person is wealthy
4. I think this is a good name
5. This name does not seem unique
6. I believe this individual would be from a lower social class
7. I think this name is unusual
8. I would highly recommend this name
9. I would expect a person with this name to be White
10. I would expect a person with this name to be Black
11. I would expect a person with this name to be Hispanic

12

Participants responded on a 7-point scale from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”.
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Appendix H. Study 2 – Feedback Manipulation and Case Instructions
Personality feedback for the police investigator group
Based on your responses to the previous questionnaires we assessed your personality on several
factors and found that you would be well matched for a career as a police investigator.
Your personality is similar to others who have gone into law enforcement and related fields and
have done extremely well.
Given your personality profile, for this study, we are asking you and others like you to use your
natural abilities and play the part of a police investigator.

Personality feedback for the journalist group
Based on your responses to the previous questionnaires we assessed your personality on several
factors and found that you would be well matched for a career as a journalist.
Your personality is similar to others who have gone into journalism and related fields and have
done extremely well.
Given your personality profile, for this study, we are asking you and others like you to use your
natural abilities and play the part of a journalist.

Instructions for the police investigator group
The personality portion of the survey is now over.
You are now going to read the case file for the investigation of an armed robbery. Last names in
this case have been removed for anonymity purposes.
Because of your personality profile, for this study, we are asking you and others like you to use
your natural abilities and take on the role of a police investigator.
While reading through the materials, imagine that you are the lead police investigator on this
case. Please take a moment to think about what being a police investigator entails.
The materials you are about to read are what you and your partner Officer Young have collected
so far.
Please review the pages carefully, as the website does not permit you to go back to previously
viewed pages. As you review the case, feel free to take notes to help with your investigation.
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Instructions for the journalist group
The personality portion of the survey is now over.
You are now going to read the case file for the investigation of an armed robbery. Last names in
this case have been removed for anonymity purposes.
Because of your personality profile, for this study, we are asking you and others like you to use
your natural abilities and take on the role of a journalist.
While reading through the materials, imagine that you are a journalist gathering information
from the case for a report you are writing about it. Please take a moment to think about what
being a journalist entails.
The materials you are about to read are what the investigators have collected so far.
Please review the pages carefully, as the website does not permit you to go back to previously
viewed pages. As you review the case, feel free to take notes to help with your report.
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Appendix I. Study 2 – Measures of Level of Group Identification
Questions were rated on 9-point scales.
Questions 1-7: 1 = not at all, 9 = very much
Question 8: 1 = not favorable at all, 9 = very favorable

This series of questions was asked using the professional group identification participants were
randomly assigned to (i.e., police investigator, or journalist).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

How much would you stand up for [the police/journalists]?
How much do you identify with being a [police investigator/journalist]?
How much of a feeling of belonging do you have as a [police investigator/journalist]?
How important was being a [police investigator/journalist] to your sense of self?
How much did you like being a [police investigator/journalist] as a whole?
How similar do you feel to [police investigators/journalists]?
How well do you feel you fit as a [police investigator/journalist]?
What is your overall impression of [the police/journalists]?

This series of questions was asked using the race participants identified as (i.e., Black, Hispanic,
or White).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

How much would you stand up for [Black/Hispanic/White] people?
How much do you identify with being [Black/Hispanic/White]?
How much of a feeling of belonging do you have as a [Black/Hispanic/White] person?
How important is being [Black/Hispanic/White] to your sense of self?
How much do you like being [Black/Hispanic/White] as a whole?
How similar do you feel to [Black/Hispanic/White] people?
How well do you feel you fit as a [Black/Hispanic/White] person?
What is your overall impression of [Black/Hispanic/White] people?

159
References
Aberson, C. L., Healy, M., & Romero, V. (2000). Ingroup bias and self-esteem: A meta-analysis.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 157-173. doi:
10.1207/S15327957PSPR0402_04
Alison, L., Doran, B., Long, M. L., Power, N., & Humphrey, A. (2013). The effects of subjective
time pressure and individual differences on hypotheses generation and action
prioritization in police investigations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 19,
83-93. doi: 10.1037/a0032148
Allport, G. W., & Postman, L. (1947). The psychology of rumor. Oxford, UK: Henry Holt.
Anderson, V. N. (1992). For whom is this world just? Sexual orientation and AIDS. Journal of
Applied Social Psychology, 22, 248-259. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1992.tb01538.x
Ankony, R. C., & Kelley, T. M. (1999). The impact of perceived alienation on police officers'
sense of mastery and subsequent motivation for proactive enforcement. Policing: An
International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 22, 120-134. doi:
10.1108/13639519910271193
Arndt, J., & Greenberg, J. (1999). The effects of a self-esteem boost and mortality salience on
responses to boost relevant and irrelevant worldview threats. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1331-1341. doi: 10.1177/0146167299259001
Arndt, J., Allen, J. J. B., & Greenberg, J. (2001). Traces of terror: Subliminal death primes and
facial electromyographic indices of affect. Motivation and Emotion, 25, 253-277. doi:
10.1023/A:1012276524327
Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (1997). Suppression, accessibility of
death-related thoughts, and cultural worldview defense: Exploring the psychodynamics of

160
terror management. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 5-18. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.73.1.5
Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Simon, L. (1997). Suppression,
accessibility of death-related thoughts, and cultural worldview defense: Exploring the
psychodynamics of terror management. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
73, 5-18. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.73.1.5
Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Schimel, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (2002). To belong or not to
belong, that is the question: Terror Management and identification with gender and
ethnicity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 26-43. doi: 10.1037//00223514.83.1.26
Arndt, J., Lieberman, J. D., Cook, A., & Solomon, S. (2005). Terror management in the
courtroom: Exploring the effects of Mortality Salience on legal decision making.
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 11, 407-438. doi: 10.1037/1076-8971.11.3.407
Ask, K., & Granhag, P. A. (2005). Motivational sources of confirmation bias in criminal
investigations: the need for cognitive closure. Journal of Investigative Psychology and
Offender Profiling, 2, 43-63. doi: 10.1002/jip.19
Ask, K., & Granhag, P. A. (2007a). Hot cognition in investigative judgments: The differential
influence of anger and sadness. Law and Human Behavior, 31, 537-551. doi:
10.1007/s10979-006-9075-3
Ask, K., & Granhag, P. A. (2007b). Motivational bias in criminal investigators' judgments of
witness reliability. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 37, 561-591. doi:
10.1111/j.1559-1816.2007.00175.x

161
Ask, K., Granhag, P. A., & Rebelius, A. (2011). Investigators under influence: How social norms
activate goal‐directed processing of criminal evidence. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25,
548-553. doi: 10.1002/acp.1724
Ask, K., & Pina, A. (2011). On being angry and punitive: How anger alters perception of
criminal intent. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2, 494-499. doi:
10.1177/1948550611398415
Ask, K., Rebelius, A., & Granhag, P. A. (2008). The ‘elasticity’ of criminal evidence: A
moderator of investigator bias. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 22, 1245-1259. doi:
10.1002/acp.1432
Balch, R. W. (1972). The police personality: Fact or fiction. Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, 63, 106-119. doi: 10.2307/1142281
Barsky, A., & Kaplan, S. A. (2007). If you feel bad, it's unfair: a quantitative synthesis of affect
and organizational justice perceptions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 286-295. doi:
10.1037/0021-9010.92.1.286
Bassili, J. N., & Smith, M. C. (1986). On the spontaneity of trait attribution: Converging
evidence for the role of cognitive strategy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
50, 239-245. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.50.2.239
Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: Clinical, experimental, and theoretical aspects. New York, NY:
Harper & Row.
Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York, NY: Free Press.
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). Are Emily and Brendan more employable than Latoya
and Tyrone? Evidence on racial discrimination in the labor market from a large
randomized experiment. American Economic Review, 94, 991-1013.

162
Bierhoff, H. W., Klein, R., & Kramp, P. (1991). Evidence for the altruistic personality from data
on accident research. Journal of Personality, 59, 263-280. doi: 10.1111/14676494.ep9107221719
Billig, M., & Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 3, 27-52. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420030103
Bodenhausen, G. V. (1988). Stereotypic biases in social decision making and memory: Testing
process models of stereotype use. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 726737. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.55.5.726
Bornstein, R. F. (1989). Exposure and affect: Overview and meta-analysis of research, 19681987. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 265-289. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.106.2.265
Branscombe, N. R., & Wann, D. L. (1994). Collective self‐esteem consequences of outgroup
derogation when a valued social identity is on trial. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 24, 641-657. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420240603
Burke, B. L., Martens, A., & Faucher, E. H. (2010). Two decades of Terror Management Theory:
A meta-analysis of mortality salience research. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 14, 155-195. doi: 10.1177/1088868309352321
Capozza, D., & Brown, R. (2000). Social identity processes: Trends in theory and research.
London, UK: Sage.
Castano, E. (2004). In case of death, cling to the in-group. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 34, 375-384. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.211
Castano, E., Yzerbyt, V., & Paladino, M. (2004). Transcending oneself through social
identification. In J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, & T. A. Pyszczynski (Eds.), Handbook of
experimental existential psychology (pp. 305-321). New York, NY: The Guilford Press.

163
Castano, E., Yzerbyt, V., Paladino, M., & Sacchi, S. (2002). I belong, therefore, I exist: in-group
identification, in-group entitativity, and in-group bias. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 28, 135-143. doi: 10.1177/0146167202282001
Chopik, W. J., & Edelstein, R. S. (2014). Death of a salesman: Webpage-based manipulations of
mortality salience. Computers in Human Behavior, 31, 94-99. doi:
10.1016/j.chb.2013.10.022
Cook, A., Arndt, J., & Lieberman, J. D. (2004). Firing back at the backfire effect: The influence
of mortality salience and nullification beliefs on reactions to inadmissible evidence. Law
and Human Behavior, 28, 389-410. doi: 10.1023/B:LAHU.0000039332.21386.f4
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. W. (2002). The police officer’s dilemma:
Using ethnicity to disambiguate potentially threatening individuals. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1314-1329. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1314
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. W., Sadler, M. S., & Keesee, T. (2007).
Across the thin blue line: Police officers and racial bias in the decision to shoot. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 1006-1023. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.92.6.1006
Cotton, J. L., O'Neill, B. S., & Griffin, A. (2008). The “name game”: Affective and hiring
reactions to first names. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 23, 18-39. doi:
10.1108/02683940810849648
Crawley, D., & Suarez, R. (2016). Empathy, Social Dominance Orientation, Mortality Salience,
and perceptions of a criminal defendant. SAGE Open, 6, 1-15. doi:
10.1177/2158244016629185

164
Crocker, J., & Schwartz, I. (1985). Prejudice and ingroup favoritism in a minimal intergroup
situation effects of self-esteem. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11, 379-386.
doi: 10.1177/0146167285114004
Dalbert, C., Lipkus, I. M., Sallay, H., & Goch, I. (2001). A just and an unjust world: Structure
and validity of different world beliefs. Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 561577. doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00055-6
Dalbert, C., Montada, L., & Schmitt, M. (1987). Belief in a just world: Validation correlates of 2
scales. Psychologische Beitrage, 29, 596-615.
Das, E., Bushman, B. J., Bezemer, M. D., Kerkhof, P., & Vermeulen, I. E. (2009). How terrorism
news reports increase prejudice against outgroups: A terror management account. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 453-459. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2008.12.001
Dean, G., Fahsing, I. A., & Gottschalk, P. (2006). Profiling police investigative thinking: A study
of police officers in Norway. International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 34, 221-228.
doi: 10.1016/j.ijsl.2006.09.002
Dean, G., Fahsing, I. A., & Gottschalk, P. (2007). Creativity as a determinant of thinking style in
police investigations. International Journal of Police Science & Management, 9, 112121. doi: 10.1350/ijps.2007.9.2.112
Dechesne, M., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., Ransom, S., Sheldon, K. M., van Knippenberg, A., &
Janssen, J. (2003). Literal and symbolic immortality: The effect of evidence of literal
immortality on self-esteem striving in response to mortality salience. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 722-737. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.84.4.722
Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5-18. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.56.1.5

165
Devine, D. J., Clayton, L. D., Dunford, B. B., Seying, R., & Pryce, J. (2001). Jury decision
making: 45 years of empirical research on deliberating groups. Psychology, Public
Policy, and Law, 7, 622-727. doi: 10.1037/1076-8971.7.3.622
Dixon, J. C., & Rosenbaum, M. S. (2004). Nice to know you? Testing contact, cultural, and
group threat theories of anti-Black and anti-Hispanic stereotypes. Social Science
Quarterly, 85, 257-280. doi: 10.1111/j.0038-4941.2004.08502003.x
Duncan, B. L. (1976). Differential social perception and attribution of intergroup violence:
Testing the lower limits of stereotyping of Blacks. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 34, 590-598. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.34.4.590
Eberhardt, J. L., Davies, P. G., Purdie-Vaughns, V. J., & Johnson, S. L. (2006). Looking
deathworthy: Perceived stereotypicality of Black defendants predicts capital-sentencing
outcomes. Psychological Science, 17, 383-386. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01716.x
Eerland, A., & Rassin, E. (2012). Biased evaluation of incriminating and exonerating (non)
evidence. Psychology, Crime & Law, 18, 351-358. doi: 10.1080/1068316X.2010.493889
Ellemers, N., & Haslam, S. A. (2012). Social Identity Theory. In P. A. M. Van Lange, A. W.
Kruglanski, & T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of theories of social psychology (pp. 379398). London, UK: Sage.
Epstein, S. (1995). Integration of the cognitive and psychodynamic unconscious. American
Psychologist, 49, 709-724. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.49.8.709
Evans, J. (1989). Bias in human reasoning: Causes and consequences. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Fahsing, I., & Ask, K. (2013). Decision making and decisional tipping points in homicide
investigations: An interview study of British and Norwegian detectives. Journal of
Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 10, 155-165. doi: 10.1002/jip.1384

166
Fahsing, I. A., & Ask, K. (2016a). In search of the detective personality: Police recruits’ logical
reasoning and ability to generate investigative hypotheses. Manuscript submitted for
publication.
Fahsing, I., & Ask, K. (2016b). The making of an expert detective: the role of experience in
English and Norwegian police officers’ investigative decision-making. Psychology,
Crime & Law, 22, 203-223. doi: 10.1080/1068316X.2015.1077249
Fein, S., & Spencer, S. J. (1997). Prejudice as self-image maintenance: Affirming the self
through derogating others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 31-44. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.73.1.31
Findley, K. A. (2012). Tunnel vision. In B. L. Cutler (Ed), Conviction of the innocent: Lessons
from psychological research (pp. 303-323). Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association. doi: 10.1037/13085-000
Findley, K. A., & Scott, M. S. (2006). The multiple dimensions of tunnel vision in criminal
cases. Wisconsin Law Review, 2006, 291-397.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2013). Social cognition: From brains to culture. London, UK:
Sage.
Florian, V., & Mikulincer, M. (1997). Fear of death and the judgment of social transgressions: A
multidimensional test of terror management theory. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 73, 369-380. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.73.2.369
Florian, V., & Mikulincer, M. (1998). Terror management in childhood: Does death
conceptualization moderate the effects of mortality salience on acceptance of similar and
different others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 1104-1112. doi:
10.1177/01461672982410007

167
Florian, V., Mikulincer, M., & Hirschberger, G. (2001). An existentialist view on mortality
salience effects: Personal hardiness, death-thought accessibility, and cultural worldview
defence. British Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 437-453. doi:
10.1348/014466601164911
Francis, L. J., Brown, L. B., & Philipchalk, R. (1992). The development of an abbreviated form
of the Revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQR-A): Its use among students in
England, Canada, the U.S.A. and Australia. Personality and Individual Differences, 13,
443-449. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(92)90073-X
Fryer Jr, R. G., & Levitt, S. D. (2004). The causes and consequences of distinctively black
names. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 767-805. doi: 10.3386/w9938
Furnham, A. (2003). Belief in a just world: Research progress over the past decade. Personality
and Individual Differences, 34, 795-817. doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(02)00072-7
Gailliot, M. T., Stillman, T. F., Schmeichel, B. J., Maner, J. K., & Plant, E. A. (2008). Mortality
salience increases adherence to salient norms and values. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 34, 993-1003. doi: 10.1177/0146167208316791
Giannakakis, A. E., & Fritsche, I. (2011). Social identities, group norms, and threat: On the
malleability of ingroup bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 82-93. doi:
10.1177/0146167210386120
Glaser, J., Martin, K. D., & Kahn, K. B. (2015). Possibility of death sentence has divergent effect
on verdicts for Black and White defendants. Law and Human Behavior, 39, 539-546. doi:
10.1037/lhb0000146
Gollwitzer, P. M., & Bargh, J. A. (Eds.) (1996). The psychology of action: Linking cognition and
motivation to behavior. New York, NY: Guilford.

168
Gollwitzer, P. M., Fujita, K., & Oettingen, G. (2004). Planning and the implementation of goals.
In R. F. Baumeister & K. D. Vohs (Eds.), Handbook of self-regulation: research, theory,
and applications (pp. 211-228). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Gollwitzer, P. M., Heckhausen, H., & Steller, B. (1990). Deliberative and implemental mindsets: Cognitive tuning toward congruous thoughts and information. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 1119-1127. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.59.6.1119
Goodman-Delahunty, J., Martschuk, N., & Ockenden, E. (2015). Effects of terrorist charges and
threatening conduct on mock jurors’ decisions. Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law, 22, 113. doi: 10.1080/13218719.2015.1120247
Graham, S., & Lowery, B. S. (2004). Priming unconscious racial stereotypes about adolescent
offenders. Law and Human Behavior, 28, 483-504. doi:
10.1023/B:LAHU.0000046430.65485.1f
Gray-Little, B., Williams, V.S.L., & Hancock, T. D. (1997). An item response theory analysis of
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 443451. doi: 10.1177/0146167297235001
Greenberg, J. (2008). Understanding the vital human quest for self-esteem. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 3, 48-55. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00061.x
Greenberg, J., Arndt, J., Simon, L., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S., (2000). Proximal and distal
defenses in response to reminders of one’s mortality: Evidence of a temporal sequence.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 91-99. doi: 10.1177/0146167200261009
Greenberg, J., & Kosloff, S. (2008). Terror Management Theory: Implications for understanding
prejudice, stereotyping, intergroup conflict, and political attitudes. Social and Personality
Psychology Compass, 2, 1881-1894. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00144.x

169
Greenberg, J., Martens, A., Jonas, E., Eisenstadt, D., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (2003).
Psychological defense in anticipation of anxiety: Eliminating the potential for anxiety
eliminates the effect of mortality salience on worldview defense. Psychological Science,
14, 516-519. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.03454
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (1986). The causes and consequences of a need
for self-esteem: A terror management theory. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), Public Self and
Private Self (pp. 189-212). New York: Springer-Verlag.
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Pinel, E., Simon, L., & Jordan, K. (1993). Effects of
self-esteem on vulnerability-denying defensive distortions: Further evidence of an
anxiety-buffering function of self-esteem. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
29, 229-251. doi:10.1006/jesp.1993.1010
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Rosenblatt, A., Veeder, M., Kirkland, S., & Lyon,
D. (1990). Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality salience on
reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 58, 308-318. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.58.2.308
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Simon, L., & Breus, M. (1994). Role of
consciousness and accessibility of death-related thoughts in mortality salience effects.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 627-637. doi: 10.1037/00223514.67.4.627
Greenberg, J., Simon, L., Harmon‐Jones, E., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Lyon, D. (1995).
Testing alternative explanations for mortality salience effects: Terror management, value
accessibility, or worrisome thoughts? European Journal of Social Psychology, 25, 417433. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420250406

170
Greenberg, J., Simon, L., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Chatel, D. (1992). Terror management
and tolerance: Does mortality salience always intensify negative reactions to others who
threaten one's worldview? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 212-220.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.63.2.212
Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Arndt, J. (2008). A basic but uniquely human motivation: Terror
management. In J. Y. Shah & W. L. Gardner (Eds.), Handbook of motivation science (pp.
114-134). New York, NY: Guilford.
Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Pyszczynski, T. (1997). Terror Management Theory of selfesteem and cultural worldviews: Empirical assessments and conceptual refinements.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 61-139. doi: 10.1016/S00652601(08)60016-7
Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., Rosenblatt, A., Burling, J., Lyon, D., ... & Pinel, E.
(1992). Why do people need self-esteem? Converging evidence that self-esteem serves an
anxiety-buffering function. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 913-922.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.63.6.913
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. (1998). Measuring individual differences in
implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74, 1464-1480. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464
Greenwald, A. G., Oakes, M. A., & Hoffman, H. G. (2003). Targets of discrimination: Effects of
race on responses to weapons holders. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39,
399-405. doi: 10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00020-9

171
Gruman, J. C., & Sloan, R. P. (1983). Disease as justice: Perceptions of the victims of physical
illness. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 4, 39-46. doi:
10.1207/s15324834basp0401_4
Hafer, C. L., & Bègue, L. (2005). Experimental research on Just-World Theory: Problems,
developments, and future challenges. Psychological Bulletin, 131, 128-167. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.131.1.128
Hagan, J. (1987). Review article: A great truth in the study of crime. Criminology, 25, 421-428.
doi: 10.1111/j.1745-9125.1987.tb00804.x
Haidt, J. (2007). The new synthesis in moral psychology. Science, 316, 998-1002. doi:
10.1126/science.1137651
Halloran, M. J., & Kashima, E. S. (2004). Social identity and worldview validation: The effects
of ingroup identity primes and mortality salience on value endorsement. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 915-925. doi: 10.1177/0146167204264080
Harmon-Jones, E., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Simon, L. (1996). The effects of mortality
salience on intergroup bias between minimal groups. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 26, 677-681. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.72.1.24
Harmon-Jones, E., Simon, L., Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & McGregor, H.
(1997). Terror Management Theory and self-esteem: Evidence that increased self-esteem
reduced mortality salience effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 2436. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.72.1.24
Hayes, J., Schimel, J., Arndt, J., & Faucher, E. H. (2010). A theoretical and empirical review of
the death-thought accessibility concept in terror management research. Psychological
Bulletin, 136, 699-739. doi: 10.1037/a0020524

172
Heatherton, T. F., & Polivy, J. (1991). Development and validation of a scale for measuring state
self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 895-910. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.60.6.895
Heine, S. J., Proulx, T., & Vohs, K. D. (2006). The meaning maintenance model: On the
coherence of social motivations. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 88-110.
doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr1002_1
Heuer, L., Blumenthal, E., Douglas, A., & Weinblatt, T. (1999). A deservingness approach to
respect as a relationally based fairness judgment. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 25, 1279-1292. doi: 10.1177/0146167299258009
Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. American Psychologist, 52, 1280-1300. doi:
10.1037/0003-066X.52.12.1280
Hirschberger, G. (2006). Terror management and attributions of blame to innocent victims:
Reconciling compassionate and defensive responses. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 91, 832-844. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.91.5.832
Hohman, Z. P., & Hogg, M.A. (2011). Fear and uncertainty in the face of death: The role of life
after death in group identiﬁcation. European Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 751-760.
doi: 10.1002/ejsp.818
Hohman, Z. P., & Hogg, M. A. (2015a). Fearing the uncertain: Self-uncertainty plays a role in
mortality salience. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 57, 31-42. doi:
10.1016/j.jesp.2014.11.007
Hohman, Z. P., & Hogg, M. A. (2015b). Mortality salience, self-esteem, and defense of the
group: mediating role of in-group identiﬁcation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,
45, 80-89. doi: 10.1111/jasp.12277

173
Innes, M. (2003). Investigating murder: Detective work and the police response to criminal
homicide. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Innocence Project Report. (2007). 200 exonerated: Too many wrongfully convicted. New York,
NY: Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
Ito, T. A., & Urland, G. R. (2003). Race and gender on the brain: Electrocortical measures of
attention to the race and gender of multiply categorizable individuals. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 616-626. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.85.4.616
Jeffreys, H. (1961). Theory of probability (3rd Ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Jonas, E., Martens, A., Niesta Kayser, D., Fritsche, I., Sullivan, D., & Greenberg, J. (2008).
Focus theory of normative conduct and terror-management theory: The interactive impact
of mortality salience and norm salience on social judgment. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 95, 1239-1251. doi: 10.1037/a0013593
Jonas, J., Schimel, J., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T., (2002). The Scrooge effect: evidence
that mortality salience increases prosocial attitudes and behavior. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 28, 1342-1353. doi: 10.1177/014616702236834
Juhl, J., & Routledge, C. (2015) Putting the terror in Terror Management Theory: Evidence that
the awareness of death does cause anxiety and undermine psychological well-being.
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 25, 1-16. doi: 10.1177/0963721415625218
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics
and biases. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Kappeler, V. E., Sluder, R. D., & Alpert, G. P. (1998). Forces of deviance: Understanding the
dark side of policing. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.

174
Kassin, S. M., Dror, I. E., & Kukucka, J. (2013). The forensic confirmation bias: Problems,
perspectives, and proposed solutions. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and
Cognition, 2, 42-52. doi: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2013.01.001
Kerstholt, J. H., & Eikelboom, A. R. (2007). Effects of prior interpretation on situation
assessment in crime analysis. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 20, 455-465. doi:
10.1002/bdm.570
Knight, K. M. (2010). Effects of mortality salience on the verdict and sentencing decisions of a
defendant with facial tattoos (unpublished master’s thesis). Marietta College, Marietta,
OH.
Kray, L. J., & Galinsky, A. D. (2003). The debiasing effect of counterfactual mind-sets:
Increasing the search for disconfirmatory information in group decisions. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91, 69-81. doi: 10.1016/S07495978(02)00534-4
Kruglanski, A. W., Shah, J. Y., Fishbach, A., Friedman, R., Chun, W. Y., & Sleeth-Keppler, D.
(2002). A theory of goal systems. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 34, 331378. doi: 10.1016/S0065-2601(02)80008-9
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 480-498. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480
Kunda, Z. (1999). Social cognition: Making sense of people. Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
Kunda, Z., & Spencer, S. J. (2003). When do stereotypes come to mind and when do they color
judgment? A goal-based theoretical framework for stereotype activation and application.
Psychological Bulletin, 129, 522-544. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.129.4.522

175
Landau, M. J., Greenberg, J., Sullivan, D., Routledge, C., & Arndt, J. (2009). The protective
identity: Evidence that mortality salience heightens the clarity and coherence of the selfconcept. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 796-807. doi:
10.1016/j.jesp.2009.05.013
Landau, M. J., Johns, M., Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Martens, A., Goldenberg, J. L., &
Solomon, S. (2004). A function of form: terror management and structuring the social
world. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 190-210. doi: 10.1037/00223514.87.2.190
Landau, M. J. Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., & Cook, A.
(2004). Deliver us from evil: The effects of mortality salience and reminders of 9/11 on
support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30,
1136-1150. doi: 10.1177/0146167204267988
Leka, G. E. (2015). Mortality salience effects on gender stereotype attitudes and sexism, and the
moderating effect of gender role conflicts (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from
ScholarWorks.
Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world. New York, NY: Plenum.
Lerner, M. J., & Miller, D. T. (1978). Just world research and the attribution process: Looking
back and ahead. Psychological Bulletin, 85, 1030-1051. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.85.5.1030
Lieberman, J. D., Arndt, J., Personius, J., & Cook, A. (2001). Vicarious annihilation: The effect
of mortality salience on perceptions of hate crimes. Law and Human Behavior, 25, 547566. doi: 10.1023/A:1012738706166
Martens, A., Burke, B. L., Schimel, J., & Faucher, E. H. (2011). Same but different: meta‐
analytically examining the uniqueness of mortality salience effects. European Journal of

176
Social Psychology, 41, 6-10. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.767
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1987). Validation of the five-factor model of personality across
instruments and observers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 81-90. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.52.1.81
McGregor, H. A., Lieberman, J. D., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., Simon, L., &
Pyszczynski, T. (1998). Terror management and aggression: Evidence that mortality
salience motivates aggression against worldview-threatening others. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 590-605. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.590
Navarrete, C. D., & Fessler, D. M. (2005). Normative bias and adaptive challenges: A relational
approach to coalitional psychology and a critique of terror management theory.
Evolutionary Psychology, 3, 297-325. doi: 10.1177/147470490500300121
Nelson, L. J., Moore, D. L., Olivetti, J., & Scott, T. (1997). General and personal mortality
salience and nationalistic bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 884-892.
doi: 10.1177/0146167297238008
Newman, J. P., Wolff, W. T., & Hearst, E. (1980). The feature-positive effect in adult human
subjects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 6, 630650. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.6.5.630
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: a ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of
General Psychology, 2, 175-220. doi: 10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175
Oakes, P. J. (1987). The salience of social categories. In J. C. Turner, M. A. Hogg, P. J. Oakes,
S. D. Reicher, M. S. Wetherell (Eds.), Rediscovering the social group: A selfcategorization theory (pp. 117-141). New York, NY: Basil Blackwell.

177
O’Brien, B. (2009). Prime suspect: An examination of factors that aggravate and counteract
confirmation bias in criminal investigations. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 15,
315-334. doi: 10.1037/a0017881
O'Brien, B., & Oyserman, D. (2008). It's not just what you think but also how you think about it:
The effect of situationally primed mindsets on legal judgments and decision making.
Marquette Law Review, 92, 149-172.
Paoline, E. A., Myers, S. M., & Worden, R. E. (2000). Police culture, individualism, and
community policing: Evidence from two police departments. Justice Quarterly, 17, 575605. doi: 10.1080/07418820000094671
Park, B., & Rothbart, M. (1982). Perception of out-group homogeneity and levels of social
categorization: Memory for the subordinate attributes of in-group and out-group
members. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 1051-1068. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.42.6.1051
Payne, K. B. (2001). Weapon bias. Split-second decisions and unintended stereotyping. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 15, 287-291. doi: 10.1111/j.14678721.2006.00454.x
Pickel, K. L., & Brown, J. R. (2002). Mortality salience and jurors' evaluations of criminal
defendants: The effects of thinking about one's own or another person's death. Manuscript
submitted for publication.
Pinter, B., & Greenwald, A. G. (2011). A comparison of minimal group induction procedures.
Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 14, 81-98. doi: 10.1177/1368430210375251
Pyszczynski, T., Wicklund, R. A., Floresku, S., Koch, H., Gauch, G., Solomon, S., & Greenberg,
J. (1996). Whistling in the dark: Exaggerated consensus estimates in response to

178
incidental reminders of mortality. Psychological Science, 7, 332-336. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.1996.tb00384.x
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Maxfield, M. (2006). On the unique
psychological import of the human awareness of mortality: Theme and variations.
Psychological Inquiry, 17, 328-356. doi: 10.1080/10478400701369542
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (1997). Why do we need what we need? A terror
management perspective on the roots of human social motivation. Psychological Inquiry:
An International Journal for the Advancement of Psychological Theory, 8, 1-20. doi:
10.1207/s15327965pli0801_1
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (1999). A dual-process model of defense against
conscious and unconscious death-related thoughts: An extension of terror management
theory. Psychological Review, 106, 835-845. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.106.4.835
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., & Schimel, J. (2004). Why do people
need self-esteem? A theoretical and empirical review. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 435468. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.130.3.435
Rassin, E. (2010). Blindness to alternative scenarios in evidence evaluation. Journal of
Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 7, 153-163. doi:
10.1080/1068316X.2015.1077249
Rassin, E., Eerland, A., & Kuijpers, I. (2010). Let's find the evidence: An analogue study of
confirmation bias in criminal investigations. Journal of Investigative Psychology and
Offender Profiling, 7, 231-246. doi: 10.1002/jip.126

179
Rattan, A., Levine, C. S., Dweck, C. S., & Eberhardt, J. L. (2012). Race and the fragility of legal
distinction between juveniles and adults. PLoS ONE, 7, e36680. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0036680
Rector, N. A., Bagby, R. M., & Nicholson, R. (1993). The effect of prejudice and judicial
ambiguity on defendant guilt ratings. The Journal of Social Psychology, 133, 651-659.
doi: 10.1080/00224545.1993.9713920
Renkema, L. J., Stapel, D. A., Maringer, M., & van Yperen, N. W. (2008). Terror management
and stereotyping: Why do people stereotype when mortality is salient? Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 553-564. doi: 10.1177/0146167207312465
Renkema, L. J., Stapel, D. A., & Van Yperen, N. W. (2008). Go with the flow: Conforming to
others in the face of existential threat. European Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 747756. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.468
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Rosenblatt, A., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Lyon, D. (1989). Evidence for
terror management theory: I. The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who
violate or uphold cultural values. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 681690. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.57.4.681
Routledge, C., Arndt, J., & Goldenberg, J. L. (2004). A time to tan: Proximal and distal effects of
mortality salience on sun exposure intentions. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 30, 1347-1358. doi: 10.1177/0146167204264056

180
Routledge, C., Arndt, J., Vess, M., & Sheldon, K. M. (2008). The life and death of creativity:
The effects of mortality salience on self versus social-directed creative expression.
Motivation and Emotion, 32, 331-338. doi: 10.1007/s11031-008-9108-y
Sagar, H. A., & Schofield, J. W. (1980). Racial and behavioral cues in Black and White
children's perceptions of ambiguously aggressive acts. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 39, 590-598. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.39.4.590
Schimel, J., Simon, L., Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Waxmonsky, J., & Arndt, J.
(1999). Stereotypes and terror management: Evidence that mortality salience enhances
stereotypic thinking and preferences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77,
905-926. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.77.5.905
Schimel, J., Hayes, J., Williams, T., & Jahrig, J. (2007). Is death really the worm at the core?
Converging evidence that worldview threat increases death-thought accessibility. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 789-803. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.92.5.789
Schimel, J., Wohl, M. J., & Williams, T. (2006). Terror management and trait empathy:
Evidence that mortality salience promotes reactions of forgiveness among people with
high (vs. low) trait empathy. Motivation and Emotion, 30, 217-227. doi: 10.1007/s11031006-9040-y
Schneider, D. J. (2004). The psychology of stereotypes. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Simon, L., Greenberg, J., Harmon-Jones, E., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., & Abend,
T. (1997). Terror management and cognitive-experiential self-theory: Evidence that terror
management occurs in the experiential system. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 72, 1132-1146. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.72.5.1132

181
Simon, D. (2012). In doubt: The psychology of the criminal justice process. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University
Skolnick, J. (1977). A sketch of the policeman’s “Working Personality.” In D. B. Kennedy (Ed.),
The dysfunctional alliance: Emotion and reason in justice administration (pp.10-25).
Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company.
Skolnick, J. (2000, December 19). Code Blue. The American Prospect. Retrieved from
https://prospect.org/article/code-blue
Smieja, M., Kalaska, M., & Adamczyk, M. (2006). Scared to death or scared to love? Terror
Management Theory and close relationships seeking. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 36, 279-296. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.301
Smith, T. W., & Dempsey, G. D. (1983). The polls: Ethnic social distance and prejudice. Public
Opinion Quarterly, 47, 584-600. doi: 10.1086/268819
Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (2000). Identity theory and social identity theory. Social Psychology
Quarterly, 63, 224-237.
Struch, N., & Schwartz, S. H. (1989). Intergroup aggression: Its predictors and distinctness from
in-group bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 364-373. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.56.3.364
Sue, D. W., Nadal, K. L., Capodilupo, C. M., Lin, A. I., Torino, G. C., & Rivera, D. P. (2008).
Racial microaggressions against Black Americans: Implications for counseling. Journal
of Counseling & Development, 86, 330-338. doi: 10.1002/j.1556-6678.2008.tb00517.x
Sunshine, J., & Heuer, L. (2002). Deservingness and perceptions of procedural justice in citizen
encounters with the police. In M. Ross, & D. T. Miller (Eds.), The Justice Motive in
everyday life (pp. 397-410). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

182
Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psychology, 33,
1-39. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ps.33.020182.000245
Tajfel, H., & Billig, M. (1974). Familiarity and categorization in intergroup behavior. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 10, 159-170. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(74)90064-X
Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and
intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 149-178. doi:
10.1002/ejsp.2420010202
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin,
& S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33-47).
Monterey, CA: Brooks Cole.
Taubman-Ben-Ari, O., Florian, V., & Mikulincer, M. (1999). The impact of mortality salience on
reckless driving: A test of terror management mechanisms. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 76, 35-45. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.76.1.35
Trope, Y., & Liberman, A. (1996). Social hypothesis testing: Cognitive and motivational
mechanisms. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook
of basic principles (pp. 239-270). New York, NY: Guilford.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987).
Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. New York, NY: Basil
Blackwell.
Twersky-Glasner, A. (2005). Police personality: What is it and why are they like that? Journal of
Police and Criminal Psychology, 20, 56-67. doi: 10.1007/BF02806707

183
Tyler, T. R., & Smith, H. J. (1998). Social justice and social movements. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T.
Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (pp. 595-629). New
York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
van den Berg, C., & Soeters,J. (2009). Self-perceptions of soldiers under threat: A field study of
the influence of death threat on soldiers. Military Psychology, 21, 16-30. doi:
10.1080/08995600903249081
van den Bos, K. (2001). Reactions to perceived fairness: The impact of mortality salience and
self-esteem on ratings of negative affect. Social Justice Research, 14, 1-23. doi:
10.1023/A:1012501506803
van den Bos, K., & Miedema, J. (2000). Toward understanding why fairness matters: The
influence of mortality salience on reactions to procedural fairness. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 79, 355-366. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.79.3.355
van den Bos, K., & van Prooijen, J. W. (2001). Referent cognitions theory: The role of closeness
of reference points in the psychology of voice. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 81, 616-626. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.81.4.616
van den Bos, K., Poortvliet, P. M., Maas, M., Miedema, J., & van den Ham, E. J. (2005). An
enquiry concerning the principles of cultural norms and values: The impact of uncertainty
and mortality salience on reactions to violations and bolstering of cultural worldviews.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 91-113. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2004.06.001
van Maanen, J. (1975). Police socialization: A longitudinal examination of job attitudes in an
urban police department. Administrative Science Quarterly, 20, 207-228. doi:
10.2307/2391695

184
Vess, M., Arndt, J., Cox, C. R., Routledge, C., & Goldenberg, J. L. (2009). Exploring the
existential function of religion: The effect of religious fundamentalism and mortality
salience on faith-based medical refusals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
97, 334-350. doi: 10.1037/a0015545
Viglione, J., Hannon, L., & DeFina, R. (2011). The impact of light skin on prison time for Black
female offenders. The Social Science Journal, 48, 250-258. doi:
10.1016/j.soscij.2010.08.003
Wagenaar, W. A., van Koppen, P. J., & Crombag, H. F. (1993). Anchored narratives: The
psychology of criminal evidence. New York, NY: St Martin's Press.
Wallace, W. A. (2015). The effect of confirmation bias on criminal investigative decision
making. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Walden University, Minneapolis, MN.
Wann, D. L., & Branscombe, N. R. (1990). Die-hard and fair-weather fans: Effects of
identification on BIRGing and CORFing tendencies. Journal of Sport & Social Issues,
14, 103-117. doi: 10.1177/019372359001400203
Wass, H. (1995). Death in the lives of children and adolescents. In H. Wass & R. A. Neimeyer
(Eds.), Dying: Facing the facts. Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis.
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures
of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 54, 1063-1070. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063
Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological Review, 101, 34-52.
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.101.1.34
Weiss, H. M., Suckow, K., & Cropanzano, R. (1999). Effects of justice conditions on discrete
emotions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 786-794. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.84.5.786

185
Westera, N. J., Kebbell, M. R., Milne, B., & Green, T. (2016). The prospective detective:
developing the effective detective of the future. Policing and Society, 26, 197-209. doi:
10.1080/10439463.2014.942845
Wiener, R. L., Habert, K., Shkodriani, G., & Staebler, C. (1991). The social psychology of jury
nullification: Predicting when jurors disobey the law. Journal of Applied Social
Psychology, 21, 1379-1401. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1991.tb00477.x
Wilson, T. C. (1996). Cohort and prejudice: Whites' attitudes toward Blacks, Hispanics, Jews,
and Asians. Public Opinion Quarterly, 60, 253-274. doi: 10.1086/297750
Yzerbyt, V., & Demoulin, S. (2010). Intergroup relations. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G.
Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (pp. 1024-1083). doi:
10.1002/9780470561119.socpsy002028
Zhou, X., Liu, J., Chen, C., & Yu, Z. (2008). Do children transcend death? An examination of
the terror management function of offspring. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 49,
413-418. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9450.2008.00665.x

